A formalised ontology for network attack classification by Van Heerden, Renier Pelser
A Formalised Ontology for Network
Attack Classification
Submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of Rhodes University
Renier Pelser van Heerden
Grahamstown, South Africa
April 2014
Abstract
One of the most popular attack vectors against computers are their network connections.
Attacks on computers through their networks are commonplace and have various levels
of complexity. This research formally describes network-based computer attacks in the
form of a story, formally and within an ontology. The ontology categorises network
attacks where attack scenarios are the focal class. This class consists of: Denial-of-
Service, Industrial Espionage, Web Defacement, Unauthorised Data Access, Financial
Theft, Industrial Sabotage, Cyber-Warfare, Resource Theft, System Compromise, and
Runaway Malware. This ontology was developed by building a taxonomy and a temporal
network attack model. Network attack instances (also know as individuals) are classiﬁed
according to their respective attack scenarios, with the use of an automated reasoner
within the ontology. The automated reasoner deductions are veriﬁed formally; and via
the automated reasoner, a relaxed set of scenarios is determined, which is relevant in a
near real-time environment. A prototype system (called Aeneas) was developed to classify
network-based attacks. Aeneas integrates the sensors into a detection system that can
classify network attacks in a near real-time environment. To verify the ontology and the
prototype Aeneas, a virtual test bed was developed in which network-based attacks were
generated to verify the detection system. Aeneas was able to detect incoming attacks and
classify them according to their scenario. The novel part of this research is the attack
scenarios that are described in the form of a story, as well as formally and in an ontology.
The ontology is used in a novel way to determine to which class attack instances belong
and how the network attack ontology is aﬀected in a near real-time environment.
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Introduction
1
CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
"... a science must deal with a subject and its properties."
Aristotle, 340 BC
Computers evolved from stand-alone systems, such as mainframes, to personal computers
and, more recently, smart phones that are permanently connected to the Internet. In
1969, with the establishment of the United States (US) Advanced Research Projects
Agency Network (ARPANET), computers started to communicate over long distances.
ARPANET started a process of making networking an integral part of computing (Leiner,
Cerf, Clark, Kahn, Kleinrock, Lynch, Postel, Roberts, and Wolﬀ, 2009). The concept
was already expressed in 1984 by John Gage1 in his famous phrase: "the network is the
computer" (Thornburg, 2009). With the emergence of the Internet, networking has grown
to a level where computers can instantly communicate over the whole world. Networked
computers have become standard for most companies and other technology using entities.
Computers are connected via Intranets and connected to the rest of the world though the
global Internet. A computer network is deﬁned as a single network, including computers,
servers, network equipment and other related devices, that form part of a single entity
and that are connected to the Internet.
Attacks on computers have also evolved and the Internet is now used as an attack path
as well as in attacks on the network infrastructure itself. Modern computer networks
1Chief Researcher and Vice President of the Science Office for Sun Inc. 1982-2008
2
3connect to the Internet, and are thus rendered accessible to anyone in the world. The
Internet presents four novel advantages to any attacker:
The ﬁrst is that an aggressor can initiate a network-based attack with a high level of
anonymity ensured. An aggressor can hide by forging the origin of an attack or use
intermediates in an attack (Lee and Shields, 2001). The aggressor can thus potentially
attack any computer-based network from any place, at any location in the world, thus
making the source of the attack virtually untraceable (Baba and Matsuda, 2002; Choo,
2008).
The second is that the target of a computer-based attack is usually online, thus an attack
cannot be prevented or mitigated by removing the target from the attack vector, i.e.
taking it oine. Sorin (2008) states that website and server uptime are directly related
to proﬁt, and system outages may also lead to future losses from visitors who will not
return to a site if it has been oine or inaccessible. In the movie The Social Network 2,
the Mark Zuckerberg character states how important uptime is (Mezirch, 2009; Sorkin,
2010):
"Okay, let me tell you the diﬀerence between Facebook and everyone else, we don't crash
EVER! If those servers are down for even a day, our entire reputation is irreversibly
destroyed! Users are ﬁckle, Friendster has proved that. Even a few people leaving
would reverberate through the entire userbase. The users are interconnected, that is
the whole point. College kids are online because their friends are online, and if one
domino goes, the other dominoes go, don't you get that."
This quote indicates how important uptime is for Facebook. Thus, removing a target's
ability to communicate on the Internet is also a major attack methodology or goal.
The third advantage is that any computer network of signiﬁcant size has a high probability
of security holes existing in its design or implementation (Geer, 2007; Perrow, 2008).
Although Shin and Williams (2008) only found weak evidence that software complexity
is directly related to vulnerabilities, they still concluded that vulnerable code is more
complex than other code. Harter, Kemerer, and Slaughter (2012) state that the size of
the code is a key factor that inﬂuences the quality of software, and that increasing the
complexity of software adds more ﬂaws.
The fourth and ﬁnal advantage is that many users of a computer network are not computer-
security literate, and unaware of how their ignorance can be exploited. These users render
2http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1285016/
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a whole network vulnerable (Ying, Dinglong, Haiyi, and Rau, 2007; Kritzinger and von
Solms, 2010). Rescorla (2003, 2005) determined that administrators are on average slow
to apply patches that ﬁx security holes and postulated that it might not be econom-
ically worthwhile for security researchers to ﬁnd and expose security holes (Rescorla,
2005):
". . . we cannot conclude that vulnerability ﬁnding and disclosure provides an increase
in software security suﬃcient to oﬀset the eﬀort being invested."
Choo (2008) and Shahzad, Shaﬁq, and Liu (2012) states that organisations generally do
not patch their systems with the same frequency as security vulnerabilities are made
public and that laxness in security is often used to compromise systems. Arjun (2012)
noted that people contributed to making networks vulnerable, and that if there is a choice
between usability and security, people tend to choose usability.
1.1 Problem Statement
Attacks on computer networks have become so commonplace that it has become a fact
of life (Choo, 2011). With the rise of complexity of computer networks, the attacks on
them have also become more complex and varied. Attacks on a computer network can
diﬀer signiﬁcantly. One of the popular attacks is a Denial-of-Service (DoS), which diﬀers
completely from defacing a website or stealing secrets from a networked computer. The
goal of this research is to formally deﬁne network attacks.
The secondary goal of this research is to investigate how the deﬁnition of network attacks
diﬀers in the near real-time environments. Verizon3 found that the average time for busi-
nesses and corporations to determine if they have been breached is seven months (Gliddon,
2012; Verizon RISK Team, 2012), with compromises typically being much longer.
The scope of this research will be limited to attacks on computer networks in the cyber-
sphere, occurring through computer network connections, such as Universal Serial Bus
(USB) ﬂash drives. The target of the attacks are computer networks themselves and their
component parts. Social engineering attacks such as Spam, Spear Phishing and physical
attacks also fall outside the scope of this thesis, although social engineering is included in
the taxonomy for completeness.
The speciﬁc research questions are:
3http://www.verizon.com/
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∙ What are the diﬀerent types of computer network attacks?
∙ How are such computer network attacks deﬁned?
∙ What is the impact on attacks in a near real-time environment?
The answer to the ﬁrst research question is to be evaluated by considering how well
computer network attacks are classiﬁed. The second question will be addressed when
networks attacks are formally described and modelled. The last question refers to how
attacks are impacted when they are only evaluated in near real-time and the question can
be validated by prototyping a network attack prediction system and empirically verifying
the impact of attacks in near a real-time environment.
1.2 Research Method
The research questions raised in this thesis were addressed using four research method-
ologies: formal (analytical), experimental (empirical), build (engineering) and model (sci-
entiﬁc). These methodologies are described by (Glass, 1995; Elio, Hoover, Nikolaidis,
Salavatipour, Stewart, and Wong, 2005). Models were developed to enhance the un-
derstanding of all the factors that inﬂuence a network attack. One model described the
temporal aspects of attacks, and the other model listed all the factors in the form of a
taxonomy. The relationships between the classes of a taxonomy were formally speciﬁed
in the form of an ontology in order to enable the veriﬁcation of the software implemen-
tation. The model and formal description were veriﬁed by building a software artefact,
in which the concepts were tested experimentally. The experiments proved that the
conceptual framework is viable.
1.3 Document Structure
The body of this document consists of three parts that are structured as follows:
∙ Part I contains the introduction, a history of computing attacks and a literature
study. This part supplies the background information on network attacks and in-
vestigates related work in this ﬁeld.
– Chapter 2 investigates signiﬁcant historical computer-based attacks. These
attacks are discussed and a list of attack scenarios are constructed.
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– Chapter 3 presents a literature study of related work. Models, taxonomies,
ontologies and sensors related to network attacks are investigated.
∙ Part II contains the bulk of the work, namely the development of the temporal
model, taxonomy, ontology and formal descriptions thereof.
– Chapter 4 develops a taxonomy that presents the classes of a computer
network-based attack from both the point of view of an attacker and defender.
A temporal model of network-based attacks is also presented.
– Chapter 5 presents an ontology that describes the relationships between the
taxonomy classes formally. The ontology is presented in the form of a scenario,
formally and via a software implementation. The Denial-of-Service scenario is
presented in detail.
– Chapter 6 describes in detail the ontology representation of each of the re-
maining attack scenarios, in story form, formally and as an individual within
the Protégé implementation.
∙ Part III describes the impact of the attack scenarios in near real-time. The impact
is formally explored and a reduced set of scenarios are determined.
– Chapter 7 investigates the quantiﬁcation and possible measurements of the
classes on the taxonomy in near real-time. A determination of which attack
scenarios can be quantiﬁed in near real-time is made. The Denial-of-Service
and Cyber-Warfare scenarios quantiﬁcation in near real-time are presented.
– Chapter 8 demonstrates how to identify attack scenarios by mapping sensors'
outputs to the temporal attack model and attack scenarios. A prototype system
called Aeneas is presented in this chapter. The Aeneas system classiﬁes network
attacks with respect to their related scenario and phase.
– Chapter 9 presents the environment in which the prototype system was veri-
ﬁed. Two environments are presented: visualised systems with a ﬁrewall con-
nected to the Internet and visualised systems within an Internet simulator.
The validation of the prototype is presented. The Aeneas system is validated
by performing a range of simple tests.
The document concludes with Chapter 10, which reﬂects on the research project and
on possible future work. Supplemental information is supplied in the form of appendices.
These appendices contain detailed information, and are referred to where applicable within
the main text.
1.4. RESEARCH OUTPUT 7
1.4 Research Output
This section lists the main research output of this thesis. Published conference and journal
outputs arising from this research are:
1. Grant, T., Burke, I., and van Heerden, R. P. Comparing models of offensive
cyber operations. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information-
Warfare & Security (ICIW 2012), pages 108121. ACI, 2012
2. van Heerden, R. P., Burke, I., and Irwin, B. Classifying network attack
scenarios using an ontology. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on
Information-Warfare & Security (ICIW 2012), pages 311324. ACI, 2012b
3. van Heerden, R. P., Pieterse, H., and Irwin, B. Mapping the most signifi-
cant computer hacking events to a temporal computer attack model. In International
Conference on Human Choice and Computers (HCC10): ICT Critical Infrastruc-
tures and Society, pages 226236. IFIP, Springer, 2012c
4. van Heerden, R., Leenen, L., Irwin, B., and Burke, I. A computer net-
work attack taxonomy and ontology. International Journal of Cyber Warfare and
Terrorism, 3:1225, 2012a
5. van Heerden, R., Leenen, L., and Irwin, B. Using an automated reasoner to
classify computer network attacks. In 5th Workshop on ICT Uses in Warfare and
the Safeguarding of Peace. November 2013a
6. van Heerden, R., Pieterse, H., Burke, I., and Irwin, B. Developing a vir-
tualised testbed environment in preparation for testing of network based attacks. In
5th Workshop on ICT Uses in Warfare and the Safeguarding of Peace. November
2013b
1.5 Document Conventions
In this document, some non-standard conventions are used. These include the term
near real-time and the presentations of taxonomies. The main sub-concept is that the
information presented in near real-time must be available timeously. For example, near
real-time for a meteorologist is measured in hours and minutes, while near real-time for
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a telecommunications systems would be in milliseconds. For the purpose of this thesis,
near real-time is deﬁned as within 60 seconds.
When referring to a website, the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) is listed as a foot-
note. This ensures that relevant information is available directly without obstructing the
reader's ﬂow.
Taxonomies, models and the ontology are presented in illustrations. By presenting them
as ﬁgures, the reader can surmise the information visually, without having to read through
long, detailed lists. The level of each class in the taxonomy is presented in a diﬀerent
colour and the various colours are associated with each level throughout this document.
Figure 1.1 illustrates ﬁve levels.
Figure 1.1: Taxonomy Class Level
When describing a logical set, the term class is used and individuals are members of
these sets. For example, the Denial-of-Service scenario class is a set with SCO Attack
and SpamHaus Attack individuals belonging to this set. These individuals are presented
in Section 5.3.1. The description of the ontology as a story in Chapter 5 is not intended
to produce grammatically perfect text, but rather a ﬂexible skeleton which can be further
developed. The ﬁrst letters of the classes of the taxonomy and ontology are capitalised,
whereas the ﬁrst letters of the relationships are lower case.
The mathematical symbols used in this thesis are listed below:
∃ There exists at least one element
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∋ Such that
∈ Element of
∧ Logical And
∨ Logical Or
⊆ Subset of
× Cartesian Product (Relation)
∘ Composition
≡ Equivalent
∪ Union
Throughout the thesis, the DoS attack example is used to illustrate the principles that
are developed in each chapter. The DoS attack is also formally presented in the main
thesis in Section 5.4.4, whereas the other scenarios are presented formally in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER
TWO
SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL COMPUTER PLATFORM
ATTACKS
"You will never find a more wretched hive of scum and villainy."
Obi-Wan Kenobi – Star Wars
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a collection of the most signiﬁcant attacks on computer platforms.
This collection is the subjective view of the researcher, but is in part based on similar lists
of other authors. It is a list of signiﬁcant network attacks and it provides a large spectrum
of diﬀerent attacks, making it possible to identify network attack scenarios. The attack
scenarios are used as a means of illustrating the Network Attack Taxonomy described in
Chapter 4 and form the base of the ontology developed in Chapter 5.
This chapter begins with a literature study of similar lists compiled by other authors.
These lists are also subjective, but provide a good starting point in compiling a list of the
most signiﬁcant network attacks. In Section 2.3, the criteria that were used to determine
which computer attacks were signiﬁcant are described. In Section 2.4 each signiﬁcant
computer attack is described in detail and in Section 2.5 attack scenarios are derived
from the selection of attacks. In Section 2.6, the attacks are sorted according to four of
the criteria mentioned in Section 2.3. Section 2.7 summarises the identiﬁed attacks.
10
2.2. LITERATURE SURVEY 11
2.2 Literature Survey
All lists that measure the signiﬁcance of computer attacks are subjective. When one
examines a collection of these lists, the most popular events can be extracted and used
as a base for signiﬁcant attacks. This base was augmented by computer attacks found to
be signiﬁcant by the researcher. In Appendix A, the complete lists of signiﬁcant attacks
are listed.
2.2.1 Malware Lists
Heater (2011), Miranda (2010) and Strickland (2008) made lists of signiﬁcant malware.
Heater listed malware that in his opinion best enabled insight into the development of
malware, and concentrated on malware that targets novel aspects of computers, such
as malware in shareware, email, databases, cellphones, social networks and the Internet.
Heater also explicitly stated that his list is not deﬁnitive, but rather informative. Miranda
examined the malware that had the biggest ﬁnancial impact, and discovered that malware
can cost millions in economic productivity. Strickland concentrated on malicious malware
that can cripple computers or networks, and he noted that when the computer industry
was in its infancy, systems were being sabotaged, but it took a few decades for hackers to
start coding computer viruses. As early as 1949, John von Neumann developed a theory
on the possibility of a self-replicating programme (Neumann and Burks, 1966).
2.2.2 Cyber-Attacks
Hall (2010), Julian (2011), Liddinton-Cox (2012) and (Tech Analyser, 2011) made lists of
cyber-attacks. Hall listed seven major cyber-warfare events and noted that attacks are
only reported after the fact, and that cyber-attacks can potentially target government,
banking or military networks and aﬀect vital data and funds, or can inﬂict physical
damage. Liddinton-Cox listed hackers that had either achieved fame or were charged
with felonies. The individuals Michael Calce (Maﬁaboy), Kevin Mitnick and Adrian
Lamo are personally listed, while the rest of his list concentrates on events rather than
persons. Tech Analyser Online magazine explored some of the most notorious cyber-
attacks (Tech Analyser, 2011). They examined how cyber-attacks have evolved from the
initial basic spreading through ﬂoppy disks to the modern use of removable media or
spreading malware via the Internet.
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Julian (2011) listed ten of the costliest cyber-attacks. The claims of which attacks were the
costliest cannot be veriﬁed, but the attacks themselves can all be considered signiﬁcant.
The list presented by Miranda diﬀers from that of Julian, and both lists claim to present
the most costly computer attacks. According to Leeson and Coyne (2005), ﬁnancial
institutions will most likely not report hacker-related incidents, fearing the eﬀect this will
have on their customers, as well as on stockholders' impressions of their security. Damage
amounting to approximately $55 billion was caused by malware in 2002, according to
Leeson and Coyne. It is impossible to measure the precise amount of damage done.
2.2.3 Cyber-Crime Lists
Marcus (2011), Buckland (2011), Poulsen (2009) and Armerding (2012) made lists of
signiﬁcant cyber-crimes. Marcus from McAfee discussed the last decade's (20002010)
most serious cyber-related attacks, and found that cyber-crime has reached new levels
of maturity, and that targeted attacks against governments and large organisations are
becoming commonplace. The scope of attacks has also reached unprecedented levels.
McAfee detected an average of 60 000 new pieces of malware each day in 2010, and
malware directed at social media is one of the fastest-growing threats (Marcus, 2011).
Buckland from Microsoft published his list of the worst cyber-crimes of the 2000s. The
crimes include malware creation, scams, hacking, credit card number theft, phishing and
disclosure of secret information. Computer networks were used as tools or were the target
of all the crimes. A similar list was developed by Poulsen (2009). Poulsen's list examined
"the most ingenious, destructive or ground-breaking cyber-crimes of the ﬁrst ten years of
the new millennium". Only four entries appear on both the Buckland and Poulsen lists.
Even the dates used to specify when some of the cyber-crimes occurred diﬀer in the lists.
These two lists indicate why such lists are considered to be subjective.
2.2.4 Data Leaks
Armerding (2012) listed 15 of the largest data breaches recorded, which demonstrates
how diverse and widespread data breaches have become. Information from technology
giants such as Google and even security companies such as RSA Security Inc. have
been leaked. Since Armerding's list, two major data breaches have occurred: Bradley
Manning gave over 260 000 sensitive diplomatic cables to Wikileaks1 (Sweetman, 2011;
1http://wikileaks.org/
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Jones, 2013) and Edward Snowden supplied the leaked information about the National
Security Agency (NSA) worldwide covert data collection programme (Richelson, 2013).
2.3 Criteria and Timeline
Bases on the works described above, a timeline was developed of the major computer
network attacks. These attacks are considered to be the most signiﬁcant by the researcher
as they had an impact in one of the following areas:
∙ ﬁrst use of a particular attacking methodology
∙ ﬁrst use of a new class of attack
∙ signiﬁcant ﬁnancial impact
∙ widespread geographical impact
∙ level of sophistication
∙ attacks considered to be signiﬁcant by other authors
∙ famous hackers
Figure 2.1 illustrates the computer network attacks that the researcher considered to
be the most signiﬁcant. The attacks are divided into ﬁve categories, namely Infamous
Hackers, Viruses and Trojans, Worms, Commercial Attacks and Cyber-War. Viruses
were initially very signiﬁcant. As the Internet became more available, viruses gave way to
worms. In recent times, commercial attacks and cyber-warfare attacks have become more
prominent. Figure 2.1 illustrates that the signiﬁcant network attacks have moved from
viruses in the 1980s and 1990s to worms in the early 2000s. From 2008, commercial attacks
and cyber-warfare have become much more prevalent. These incidents are discussed
further in Section 2.4.
2.4 Significant Computer Attacks Survey
The attacks listed in Section 2.2 that were chosen by three or more authors are listed in
Table 2.1. The third column indicates the number of times a particular attack was chosen
to be signiﬁcant.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Signiﬁcant Attacks
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Table 2.1: Attacks Most Frequently Listed
Date Attack #
2000 I-LOVE-YOU 6
2004 MyDoom 6
1988 Morris Worm 4
1999 Melissa Virus 4
2003 SQL Slammer 4
2008 Conﬁcker 4
2000 Maﬁaboy 3
2000 Titan rain 3
2004 Sasser Worm 3
2010 Stuxnet 3
2011 Epsilon 3
2011 Sony Playstation 3
In the following sections, the author will list signiﬁcant computer network attacks. These
attacks have been discussed previously in van Heerden, Pieterse, and Irwin (2012c).
2.4.1 Phone Phreaking, 1970
A toy whistle included in a box of Cap'n Crunch cereal became the simplest method to
break into telephone systems (Rajagopalan, 2000; Robson, 2004). This little toy whistle
produced a tone that was used to control telephone systems, and enable the user to make
free long-distance calls (also known as phreaking). The whistle generated a frequency
similar to the maintenance frequency used by the telephone systems. John Draper was
one of the ﬁrst hackers to abuse this simple method to make free long-distance calls (Levy,
1984; Massey, 2003). Phreaking became a popular hobby for college students, businessmen
and anyone else who knew enough about electronics, and it led to the development of new
methods that included war dialers, wiretapping and phreaking boxes (Rajagopalan, 2000).
Joe the Whistler, a blind man who could whistle a perfect 2600 Hz tone, was used by
phreakers to tune their boxes (Rajagopalan, 2000). For many years, US phone companies
could do little to counteract phreaking, but as the systems changed from analogue to
digital, and the 2600 Hertz (Hz) signal slowly phased out, phreaking techniques were
successfully employed in fewer places (Lapsley, 2013). Phone phreaking is considered one
of the ﬁrst computer-based system hacks.
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2.4.2 The Logic Bomb, 1982
In 1982 the Central Intelligence Agency discovered that Soviet spies had secretly acquired
a gas pipeline controller built in Canada. The Central Intelligence Agency proceeded to
plant a Trojan horse, which consisted of a logic bomb, in the software of the controllers
(Goertzel, 2009). The controller software controlled the testing of the pipeline pressure
gauges, and the logic bomb caused resetting of the gauges to read two-fold lower than
the actual gas pressure in the pipelines. This resulted in one of the most monumental
non-nuclear explosions ever seen from space (Saﬁre, 2004). This event is one of the ﬁrst
known physical attacks perpetrated by means of hacking.
2.4.3 Brain Virus, 1986
The Brain Virus is considered the world's ﬁrst computer virus. It was created by two
brothers, Basit and Amjad-Farooq Alvi, in Lahore, Pakistan (Abou-Assaleh, Cercone,
Keselj, and Sweidan, 2004). It was a boot sector virus since it only aﬀected boot records
(Spaﬀord, Heaphy, and Ferbrache, 1989; Leyden, 2006). The Brain Virus marked the area
where the virus code was hidden as having bad sectors. It occupied a part of the computer
memory and infected any ﬂoppy disk that was accessed and hid itself from detection by
hooking into the interrupt vector of the boot sector. When an attempt was made to read
the infected sector, the virus simply showed the original sector (F-Secure, 2012). Thus the
Brain virus was also the ﬁrst "Stealth" virus that actively attempted to hide its presence.
2.4.4 PC-Write Trojan Horse, 1986
One of the ﬁrst recorded Trojan Horse software developments, PC-Write Trojan, appeared
in 1986. The Trojan pretended to be a Quicksoft PC-Write word processor version 2.72
(Wiggins, 2001; Wang, Chen, and Xu, 2011). When the application was started, the
PC-Write Trojan also started. The Trojan then formatted the hard drive and deleted all
stored data. It is well known that Quicksoft never published a PC-Writer version 2.72.
2.4.5 Morris Worm, 1988
On 2 November 1988, a Cornell graduate student, Robert Tappan Morris, unleashed
one of the ﬁrst computer worms into the wild (Orman, 2003). It started as a benign
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experiment with a simple bug in a programme, but the worm replicated much faster than
anticipated (Chen and Robert, 2004). By the following morning, it had infected over 6 000
hosts, nearly 10% of the Internet at the time (Spaﬀord, 1989; Cass, 2001). Ultimately
the worm became a victim of its own success as it could not determine whether a host
had already been infected or not. As a result the worm distributed multiple copies of
itself on a single host. The exponential increase in data load eventually tipped oﬀ the
system administrators and the worm was discovered. The success and damage caused
by the Morris worm led to the founding of the ﬁrst Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon University2. The Morris worm prompted the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to fund a computer emergency response
team, now the CERT.
2.4.6 Chameleon Virus, 1990
Polymorphic computer viruses appeared in the early 1990s (Bania, 2009). The Chameleon
Virus (also known as the 1260 Virus), created by Mark Washburn, was the ﬁrst poly-
morphic virus. Polymorphic viruses modify themselves with every new infection. The
Chameleon Virus consisted of a combination of the Vienna Virus and the Cascade Virus
(Beaucamps, 2007b). Washburn extended the original Cascade Virus code and developed
a decryptor with a mutable body. The creation of the polymorphic virus shocked the
antiviral community since detection techniques used at the time relied on ﬁxed signatures
(Beaucamps, 2007a).
2.4.7 Michelangelo Virus, 1991
The Michelangelo Virus surfaced in 1991 (Baskerville, 1993; White, Swimmer, Pring,
Arnold, Chess, and Morar, 1999). This particular virus was one of the ﬁrst viruses to
spread worldwide, and it received much media attention. The purpose of the virus was to
strike on 6 March, with the eﬀect of destroying millions of computer hard disks. Less than
20 000 computers were actually infected. The Michelangelo Virus contributed greatly to
public awareness of computer viruses.
2http://www.cert.org/encyc_article/
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2.4.8 Kevin Mitnick, 1995
The name Kevin Mitnick has become synonymous with hacking and computer crime
(Shimomura and Markoﬀ, 1995; Liddinton-Cox, 2012). As a young boy living in the San
Fernando Valley, Kevin started developing his social engineering skills by obtaining free
bus rides (Mitnick, Simon, and Wozniak, 2002). During the years that followed, Kevin
evolved his skills from phone phreaking to hacking, and eventually mastered the art of
social engineering. He soon became the most wanted cyber-criminal in the United States.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Kevin in 1995. Well-known criminal
acts of Kevin include hacking into DEC, Motorola, Nokia, Sun, NEC, as well many other
systems (Mitnick et al., 2002). Kevin Mitnick became the poster boy for hacking and the
role model for aspiring hackers (Greenberg, 2008).
2.4.9 Citi Bank, 1995
The attack on Citi Bank was one of the ﬁrst major ﬁnancial attacks (Hancock, 1995;
Hesseldahl and Kharif, 2010). A Russian hacker (Vladimir Levin) programmed Citi Bank
Systems to send $10 million to his own account. Hancock speculated that Levin gained
access via stolen passwords. Vladimir Levin was eventually extradited to the United
States where he served a three-year prison sentence, and paid $240 000 in damages. Citi
Bank managed to recover most of the money (Kabay, 2003).
2.4.10 Laroux, 1996
In July 1996, the ﬁrst Excel virus, called Laroux, was discovered (Davis, 1996; Haddox,
1996). This virus can be described as a macro virus that consisted of two other macros
called "Auto_Open" and "Check_Files" which are stored in a hidden datasheet named
"laroux". This virus replicates itself each time a new document is created. Documents
that used to be read and write ﬁles have become executable, and thus a new agent to
spread malware. Since documents are also now a danger, the scope of malware infections
has increased from executable binaries only to all but the most basic documents.
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2.4.11 Melissa, 1999
The Melissa Virus arrived in the early hours of 26 March 1999 in the form of a Word
document (McNamara, 2009). David L. Smith was the alleged creator (Garber, 1999).
The Word document, called list.doc, supposedly contained a list of passwords to adult-
content websites. Upon opening the document, the virus turned oﬀ the security protocol
and emailed copies of the infected document to other users of Microsoft Outlook. Melissa
was responsible for serious disruptions in big organisations such as Intel, Lockheed-Martin
and Microsoft. At the time, it was one of the most damaging computer viruses ever
created, and was the ﬁrst to use email methodology.
2.4.12 I-LOVE-YOU, 2000
The I-LOVE-YOU Worm ﬁrst appeared on 4 May 4 2000 in the form of an email with
the subject: I-LOVE-YOU (Ebel, Mielsch, and Bornholdt, 2002). It was created by a
student named Onel de Guzman, and originated from Manila, Philippines. The worm
code was written using Visual Basic and processed by the Microsoft WScript engine
(Bishop, 2000). It targeted computers using Internet Explorer and Microsoft's Outlook
application. Within a few hours, it had spread worldwide via email by making use of
addresses in the Outlook address books of infected users. This worm exploited human
curiosity in order to entice people into opening an untrusted email.
2.4.13 Mafiaboy, 2000
Michael Calce also known as "Maﬁaboy", grabbed headlines in Canada when this high
school student launched multiple Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks against
major commercial websites. Yahoo, Amazon, Dell, eBay and CNN were some his targets
(Groebel, Metze-Mangold, van der Peet, and Ward, 2001). Most of these websites were
attacked using a well-known method called "Smurf attacks" (US-CERT, 1998). Smurf
attacks involve using fake reply addresses (spooﬁng), and requesting that the replies be
broadcast into a network, thus causing a denial of service though a spike in network traﬃc
(Shearman, 1999). Michael Calce was considered an amateur by other hackers. Grabosky
(2004); Genosko (2008) speculated that Michael's main motivation was to receive recog-
nition within his hacker peer group.
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2.4.14 Titan Rain, 2000-2008
In 2004, Shawn Carpenter discovered a series of "cyber-raids" carried out by alleged
government-supported cells in China targeting the US (Kabay, 2008). Several sensitive
computer networks were inﬁltrated, including Lockheed-Martin and Sandia. The FBI
later named it "Titan Rain". The motives were mostly political and economic (Gandhi
et al., 2011). It is considered one of the most sophisticated state-sponsored computer
attacks ever detected. The attackers searched military networks for single computers
with vulnerabilities they would use at a later time to extract data (Thornburgh, 2005).
The scale and ambition of this attack made it unique in its time.
2.4.15 Apache.org Defaced 2000
Figure 2.2: Apache.org Defaced (Dede, 2010)
In May 2000, the Apache.org website was defaced (Dede, 2010). Peter van Dijk and his
accomplices modiﬁed the web page to include a banner "Powered by Microsoft BackOﬃce"
(Apache is a Microsoft competitor in the web-hosting space). The hackers had discovered
that their target was using a default conﬁguration. Thus they were able to obtain root
access (van Dijk, 2000). The Apache administration team resolved the problems quickly
without any signiﬁcant after eﬀects. The defaced website is shown in Figure 2.2. This
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attack is considered signiﬁcant as it represents not only the defacement of a web page, but
the defacement of the web page of the most popular web page software. From October
1996 to 2012, Apache had the top market share for web servers worldwide (Netcraft, 2012).
If the attackers' motives were more sinister they could have explored the opportunity of
installing malicious code into the web server code.
2.4.16 Code Red, 2001
The Code Red Worm appeared on 12 July 12 2001. It exploited a buﬀer-overﬂow vulner-
ability in Microsoft's IIS web servers (Moore et al., 2003). Upon infection of a machine,
it checked whether the date was between the ﬁrst and the 19th of the month. If so, a
random list of IP addresses was generated and each machine on the list was probed to
infect as many other machines as possible. Proper propagation of the worm failed due to
a code error in the random number generator (Zou, Gong, and Towsley, 2002). On 19
July, a second version of the Code Red Worm appeared, which infected computers at a
rate of 200 hosts per minute (Orman, 2003) and infected more than 250 000 systems in
just nine hours (Berghel, 2001). This new version shared no source code with the original,
but used the same vulnerability and was called Code Red II (Dolak, 2001).
2.4.17 SQL Slammer, 2003
The SQL Slammer Worm consisted of a single User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet that
exploited a Structured Query Language (SQL) server vulnerability. This worm infected
over 90% of vulnerable targets within ten minutes (Moore et al., 2003; Zou, Gao, Gong,
and Towsley, 2003). It caused signiﬁcant network outages among ﬁnancial and government
institutions. One of the Slammer's novel features was its incredible scanning rate. The
Slammer did not inﬂict damage with a malicious payload, but rather by overloading
networks through the saturating of available bandwidth (Chen and Robert, 2004). In
Figure 2.3 the geographical spread of the SQL Slammer worm is shown a mere 30 minutes
after its release. The diameter of each circle represents the number of infected hosts on a
logarithmic scale.
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Figure 2.3: Geographical Spread of SQL Slammer by Moore et al. (2003)
2.4.18 SCO Denial-of-Service, 2003
An Unix company SCO fell victim to a distributed denial-of-service attack in May 2003
(Shankland, 2003). This attack used multiple computers to simultaneously request a
magnitude of connections to the SCO web server. The SCO web server was unable to
serve (respond in time) all the connections. Thus SCO's web presence was removed
during the attack. A SCO representative stated that they had no indication of who was
behind the attack, and nobody claimed oﬃcial responsibility for it. In a similar attack
during December 2003, the UCSD Network Telescope calculated that the SCO server
had to respond to more than 700 million attack packets over a 32-hour period (Moore
and Shannon, 2003). The motive for the attack was suspected to be related to the SCO
lawsuit against IBM regarding copyright of the Linux code (Namuduri, 2006). This attack
is considered signiﬁcant as it is an example of hacktivism, where a website was attacked
by non-state actors for political reasons.
2.4.19 Cabir Worm, 2004
The Cabir Worm was discovered by Symantec on 14 June 2004. It was the ﬁrst worm to
infect mobile devices (Sarwar, Ramadass, and Budiarto, 2007). It targeted mobile devices
using the Symbian OS. Its creator lived in France and used the name Vallez (Gostev, 2006).
Infection occurred via Bluetooth. The infection rate was signiﬁcantly restricted due to the
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short transmission distances of Bluetooth (Attewell, 2005). The worm did not succeed
in creating major havoc on mobile devices, and caused little damage. However, with
the rising popularity of smart phones it is expected that mobile devices will increasingly
become the targets of malware.
2.4.20 MyDoom, 2004
27 January 2004 saw the arrival of the mass-mailing worm called MyDoom (Dübendorfer
and Plattner, 2005). The worm spread via executable email attachments, and also set up
a backdoor Trojan on infected computers. It used its own Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP) engine to send infected emails. During its active lifetime of 12 months it caused
an increase in global email traﬃc estimated to be between 14% and 30% (Dübendorfer and
Plattner, 2005). Public awareness, antivirus software and ﬁrewalls using SMTP ﬁltering
prevented it from growing rapidly. The MyDoom Worm had many variants, including
the variant MyDoom.e, which attacked the SCO web page, and the variant MyDoom.f
attacked Microsoft and RIAA websites (Germain, 2004).
2.4.21 Sasser Worm, 2004
The Sasser Worm spread through a Microsoft network vulnerability (MS04-0113). This
vulnerability exploited a buﬀer overﬂow in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Ser-
vice (LSASS). The Sasser Worm was allegedly authored by Swen Jaschan, a German
high school student (TrendMicro, 2004). It randomly generated IP addresses and then
attempted to connect on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 445 and exploit more
hosts. This worm was able to infect over half a million Windows users within the ﬁrst
few days of its release (Sanger, 2012).
2.4.22 Sony XCP, 2005
Sony BMG included digital rights management technologies in Compact Disks (CDs)
released during 2005 (Halderman and Felten, 2006; Mulligan and Perzanowski, 2007). One
such technology was XCP, a CD-based protection measure developed by First4Internet.
The initial purpose of XCP was to place certain restrictions on the use of purchased CDs.
3http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms04-011/
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In addition to the restrictions, XCP also created a number of security vulnerabilities for
Windows users. Mark Russinovich was the ﬁrst person to release information about these
risks to the public on 31 October 2005 (Krebs, 2005). Sony's initial response was slow.
By the end of 2005, millions of infected CDs were still available in retail stores before
their eventual recall. This vulnerability was an example of where a large international
corporation's (Sony) desire to protect its content led to damaging users' computers and
the corporation's own reputation.
2.4.23 Operation Shady RAT, 2006-2010
Operation Shady RAT was a huge corporate spying network used to steal corporate secrets
from over 72 international companies (Alperovitch, 2011). This included source code,
email archives, exploration details for fossil fuels, legal contracts, design schematics, etc.
McAfee was able to gain access to one of the command and control computers used in
this attack and identiﬁed 72 compromised parties that were distributed all over the world
(Figure 2.4). Although no deﬁnitive proof exists, it is currently suspected that the attack
originated in China (Gross, 2011).
Figure 2.4: Operation Shady RAT Victims Geographical Locations (Alperovitch, 2011)
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2.4.24 Estonia Incident, 2007
Early in 2007, a series of politically motivated cyber-attacks struck Estonia (Finn, 2007;
Czosseck, Ottis, and Taliharm, 2011). The attacks included web defacements and DDoS
attacks on well-known Estonia government agencies, banks and Internet service providers.
The attacks followed the removal of a six-foot-tall bronze statue in Tallinn, which com-
memorated the dead of the Second World War (Davis, 2007). At the time of the attacks,
Estonia was one of the leading nations in Europe with regard to information and com-
munication technologies (Czosseck et al., 2011). This can be considered an example of
cyber-warfare and its potential eﬀects (Clarke and Knake, 2011).
2.4.25 South Ossetia Incident, 2008
Websites in Georgia were hacked three days before the start of the Georgia Russia war.
The websites of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and its Parliament were replaced
with images comparing the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to Adolf Hitler, as
shown in Figure 2.5 (Cluley, 2008).
Figure 2.5: Defaced Georgian Parliamentary Website (Cluley, 2008)
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Russian intelligence services also conducted DoS attacks on Georgian websites. Re-
searchers concluded that the attacks were synchronised with Russian military operations,
and that the malware was written or customized for the attack against Georgia (Ruther-
ford, 2009). The Russian state-sponsored news agency, RIA Novosti was attacked in
retaliation (Spiegelman, 2008).
2.4.26 Conficker Worm, 2008
The Conﬁcker Worm was the ﬁrst worm to penetrate cloud technology (Fitzgibbon and
Wood, 2009; Sharma, 2011). It ﬁrst appeared in November 2008 and quickly became one
of the most infamous worms to date. It controlled over nine million computer systems and
also controlled the world's largest cloud network at the time (Wattanajantra, 2009). As
a result of the infrastructure of a cloud, the worm could propagate much faster, infect a
broader range of hosts and cause greater damage. Conﬁcker spread via autorun in remov-
able storage devices and also spread via network shares (Porras, Saïdi, and Yegneswaran,
2009). Conﬁcker has not been used as an attack weapon since, and it is speculated that
it might have been a precursor to Stuxnet (Finkle, 2011).
2.4.27 Ikee Worm, 2009
The ﬁrst worm to infect Apple's iPhones emerged in 2009. Ikee targeted jailbroken iPhones
by exploiting default passwords (Porras, Saidi, and Yegneswaran, 2010). It did not cause
serious damage to the infected iPhone, but simply changed the wallpaper to an image
of the singer Rick Astley. After changing the wallpaper, it sought out other jail-broken
iPhones to infect. The creator, a 21-year-old student called Ashley Towns, only developed
the worm in order to raise concerns about certain security issues (Andersen, 2009). It did
not contain any malicious content.
2.4.28 Operation Aurora 2009
Google disclosed in early 2010 that it fell under attack from China (Higgins, 2010; Drum-
mond, 2010). The goal of the attacks was to extract source code from Google, Adobe and
other signiﬁcant technology companies (Zetter, 2010). The attackers used a 0-day exploit
in Internet Explorer to steal intellectual property. Also, signiﬁcantly, access to Chinese
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Gmail accounts was sought. Attacks of this sophistication and scope was unknown at the
time and required signiﬁcant investment and time to execute (Zetter, 2012a). McAfee
described the steps used by the attackers to steal data (McAfee, 2010):
1. A targeted user received a link in email or instant message from a ‘trusted’ source.
2. The user clicked on the link, which caused them to visit a website hosted in Taiwan
that also contained a malicious JavaScript payload.
3. The user’s browser downloaded and executed the malicious JavaScript, which in-
cluded a zero-day Internet Explorer exploit.
4. The exploit downloaded a binary disguised as an image from Taiwanese servers and
executed the malicious payload.
5. The payload set up a back door and connected to command and control servers in
Taiwan.
6. As a result, attackers had complete access to internal systems.
The attack was traced back to two schools in China that have close ties with the Chinese
military (Markoﬀ and Barboza, 2010).
2.4.29 Stuxnet Worm, 2010
Stuxnet was one of the most complex threats ever analysed (Falliere, Murchu, and Chien,
2011). The primary purpose of Stuxnet was to target industrial control systems, such as
gas pipelines and power plants, with the goal of reprogramming the Programmable Logic
Controls (PLCs) systems to enable an attacker to control them. Stuxnet was also the
ﬁrst to exploit four zero-day vulnerabilities as well as compromise two digital certiﬁcates.
As of 29 September 2010, Iran had the greatest number of infected computer systems.
Stuxnet has shown that direct-attack attempts on critical infrastructure are no longer a
myth, but a deﬁnite possibility. Stuxnet actions can be considered an act of war, but no
one has oﬃcially claimed responsibility for it (Fidler, 2011), although Sanger (2012) was
able to conﬁrm that Stuxnet was a joint Israeli-American cyber-weapon.
2.4.30 Epsilon, 2011
In April 2011, customer information (names and emails) were stolen from Ameriprise
Financial, Best Buy, Bookstone, Capital One, Citi, Disney Destinations, Home Shopping
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Network, JPMorgan Chase, Marriott Rewards, US Bank, TiVo and Walgreens (Olivarez-
Giles, 2011). Epsilon, a marketing email provider from which the email addresses were
leaked stated that passwords and credit card details were not compromised (Halliday,
2011). The biggest danger resulting from this attack is a possibility that the stolen names
and email addresses may be used in future Spear Phishing attacks (Kerber and Bartz,
2011).
2.4.31 PlayStation Network, 2011
Sony's PlayStation Network went oine on 20 April 2011 (Thomas, 2011). A few days
later, Sony confessed that the network went oine due to an external intrusion. Sony also
warned its users to watch out for possible identity theft as the hackers obtained sensitive
information such as usernames, passwords, addresses and birth dates (Goodin, 2011).
Sony blamed Anonymous for the attack, but Anonymous denied involvement (Cohen,
2011; Kaplan, 2011).
2.4.32 HBGary, 2011
In February 2011, a computer attack was launched on one of the leading computer security
ﬁrms, HBGary Federal (Bright, 2011). The CEO of HBGary Federal, Aaron Barr, an-
nounced that he was going to unmask the well-known hacking group Anonymous. Anony-
mous responded swiftly and caused severe damage to the security ﬁrm. The attacks re-
sulted in defacement of their website and deletion of vast amounts of data. In addition,
a website owned by the owner of HBGary, Greg Hoglund, went oine and the user reg-
istration database was published on the Internet. Anonymous ultimately removed the
links to the published emails after negotiations with Barr and Hoglund (Zetter, 2011).
This attack is considered signiﬁcant as it demonstrates the potentially negative impact of
skilled hacker groups, and the inherent vulnerability of individuals.
2.4.33 South African PostBank, 2012
The South African PostBank was robbed of R42 million ($6.7 million) during a 72-hour
operation that took place during the New Year holiday period (Swart and Afrika, 2012).
Boy Meshack Thekiso a Postbank employee, used the computer of a colleague who was on
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leave, which was linked to the PostBank server, to transfer money to multiple accounts.
Large amounts of money were withdrawn from ATM's all over South Africa from these
accounts. Two of the syndicate members, Motsoane and Masoleng, were arrested in
February 2012 and sentenced to 15 years for their role in the theft (SAPA, 2012; Swart,
2012). Thekiso turned state witness and received a ten-year sentence.
2.4.34 Flame, 2012
Flame is a modular computer malware that attacks computers running the Microsoft
Windows operating system. The Flame malware has a backdoor, a Trojan, and worm
features which allow it to replicate in a local network (Gostev, 2012). The Flame software
seems to especially target systems in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Israel and other Middle
Eastern countries. In Figure 2.6, a map of the initially infected countries is shown.
Figure 2.6: Flame-infected Countries 28 May 2002 (Gostev, 2012)
Flame is considered the most sophisticated and complex malware ever found (Sharma,
2012).
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2.4.35 SpamHaus, 2013
On 16 March 2013, a DDoS attack was launched on the SpamHaus website (Hanford,
2013)4. The attack grew to 300 Gigabits per second (Gbps) of ﬂood traﬃc, a level which
threatened the overall Internet core infrastructure and Leyden (2013) claimed that it
was the "Biggest DDoS attack in History". SpamHaus contracted CloudFare5 to mitigate
against the attack, and they were able to restore SpamHaus services (Prince, 2013). Figure
2.7 displays bandwidth across a number of the routers that CloudFare monitored in front
of the SpamHaus web site. The green area represents incoming requests in-bound and
the blue line represents outgoing data. The massive spike in incoming traﬃc presents the
DDoS attack.
Figure 2.7: CloudFare Monitoring Traﬃc in front of SpamHaus (Prince, 2013)
Although they deny it, it has been speculated that a Dutch hosting company called Cyber-
Bunker attached SpamHaus in retaliation for being placed on the SpamHaus anti-spam
list (Markoﬀ and Perlroth, 2013). A Dutch national was arrested in Spain during April
2013, was extradited to the Netherlands and faces charges with regard to the DDoS attack
on SpamHaus. The DDoS attack on SCO in 2003 and SpamHaus in 2013 used the same
methodology, and only diﬀered in scale. In the ten years between the attacks, the Internet
and related networks have grown to the extent that the amount of data required for a
successful DDoS attack is signiﬁcantly greater.
2.4.36 Edward Snowden, 2013
In June 2013 The Guardian and Washington Post newspapers revealed in June 2013 that
the NSA accessed servers from large US tech companies to collect metadata (Greenwald,
4http://spamhaus.org/
5https://www.cloudflare.com/
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2013). More revelations about NSA cyber-spying programme called PRISM was revealed
in the following weeks. The source of the leaks were revealed to be Edward Snowden,
a NSA contractor (Glenn Greenwald and Poitras, 2013). Snowden's motivation for re-
vealing information about PRIMS and the NSA is that he wanted to prompt a national
security debate (Farivar, 2013):
"The surveillance of whole populations, rather than individuals, threatens to be the great-
est human rights challenge of our time. . . "
It has emerged that one of the techniques that Snowden used to collect all the material
was by convincing "20 to 25" of his coworkers to hand over their login credentials and
passwords (Geuss, 2013). Currently Snowden has been given temporary asylum in Russia
while the US insists that he is a traitor (Walker, 2013). Catro (2013) estimates that
Snowden's revelations will cost the US cloud computer industry up to $35 billion.
2.5 Attack Scenarios
Rahmad, Supangkat, Sembiring, and Surendro (2010) developed the concept of a "threat
scenario". They reasoned that all threats can be classiﬁed as either the hijacking of uses,
espionage, exceeded limits of operation, damage, modiﬁcations or loss of property. These
scenarios were used as a starting point for development of the following attack scenarios:
∙ Denial-of-Service (SCO DoS, Maﬁaboy, SpamHaus)
∙ Industrial Espionage (Titan Rain, Operation Aurora, Operation Shady RAT)
∙ Web Defacement (HB Gary Hack, Apache.org Defaced)
∙ Unauthorised Data Access (Kevin Mitnick, Playstation Network, Epsilon, Edward
Snowden)
∙ Financial Theft (South African PostBank, Citi Bank)
∙ Industrial Sabotage (The Logic Bomb, Stuxnet Worm)
∙ Cyber-Warfare (South Ossetia Incident, Estonia Incident)
∙ Resource Theft (Phone Phreaking)
∙ System Compromise (Flame, MyDoom, Conﬁcker, Code Red, Sony XCP)
∙ Runaway Malware (I-LOVE-YOU, Morris Worm, Mellissa, SQL Slammer, Brain
Virus, PC-Write Trojan Horse, Chameleon Virus, Michelangelo Virus, Laroux, Cabir
Worm, Sasser Worm, Ikee)
Each of the attack scenarios above are explored in more detail in Section 4.3. The Denial-
of-Service scenario is used to describe attacks that target accessibility by overloading a
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victim's capability to respond to a ﬂood of interaction requests. Industrial Espionage
refers to the theft of commercially valuable data such as trade secrets, system blueprints
or sales numbers. Unauthorised Data Access refers to a situation where a person has
access to a location that is hidden or contains sensitive or secret data. This can lead to
the unauthorised entry of data into a ﬁle, reading a ﬁle, changing the contents of the ﬁle
or for any other malicious purpose.
Web Defacement can be considered graﬃti of the digital world. Websites are the public
face of commercial and other entities in the digital world, and reputations are negatively
aﬀected by defacing them.
Computers can be used for direct ﬁnancial gain by stealing money directly from banks,
individuals or other institutions. Computer attacks with a sole ﬁnancial goal are referred
to as the Financial Theft scenario. Much malware attempts to control computers and
networks. When control of a computer or network has been lost, the System Compromise
is applied. System Compromise refers to the breaking or cracking into a single or multiple
computers without authorisation. Such a compromise is often achieved by using stolen
identiﬁcation and/or passwords to achieve privilege escalation and then compromise the
computer system.
Industrial Sabotage scenarios refer to where computers are used to attack industrial targets
physically. The Logic Bomb and Stuxnet attacks resulted in physical damage to industrial
equipment. The next step is to use computers directly in war. This was done in the
South Ossetia Incident where computer attacks were launched in conjunction with military
operations.
Much of the malware that caused the greatest damage and ﬁnancial losses was software
that was written with no other goal than to see how far it could spread. This Runaway
Malware usually exploits some technical ﬂaw that allows it to spread.
Resource Theft is the unauthorised usage of computer resources, such as bandwidth and
disk space, to accomplish unoﬃcial tasks. Resource Theft includes, but is not limited to,
the following activities: using computing facilities and resources to interfere with the work
of an employee, abusing computing facilities and resources to send unauthorised messages
that are obscene, harassing or threatening and interfering with the normal operations of
a company's computing system.
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2.6 Significance
In this section, the signiﬁcance of the attacks are sorted according to four criteria:
∙ ﬁrst use of an attack methodology;
∙ ﬁrst signiﬁcant use of a new technology;
∙ attacks with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial impact; and
∙ sophisticated attacks.
The grouping of the attacks into these criteria is subjective and meant to be a deﬁnitive
grouping.
In Figure 2.8, the attacks are listed that are signiﬁcant because they were the ﬁrst known
instance of a new attack methodology. For example, the Laxroux Excel Virus was the
ﬁrst macro virus, and Ikee the ﬁrst worm that attacked via mobile phones.
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Figure 2.8: List of Computer Attacks with the First Signiﬁcant Use of an Attack Method-
ology
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant use of a technology for computer-related attacks is shown is Figure
2.9. One of the best examples of an attack that used a new technology for the ﬁrst time
is the Sony XPS attack, which used digital rights management technology.
Pre 1984 1985-1988 1989-1992 1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004 2005-2008 2009 -
Brain 
Virus
1986
PC-Write
Trojan
1986
Morris
Worm
1988
I-LOVE-
YOU
Worm
2000
Conflicker
Worm
2008
Sony
 XPS
2005
Phone
Phreaking
1970
Logic
Bomb
1982
Estonia
DoS
Attack
2007
South 
Ossetia 
Incident
2008
Stuxnet
2010
Time
Operation
Aurora
2009
Computer
Attack
Figure 2.9: List of Computer Attacks with the First Use of a New Technology
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Many of the computer-related attacks had a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial impact. Many of the
attacks shown in Figure 2.10 regarding ﬁnancial impact cannot be determined due to the
diﬃculty in measuring conﬁdence loss. For example, the Playstation Network Attack was
estimated to have cost Sony over $170 million (Stone, 2012).
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Figure 2.10: List of Computer Attacks with Signiﬁcant Financial Impact
The ﬁnal criterion is sophisticated attacks. One of the best examples is the Stuxnet
attack, which used multiple zero-days and attacked a network that was not accessible via
the Internet. Stuxnet is considered to be a cyber-weapon (Chen, 2010).
2.7 Summary
Computer viruses were the most signiﬁcant computer attacks in the 1980s. Computer
viruses used novel and unique methodologies to attack computers. Viruses started out as
simple viruses such as the Brain Virus that simply copied itself through interrupt vectors.
More complicated viruses are the polymorphic viruses such as the Chameleon Virus.
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Figure 2.11: List of Computer Sophisticated Attacks
With the development of the Internet, the signiﬁcant computer attacks became network-
based attacks. During the 1990's and 2000's, worms became the most signiﬁcant threat.
These worms spread though server software vulnerabilities (such as the Morris Worm and
SQL Slammer) or used social engineering methods such as the I-LOVE-YOU email worm.
With the commercial growth of the Internet, attacks on commercial entities became more
sophisticated and signiﬁcant. The scope of attacks on commercial entities ranged from
politically motivated (SCO DoS) to large-scale industrial espionage. The step from indus-
trial espionage to industrial sabotage reached a signiﬁcant level with the Stuxnet-targeted
attack. The Stuxnet attack proved that, since computer networks have become an integral
part of a nation's infrastructure, they can be used as an attack vector.
This chapter examined recent history to identify computer attacks that have had the most
impact or can be considered the most signiﬁcant. These signiﬁcant attacks were used to
identify computer attack scenarios. These scenarios are used as the base for the computer
attack ontology developed in Chapter 5. In the next chapter, related research on network
attacks will be presented.
CHAPTER
THREE
RELATED RESEARCH
"Read at every wait; read at all hours; read within leisure; read in
times of labour; read as one goes in; read as one goes out. The
task of the educated mind is simply put: read to lead."
Marcus Tullius Cicero – 106 BC to 43 BC
3.1 Introduction
Attacks on computer networks can be considered an arms race. With every advance
in protection/prevention, new attacks counter it and become more sophisticated (Zhou,
Leckie, and Karunasekera, 2010; Kayack, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood, 2011). This
chapter presents related work in the study of computer network attacks. In Section
3.2, a survey of network attack models is presented and in Section 3.3, a summary of a
collection of network attack taxonomies is presented. Ontologies have been used in the
ﬁeld of computer attack detection, and such studies are presented in Section 3.4. Sensors
that can be used to detect network-related attacks are discussed in Section 3.5.
Most models, taxonomies and ontologies are presented in the form of ﬂow charts or class
diagrams. The ﬂowcharts simplify the presentation of the interaction within models and
the the class diagrams enable a holistic view and comprehension. Where applicable,
references are made to where these classes were used within the researcher's taxonomy
and ontology.
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3.2 Network Attack Models
In this subsection, models that represent attack on networks are discussed. The most
basic attack process and slight variations on it are presented. This model was used to
base the network attack model developed in Section 4.4. The variations on the basic
model are presented in historical order as shown in Figure 3.2.
After the basic models, three complex models are presented. These complex models
include the inputs and outputs of the attack models. The complex models are shown in
Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
3.2.1 Generalised Basic Attack Process
The most basic generalised attack process, as derived from research conducted by Cheswick
(1992); Kurtz, McClure, and Scambray (1999); Boyd (2000); Schultze (2002); Teumim
(2010), is shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Generalised Basic Attack Process
According to Teumim (2010), and Knapp (2011) the attack process is equally valid for
any target being attacked, be it Internet networks or industrial systems. Teumim deﬁned
the attack phases as follows:
∙ Reconnaissance: This is the initial phase (also known as "foot printing") where an
attacker obtains information about an organisation, such as its employees, Internet
domain and other useful information.
∙ Scanning: This is the identiﬁcation of network-related devices using Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) to determine live hosts, and open TCP and UDP ports
to determine possible services.
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∙ Enumeration: This is the identiﬁcation of user accounts, network shares and other
open information on the network. For example, if a user account name can be
obtained, its password can be guessed or cracked by brute force.
∙ Disrupt: The goal of this activity is only to withhold some service from the computer
user. This does not necessarily require further network or computer penetration.
∙ Penetrate: The goal of this phase is to overcome the system's defences, such as
antivirus and privilege-level software.
∙ Infect: The goal of this phase is to become a persistent threat by attempting to stay
hidden while performing any required tasks. Sterling (2010) listed additional steps
required to maintain persistent infection:
– constructing outbound connections (also known as backdoors) for command
and control use
– collecting user credentials and attempting to access more systems
– escalating user privileges to a higher level
– using legitimate services to hide outbound connections
– utilising mutation and other polymorphic techniques to avoid detection
– maintaining its hidden presence on the system by removing logs (evidence of
infection)
Formal variations on the basic network attack model are introduced in sections 3.2.2
to 3.2.6. These models all follow the same basic steps, with small variations in name
conventions and steps. The models mostly follow a linear path, have between four and
eight stages, and are presented in chronological form. In sections 3.2.7 to 3.2.9, more
complicated attack models are presented. These models also require inputs and outputs
for each stage.
3.2.2 Hansman and Hunt Model
Hansman and Hunt (2003) described a computer attack as a process with several distinct
phases occurring on a targeted computer or network. An attack follows four main phases,
as demonstrated in Figure 3.2a. The Hansman and Hunt model denotes Information
Gathering and Target Selection as phases that occur concurrently and distinctly. Most
other models regard Target Selection as a phase that occurs before Information Gathering.
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(a) Hansman and Hunt Model
(b) Tutănescu and Sofron Model
(c) Gadge and Patil Model
(d) Sharan Model
(e) Nachenberg Model
Figure 3.2: Basic Attack Models
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3.2.3 Tutănescu and Sofron Model
Tut nescu and Sofron (2003) presented a synthetic anatomy of network attacks, as shown
in Figure 3.2b. Tut nescu and Sofron also stated that these attack phases are in contin-
uous development and require constant updating. The Footprint and Scanning phase is
similar to other Reconnaissance phases. This model is similar to the model of Grant and
Kooter, which is also only limited to attacks that gain access to systems, and it does not
represent the Denial-of-Service scenarios.
3.2.4 Gadge and Patil Model
The Gadge and Patil (2008) model consists of six basic steps: performing reconnaissance,
scanning and enumeration, gaining access, escalation of privilege, maintaining access, and
covering tracks and placing backdoors. Gadge and Patil deﬁned reconnaissance as the
phase where a hacker tries to ﬁnd out as much as possible about the target. The researcher
refers to this phase as Target Identification, but Jung, Paxson, Berger, and Balakrishnan
(2004) refer to the Scanning and Enumeration phases as the Reconnaissance phase. The
researcher chose to refer to scanning and other similar actives as reconnaissance. In Figure
3.2c, the Gadge and Patil model is displayed.
3.2.5 Sharan Model
Sharan (2010) described ﬁve stages of ethical hacking. These stages are shown in Figure
3.2d. The steps used by ethical hackers can also be used by hackers with more malicious
intent. Sharan's steps are very similar to Teumim's model, except for diﬀerentiating
between active and passive reconnaissance. Sharan uses slightly diﬀerent terms, such as
Gaining Access rather than the more popular Enumeration used by most authors.
3.2.6 Nachenberg Model
Nachenberg (2012) described hacking as a systematic, wearisome process. This process is
methodical, and requires six main steps: footprinting, scanning, enumeration, penetration,
advance and covering tracks. In the advance phase, the hacker beverages information
gained to launch the next level of attacks, for example installing backdoors. Figure 3.2e
displays Nachenberg's model.
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3.2.7 Grant and Kooter Model
Grant and Kooter (2005) developed an attack model within a crime context. It was
developed following an analysis of hackers' writings. The model is summarised in Figure
3.3, where it uses the similar phases as described previously and includes the inputs and
outputs of each phase. This model is speciﬁc to hacking-type attacks, with phases such as
Penetration, Control, Embedding, Data Extraction and Attack Relay. These phases can be
used in denial-of-service-type scenarios. Grant, Venter, and Eloﬀ (2007) reﬁned the model
into nine phases: footprinting, reconnaissance, vulnerability identiﬁcation, penetration,
control, embedding, data extraction, attack relay and attack dissemination.
Figure 3.3: Grant and Kooter (2005) Model
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3.2.8 Colarik and Janczowski Model
Colarik and Janczowski (2008) developed a model within a hacking terrorism context.
Their model was developed by creating analogies based on hacker crime instances. The
model is presented in Figure 3.4. The Colarik and Janczowski model groups the identiﬁ-
cation of vulnerabilities and selection of malware into a single Penetration phase. Unlike
the Grant and Kooter model, this model diﬀerentiates between owning a system and
disrupting a system.
Figure 3.4: Colarik and Janczowski (2008) Model
3.2.9 Damballa Model
Damballa (2008) looked at case studies of lone hackers within the criminal context. His
model is illustrated in Figure 3.5 and consists of only three basic steps: Deliver Malware,
Consolidation and Take Action. This model does not use the Reconnaissance or similar
phases.
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Figure 3.5: Damballa (2008) Model
3.2.10 Network Attack Models Overview
In this section, several network attack models are presented. All the models follow a
similar path, with slight diﬀerences. These diﬀerences are in naming conventions or
grouping of stages. For example, the terms Footprint and Reconnaissance could be used
interchangeably. Most of the models start with some Footprint/Reconnaissance/Scanning,
followed by Gaining Access/Enumeration/Escalation Privilege. After the system has been
compromised, the attack Disrupts/Penetrates/Infects/Maintains Access of some sort and
ends by Covering Tracks/Installing Backdoors. The attack model developed in Section
4.4 is based on the stages presented in this section.
3.3 Attack Taxonomies
In this section, the network attack and related taxonomies are explored. Rouse (2005)
deﬁnes a taxonomy as:
"the science of classiﬁcation according to a predetermined system, with the resulting
catalog used to provide a conceptual framework for discussion, analysis, or information
retrieval."
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The word taxonomy is derived from the Greek taxis (arrangement) and nomos (law).
Hlava (2012) deﬁnes a taxonomy as a knowledge organization system. It is therefore a set
of words that is used to deﬁne a ﬁeld's vocabulary.
Taxonomies are presented as ﬁgures with their main class at the top. Some of the tax-
onomies were split to ﬁt all the classes and sub-classes within a single page. The level of
the classes and sub-classes can be diﬀerentiated by their shape, as illustrated in Section
1.5. The taxonomies are presented in a chronological sequence.
3.3.1 Taxonomy of Attack Techniques by Lindqvist and Jonsson
(1997)
Lindqvist and Jonsson (1997) presented a classiﬁcation of network intrusions. The classi-
ﬁcation was built on intrusion experiments. Lindqvist and Jonsson expanded on the nine
computer misuse classes deﬁned by Neumann and Parker (1989). In Figure 3.6, Lindqvist
and Jonsson display the Computer Misuse and Computer Misuse Result classes.
The researcher's Attack Goal, Effect and Sabotage classes were inﬂuenced by Neumann
and Parker's taxonomy, whose taxonomy is fully presented within Lindqvist and Jonsson's
taxonomy. These can be seen in sections 4.2.5, 4.2.8, and 4.2.11. Their taxonomy Com-
puter Misuse Result class does not present destruction, changing or disclosure of data on
its disclosure. Their Computer Misuse class also caters for activities which fall outside the
scope of computer network attacks, such as Misuse from Inaction and Hardware Misuse.
3.3.2 A Taxonomy of Network and Computer Attack Methodolo-
gies by Hansman and Hunt (2003)
In Figure 3.7, Hansman and Hunt present attack methodologies, and in Figure 3.8, their
attack taxonomy. The attack methodologies are separated by the their mechanism (such
as Buﬀer Overﬂows and Physical Attacks), their target (such as Web Application and
Password Attacks) or eﬀect of the attack (such as Denial-of-Service and Information
Gathering Attacks). The complexity of attack mechanisms is shown as Figure 3.7 presents
more than 30 unique attack mechanisms classes.
The Attack Mechanism class of Section 4.2.6 is based primarily on Hansman and Hunt's
work. Furthermore, the Target, Vulnerability and Attack Goal classes were all inﬂuenced
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Figure 3.6: Classiﬁcation of Computer Misuse and the Results of Computer Misuse after
Lindqvist and Jonsson (1997)
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by Hansman and Hunt's taxonomy, as shown in Figure 3.8. Hansman and Hunt's target
class has three main distinctions  hardware, software and network  all referring to
physical elements that are targeted. The Target class developed in Section 4.2.13 uses
deﬁnition, but also adds an Industrial Equipment class. The three vulnerabilities; Con-
ﬁguration, Design and Implementation, are used in the Vulnerability class developed in
Section 4.2.14. Some payloads shown in Figure 3.8, namely Disclosures of Information
and Corruption of Information, correspond to the Attack Goal sub-classes: Steal Secret
and Change Data.
The Attack Methodology (Figure 3.7) class of Hansman and Hunt only lists attack methods
and does not group them according to a higher attack methodology goal. The human-
based attack, such as social engineering and phishing, is also required. The Network
Attack Dimensions (Figure 3.8) class only addresses the scope of the attack under the
sub-class Miscellaneous, and not as a speciﬁc sub-class. Only the physical properties of
an attack is mentioned, without investigating the origin of the attack.
3.3.3 Hacking? How They Do It, by CERT-In (2003)
The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) conducted a crime and
security survey of computer-related crime incidents (CERT-In, 2003). They made the
following ﬁndings regarding hacking:
∙ The biggest ﬁnancial loss was caused by theft of secret and proprietary information.
∙ The second biggest loss was due to denial of service attacks.
∙ Virus incidents and insider abuse were the most frequent types of incident.
∙ More than two-thirds of corporate companies are against hiring hackers that have
been reformed.
CERT-In developed an attack methodology in their survey. In this methodology they
examined the eﬀect of hacking, the type of attacks, exploit types, vulnerabilities and
hacking tools (Figure 3.9). The methodology was developed to enable administrators to
maintain a constant watch over malicious code, and enable them to immediately update
their security protection solution. Thus providing for rapid, timely patching.
Within the researcher's Attack Mechanism (as presented in Section 4.2.6), the Malware
sub-class was derived from CERT-In's similar class. The Popular Vulnerabilities, Attack
Methods and Effect of Hacking classes also inﬂuenced the researcher's Attack Mechanism
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Figure 3.7: Attack Methodologies after Hansman and Hunt (2003)
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Figure 3.8: Hansman and Hunt (2003) Attack Taxonomy
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Figure 3.9: CERT-In (2003) Eﬀect of Hacking, Malware, Popular Vulnerabilities, Attack
Methods, Hacking Tools, Types of Attacks, Attack Actions, Attacker Actions and Attack
Categories
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class. CERT-In classes list the diﬀerent attack methods in detail, which can be reduced
to a simpler class, such as the ﬁrst sub-class of the researcher's Attack Mechanism class,
namely: Access Attack, Information Gathering and Data Manipulate. The critique holds
for their Popular Vulnerabilities class which is oversimpliﬁed and does not present any re-
lationship to the vulnerabilities. Their Effect of Hacking class is also too limited, without
any references to other hacking eﬀects, as listed by the researcher in Section 4.3.
3.3.4 Anatomy and Types of Attacks against Computer Networks
by Tutănescu and Sofron (2003)
Tut nescu and Sofron (2003) described active and passive computer network attacks.
These attack types are shown in Figure 3.10. The Active Attacks and Passive Attacks only
Figure 3.10: Active and Passive Attacks by Tut nescu and Sofron (2003)
describe a single property of attacks. This property does not add value to the researcher's
taxonomy, and Tut nescu and Sofron's classiﬁcation of IP sniffing could also fall within
the passive class. Passive attacks formed part of the researcher's Target Identification
(Section 4.2.10) sub-class.
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3.3.5 An Ontology for Network Security Attacks by Simmonds
et al. (2004)
Simmonds et al. (2004) deﬁned an extensible ontology for network security from teaching a
network security subject at the University of Technology in Sydney. Although Simmonds
et al. refers to an ontology, the paper presents an extensive taxonomy that is presented in
Figure 3.11. A map was developed to demonstrate the vulnerability relationships (Figure
3.12).
The Simmonds et al. Actor, Asset, Outcome and Motive classes directly inﬂuenced the
author's Actor, Asset, Effect and Motivation. The researcher's classes are presented in
sections 4.2.1, 4.2.4, 4.2.8 and 4.2.9. Their taxonomy used a Fault class to describe vulner-
abilities. This class presents similar information to the Vulnerability class (Section 4.2.14),
but diﬀerentiated according to structure, not methodology. Their Attack On class is a
direct mapping to the traditional Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Availability Authentica-
tion (CIA+) mapping of security threats. The researcher's Attack Goal (Section 4.2.5)
presented the same information and added a sub-class to present indirect attack goals.
The CIA+ is an expansion of the popular Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA)
triad (Anderson, 2003; Whitman and Mattord, 2011), as shown in Figure 3.13.
3.3.6 Taxonomies of Cyber-adversaries and Attacks by Meyers
et al. (2009)
Meyers et al. (2009) proposed a taxonomy of cyber-adversaries based on the work done
by Rogers (2006). This taxonomy was presented as a two-dimensional circumplex (Fig-
ure 3.14) image in which motivation is presented along the circumference and where the
sophistication level increases with the radius. Each quadrant represents: Revenge, Finan-
cial, Notoriety and Curiosity.
Script kiddies, newbies and novices are adversaries with limited programming skills, who
are new to hacking and rely mainly on prewritten tools. Hacktivists and political ac-
tivists are motivated by political cause and not necessarily by personal gain. Cyber-
punks, crashers and thugs are attention-seeking hackers with more programming skills
than novices. Insiders and user malcontents are considered by many as the greatest risk
(Rogers, 2006; Gellers, Brant, and B., 2008; Meyers et al., 2009). Insiders, due to their
specialised knowledge, can cause a very large amount of damage. Coders and writers are
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Figure 3.11: Network Security Attacks Taxonomy by Simmonds et al. (2004)
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Figure 3.12: Vulnerability Map after Simmonds et al. (2004)
Figure 3.13: CIA Triad
primarily used to write code for use by the other groups. White hat hackers, old guard
and sneakers are hackers without malicious intent, who have no regard for privacy or
secrecy. Black hat hackers, professionals and elite are professional hackers who sell their
skills to the highest bidder. These adversaries can be employed by organised crime syn-
dicates. Cyber-terrorists are skilled hackers that engage in state-sponsored information
warfare. Meyers et al.'s list of cyber-adversaries are contained in the Actor, Aggressor
and Motivation classes (Section 4.2.1, 4.2.3, 4.2.9).
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Figure 3.14: A Circumplex of Adversaries after Meyers et al. (2009)
3.3.7 Diversity in Network Attacker Motivation: A Literature
Review by Rounds and Pendgraft (2009)
Rounds and Pendgraft (2009) investigated the diversity in network attacker motivations
and compiled a list of possible hacker agents (Figure 3.15). The researcher's Actor, Ag-
gressor and Motivation classes were inﬂuenced by their review of attacker motivation.
These classes are presented in sections 4.2.1, 4.2.3 and 4.2.9. Rounds and Pendgraft's
class does not separate between who is the attacker and who is sponsoring the attacker.
3.3.8 Dimension of Cyber-Attacks by Gandhi et al. (2011)
The goal of Gandhi et al. (2011)'s goal was to thoroughly understand a cyber-attack by
studying the nature and the motivation behind it. The taxonomy developed by Gandhi
et al. is shown in Figure 3.16. They noted that a hacker's motivation can be classiﬁed
into three classes: political, sociocultural and economical. These classes can overlap, as
shown in Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.15: Hacker Agents after Rounds and Pendgraft (2009)
The Aggressor and Actor classes of Section 4.2.3 and 4.2.1 have similarities with the
Gandhi et al. Attack Agent and Attack Co-ordination classes. For example, Nation States,
Script Kiddie, Hactivists, Cybervigilante, Cyber-Mafia, Organised Crime can directly be
mapped to the classes presented in sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.1.
Gandhi et al.'s Attack Victim class represents the main targets of cyber-attacks. These
victims are presented as the scope of an attack in Section 4.2.12. The Attack Consequences
class of Gandhi et al. Describes, with over 15 classes, what eﬀects or consequences cyber-
attacks have. These consequences are presented in Section 4.2.11 as the Sabotage class.
The Attack Motive presented by Gandhi et al. has three main classes: Socio-cultural,
Economic and Political. Gandhi et al. state that motivation is not set, but could contain
a combination of factors. How the factors can be combined is shown in Figure 3.17 as the
Attack Motive class.
This taxonomy had only a simplistic method to vulnerabilities and attack mechanisms.
The target and its properties were not presented in the same detail as the attacker,
aggressor and attack agent, which was developed in detail by Gandhi et al.
3.3.9 The Scrap Value of a Hacked PC, revisited by Krebs (2012)
Krebs (2009, 2012); Cardenas, Radosavac, Grossklags, Chuang, and Hoofnagle (2010)
compiled lists of all the methods in which a compromised PC can be used for ﬁnancial
gain. The goal of these lists are to demonstrate why someone would want to hack a PC
(Figure 3.18). Krebs' classes are contained within the researcher's Attack Goal class. More
speciﬁcally, the Steal Data and Gain Control sub-classes presented in Section 4.2.5 were
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Figure 3.16: Dimensions of Cyber-Attacks after Gandhi et al. (2011)
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Figure 3.17: Motivation Classes after Gandhi et al. (2011)
inﬂuenced by Krebs's classes. Krebs's reasons for hacking a Personal Computer (PC) are
extensive and can be used when analysing the reasons for attacking computers in detail.
3.3.10 Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classiﬁcation (CAPEC) is publicly available
lists of common attack patterns and a classiﬁcation taxonomy1. An attack pattern is
deﬁned as an abstraction of the mechanism employed by an attack. Each pattern deﬁnes
a challenge that an attacker faces and provides a description of the technique(s) used
by the attacker to overcome the problems faced in executing an attack. Recommended
methods for mitigating an actual attack are also listed. The comprehensive CAPEC
lists are community-developed and freely available2. The CAPEC lists' goal is to be
as comprehensive as possible, and thus provides too much detail and information to be
useful.
3.3.11 Taxonomies Overview
In this section, several network attack-related taxonomies are presented. Hansman and
Hunt (2003), CERT-In (2003), Simmonds et al. (2004) and Gandhi et al. (2011) developed
taxonomies that cover most aspects of network attacks. The motivations behind attacks
1http://capec.mitre.org/
2http://capec.mitre.org/data/index.html/
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Figure 3.18: Reasons for Hacking a PC after Krebs (2012)
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were probed by Rounds and Pendgraft (2009), whereas Krebs (2012) investigated all
the diﬀerent ways to make money from attacking a PC. The CAPEC lists provide a
comprehensive enumeration of attack patterns. The taxonomies listed in this section
contributed to the researcher's taxonomy, as presented in Chapter 4.
3.4 Ontologies used to Detect Computer-based Attacks
The use of ontologies in the study of network attacks is relatively new and not much has
been published on this. In this section, four network attack-related ontologies are pre-
sented. Most of these ontologies have not used automated reasoners to infer information,
such as those developed by the researcher in Chapter 5.
Gruber (1993) describes an ontology as: "a speciﬁcation of a representational vocabu-
lary for a shared domain of discourse  deﬁnitions of classes, relations, functions, and
other objects...". Noy and McGuinness (2001) deﬁned an ontology as: "... a com-
mon vocabulary for researchers who need to share information in a domain ... includes
machine-interpretable deﬁnitions of basic concepts in the domain and relations among
them" Grüninger and Fox (1995) state: "An ontology is a formal description of objects,
properties of objects and relations among objects". They list the following motivations
for developing an ontology:
∙ sharing a common understanding of the structure of information
∙ facilitating re-use of domain knowledge
∙ making domain assumptions clear
∙ separating domain knowledge from operational knowledge
∙ analysing domain knowledge
The research of Simmonds et al. (2004) into network security ontology concentrates mainly
on the taxonomy and presents a very limited ontology. In sections 3.4.2 to 3.4.5, research
into the use of network attacks is presented in chronological form.
3.4.1 RBAC Policy Engineering with Patterns by Rochaeli and
Eckert (2005)
Rochaeli and Eckert (2005) proposed an ontological approach to construct the knowledge
representation framework for computers and their vulnerabilities. A framework was de-
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veloped in which security administrators can search for patterns that match the scenario-
oriented risks and thus specify policies with the help of experts' knowledge. With this
framework, security administrators can interpret their detected scenario, compare with
patterns that match the scenario and assert instances of the scenario into the knowledge
representation framework.
3.4.2 An Ontology-supported Outbound Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem by Mandujano (2005)
Mandujano (2005) developed an ontology to generate and identify attack programme
signatures. Mandujano used Snort3 to match signatures as input data for their ontology.
This ontology is aimed at the packet-level intrusion detection and is therefore more suited
to a sensor within the researcher's system.
3.4.3 An Ontology-based Intrusion Alerts Correlation System by
Li and Tian (2010)
Li and Tian (2010) developed an ontology-based intrusion alerts correlation system. This
system consisted of agents and sensors, where the sensors collate security information and
agents process the information.
An automated reasoner was used to determine attack sessions and classes that could be
used to determine risk. The attack classes have to be analysed oine by experts. Li and
Tian's ontology cannot handle new types of attacks in real time as their knowledge base
has to be updated for new attacks.
This is a design feature. Their ontology is shown in Figure 3.19. The researcher's tax-
onomy and ontology also have Asset, Vulnerability and Attacker classes and hasAttacker
and hasVulnerability relationships. Li and Tian's Address class is presented by the author
as Actor Location.
3http://www.snort.org/
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Figure 3.19: Alert Correlation Ontology (Li and Tian, 2010)
3.4.4 Ontology-based Distributed Intrusion Detection System by
Abdoli and Kahani (2009)
Abdoli and Kahani (2009) developed a system that uses IDSagents and a special Master-
Agent for intrusion detection. The MasterAgent contains the attack ontology. When an
IDSagent detects an attack, a detection report is sent to the MasterAgent, which extracts
the semantic relationships. Their system was able to reduce false negatives and false
positives. Abdoli and Kahani's ontology is presented in Figure 3.20.
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Figure 3.20: Abdoli and Kahani (2009)'s Attack Ontology
This ontology only presented attacks and their sub-classes, and relationships and other
ontology properties were not developed.
3.4.5 An Ontology-based System to Identify Complex Network
Attacks by Frye et al. (2012)
Frye et al. (2012) used an ontology to determine what constitutes a network attack.
They developed an ontology with four main classes: Availability, Recon, GainAccess, and
ViewChangeData, and a separate ontology that presents complex attacks. The complex
ontology (Figure 3.21) with four main sub-classes is similar to four of the scenarios de-
veloped in Section 2.5. The relationships between the classes were only developed to a
limited extent to the levels of sub-class "intersection", "union" or "contains".
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Figure 3.21: Complex Attack Ontology (Frye et al., 2012)
3.4.6 Ontologies Overview
The use of ontologies to describe network attacks is still very limited and very few research
papers have been published in this ﬁeld of study. The ontologies vary signiﬁcantly and
thus no constant theme can be derived. For example, Frye et al. (2012) have only four
main classes without specifying their relationships.
3.5 Network Attack Sensors
Network attacks are measured by integrating information from various sensors. The
function and scope of these sensors are investigated in this section. The main sen-
sors that are used to detect computer network attacks are Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (IDSs). Mukherjee, Heberlein, and Levitt (1994) deﬁned network intrusion as:
"the problem of identifying individuals who are using a computer system without au-
thorization (i.e., `crackers') and those who have legitimate access to the system but are
abusing their privileges (i.e., the `insider threat')".
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Mukherjee et al. (1994) also postulated:
"IDS's are based on the belief that an intruder's behavior will be noticeably diﬀerent
from that of a legitimate user and that many unauthorized actions are detectable."
In this section, the type of sensors available and taxonomies of IDS are presented. Only
two IDS research papers are presented in sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 due to the researcher's
interest in the types of taxonomy of IDS, and not the details of their design or performance.
In this subsection the characteristics and methods of sensors are presented to present a
comprehensive picture on when and how sensors are used.
IDSs can either be host based or network-based (Anderson, 1980; Lunt and Jagannathan,
1988; Lunt, 1993; Mukherjee et al., 1994; Kuwatly, Sraj, Al Masri, and Artail, 2004;
Garcia-Teodoro, Diaz-Verdejo, Macia-Fernandez, and Vazquez, 2009). Network-based In-
trusion Detection System (NIDS) monitor network traﬃc, by examining network packets.
NIDS monitors the IP address, ports and the data segments of packets, whereas tradi-
tional ﬁrewalls only monitor the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and ports of data packets
(Kachirski and Guha, 2003). Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs) examine
data that is held on individual systems, which are used to protect a single system or a sin-
gle data source. Crosbie and Spaﬀord (1995) and Balasubramaniyan, Garcia-Fernandez,
Isacoﬀ, Spaﬀord, and Zamboni (1998) stated that for an IDS to be eﬀective, it must have
the following characteristics:
∙ It must run continually with minimal human supervision.
∙ It must be fault tolerant in the sense that it must be able to recover from system
crashes, either accidental or caused by malicious activity.
∙ It must resist subversion. The IDS must be able to monitor itself and detect if it
has been modiﬁed by an attacker.
∙ It must impose a minimal overhead on the system where it is running, so as to not
interfere with its normal operation.
∙ It must be able to be conﬁgured according to the security policies of the system
that is being monitored.
∙ It must be able to adapt to changes in system and user behaviour over time.
The Hybrid IDS system has been developed to use network- and host-based characteristics
(Day, Flores, and Lallie, 2012; Aydin, Zaim, and Ceylan, 2009). Abraham and Thomas
(2005) developed a Distributed IDS system that consists of multiple IDSs over a network,
which all communicate with each other, or with a central server.
Mandujano (2005) determined that three main classes of intrusion detection agents exist:
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∙ Sensors: Sensors are responsible for collecting data, and are divided into Traﬃc
Sensors or Process Sensors, depending on the source of data.
∙ Correlators: Correlators receive data from sensors and examine the data for events.
∙ Reactors: Reactors are triggered after speciﬁc events, and are divided into Guards
(that execute locally) and Tracers (that execute externally).
3.5.1 Anomaly and Misuse Detection
Stiawan, Idris, Ihsan, Hussain, and Abdullah (2011); Peddabachigari, Abraham, Grosan,
and Thomas (2007); Wu and Banzhaf (2010) describe two main intrusion detection meth-
ods:
∙ anomaly detection; and
∙ misuse detection.
Misuse detection uses predeﬁned signatures to search for matches for known intrusion
behaviour or known malware. Anomaly detection looks for statistical diﬀerences between
normal system behaviour and user behaviour. Behaviour that diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
the statistical norm is classiﬁed as malware or an intrusion.
Aydin et al. (2009) discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the two types of detec-
tion systems. Anomaly detection can detect attacks even if previous information about
the attack method is not available, but it has a high false positive rate. Anomaly detection
systems also require a large training data set. Misuse detection systems provide a simple
way of monitoring computer systems without the requirement of training data, but only
previously characterised attacks can be identiﬁed.
Idika and Mathur (2007) made a survey of malware detection methods. They listed three
main methods: anomaly, speciﬁcation and signature methods. Each of these methods
could then be split into a dynamic, static or hybrid approach to malware detection.
3.5.2 Threat Detection
Lunt and Jagannathan (1988) and Lunt (1993) developed an Intrusion Detection Expert
System (IDES) that learns the behaviour patterns of users. Thus threats were detected
by users or the computer system alternated suddenly from its usual behaviour. Two
categorical measures were used:
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∙ discrete measure: a function that uses ﬁnite measure of a user's behaviour, such as
user time and location of login; and
∙ continuous measure, a function that changes during usage, such as average Central
Processing Unit (CPU) use, and Input and Output (IO) activity.
Stiawan et al. (2011) investigated methods whereby threats can be identiﬁed. The follow-
ing methods have been incorporated by other researchers:
∙ The use of Domain Name System (DNS) Blacklists to stop man-in-the-middle at-
tacks have been investigated by Ramachandran, Dagon, and Feamster (2006).
∙ Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) port numbers can be used to identify
botnet activity (Karasaridis, Rexroad, and Hoeﬂin, 2007).
∙ URL and IP Block Blacklists are used to prevent access to malicious Internet sites
(Dietrich and Rossow, 2009).
∙ Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) lists are used to identify network vul-
nerabilities (FIRST-Forum, 2007). Attack methodologies and the source of attackers
can be determined from honeypot data (Provos, 2004).
∙ Intercepting and analysing traﬃc ﬂows can be used to identify network intrusions
(Sperotto, Schaﬀrath, Sadre, Morariu, Pras, and Stiller, 2010).
∙ Data stored in logs can indicate the presence of an attack and help the defender in
managing the attack (Kent and Souppaya, 2006).
∙ Spam rules prevent unwanted email from spreading by stopping the email before it
reaches its target (Madigan, 2005).
∙ Computer viruses are a signiﬁcant risk to computer systems that require eﬀective
and timely response (Subramanya and Lakshminarasimhan, 2001).
∙ Computer security policy should be an integral part of securing any computer net-
work (Sterne, 1991).
∙ IDS alerts indicate that an attack may be in progress and that a computer is vul-
nerable (Gula, 2011).
∙ Web Crawler data can be used to identify malware hosted on Internet sites (Moshchuk,
Bragin, Gribble, and Levy, 2006).
∙ Regular Expression pattern matching can be used to detect attacks in raw through-
put data (Vasiliadis, Polychronakis, Antonatos, Markatos, and Ioannidis, 2009).
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3.5.3 Taxonomy for Intrusion Detection Systems by Debar et al.
(2000)
Debar et al. (2000) constructed a taxonomy for intrusion detection systems. They build
from the eﬃciency measurement deﬁned by Porras and Valdes (1998). The measures
are: Accuracy, Performance, Completeness, Fault Tolerance and Timeliness. Their ﬁve
main concepts are: Detection Method, Behaviour on Detection, Audit Source Location,
Detection Paradigm and Usage Frequency. These classes and the taxonomy sub-classes
are:
∙ Accuracy: Reducing the occurrence of false positives. This refers to the classiﬁcation
of normal or legitimate traﬃc as malicious.
∙ Performance: The tempo or rate at which traﬃc can be analysed for malicious
traﬃc.
∙ Completeness: The chance of detecting all attacks. This measure is diﬃcult to
measure and impossible to achieve. This measure can only be measured when an
attack cannot be detected, which implies that the attack has been detected through
some other method.
∙ Fault Tolerance: The intrusion detection system itself must be able to handle and
defend the system against attacks. The detection systems itself must not add vul-
nerabilities to the system.
∙ Timeliness: The analysis and reporting of the intrusion detection system must occur
timeously, to ensure that someone can act on the information it presents. If the
detection or analysis of an attack is too slow, the relevance of identifying it may be
lost.
Debar et al.'s intrusion detection concepts are shown in Figure 3.22.
3.5.4 Intrusion Detection Systems: A Survey and Taxonomy by
Axelsson (2000)
Axelsson (2000) surveyed the ﬁeld of intrusion detection and presented a taxonomy that
described IDS systems with respect to their System Characteristics and Detection Princi-
ples (Figure 3.23). Anomaly detection principles depend on abnormalities in traﬃc rather
than detecting known intrusions.
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Figure 3.22: Intrusion Detection Concepts (Debar et al., 2000)
Signature detection principles determine intrusions by comparing behaviour with a model
of the intrusive process. These principles operate irrespective of user behaviour, by only
looking for intrusion-like patterns. Signature Inspired detection principles use anomaly
and signature principles to determine intrusive behaviour. Programmed methods require
direct input (in the form of an algorithm or list) to detect what is a security violation. Self-
Learning automatically learns suspicious behaviour after being trained through examples
of normal and intrusive behaviour. Time of detection refers to real-time or postponed
detection characteristics. Granularity of Data-Processing diﬀerentiates between continu-
ously processing data or handling data in batches. The main Source of Audit data sources
are either network data (for example multicast Ethernet streams) or host-based data (such
as security, kernel, application, ﬁrewall, logs, etc.).
The Response to Detected Intrusions are passive or active. Passive responses notify the
authority about the intrusion. Active responses can either try to thwart the attack by
controlling the attacked system or neutralise the threat directly. The last option is con-
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Figure 3.23: IDS System Characteristics and Detection Principles (Axelsson, 2000)
sidered a legal grey area and is fraught with legal dangers (Caltagirone and Frincke, 2005;
Mansﬁeld-Devine, 2009). Locus of data processing and Locus of data collection refer to
the manner in which data is processed, namely: distributed or centralised.
The Security characteristic refers to the ability of the IDS system to withstand an attack
on itself. The last characteristic found by Axelsson is Degree of inter-operability, whereby
the IDS can co-operate in conjunction with other IDSs.
3.5.5 Network Telescope
A network telescope, also known as a darknet, Sinkhole, Internet Motion Sensor or Black
Hole (Moore, Shannon, Voelker, and Savage, 2004; Harrop and Armitage, 2005; Bailey,
Cooke, Jahanian, Myrick, and Sinha, 2006), is a network system that observes diﬀerent
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events taking place on a network. Network telescopes have been used to monitor the
system for malicious Internet traﬃc (Irwin, 2011). The telescope observes traﬃc targeting
the dark (unused) address space of the network. Since all traﬃc to these addresses is
suspicious, information about possible network attacks can be obtained. The network
telescope is an ideal sensor to detect threats because:
∙ only malicious traﬃc is captured; and
∙ the following types of malicious traﬃc can be detected:
– random scanning malware (Moore et al., 2004),
– DDoS backscatter, (a DDoS attack using multiple spoofed addresses) (Moore,
Shannon, Brown, Voelker, and Savage, 2006),
– targeted scans.
3.5.6 Network Attack Sensors Overview
The best-known sensor to detect network attacks is an IDS. An IDS is typically either a
host, a network or a combination of the two. These IDSs either detect anomalies or direct
misuse. Threats can also be directly detected by learning users' patterns and detecting
alternative behaviour, and indirectly by suspicious data though network telescopes.
3.6 Summary
This chapter introduced the academic base of the network attack model of Chapter 4,
Section 4.4, the taxonomy of Chapter Section 4.2 and ontology of Chapter 5.3. Most of the
network attack models presented in Section 3.2 have only a few basic steps. The network
attack model developed in Section 3.2 uses very similar steps. Taxonomies that cover most
of the aspects of network attacks are presented in Section 3.3. Only a limited number of
ontologies are used to describe network attacks, and those presented in this chapter diﬀer
from each other. A comprehensive network attack ontology is presented in Chapter 5.
IDS and network telescope-type systems are the main sensors that are available to detect
network-based attacks. These sensors are either host or network based, or a combination
of the two. In the next chapters, the attack model, taxonomy and ontology are developed
in detail, based on the information provided in the presented literature study.
Part II
Theoretical
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CHAPTER
FOUR
NETWORK ATTACK TAXONOMY
"You don’t know the power of the Dark Side."
Darth Vader – Star Wars
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a taxonomy that describes network attacks and contains more than
15 main classes and more than 100 sub-classes. The researcher speciﬁcally developed it
to address computer network-based attacks and it focuses on the classes that are required
in order to specify such attacks. Several taxonomies have been developed by other re-
searchers, as reviewed in Section 3.3. In this section, the taxonomies are presented in the
form of diagrams, where each class and sub-class are represented. These taxonomies are
either too wide or too focused for this research. The taxonomy developed by Hansman
and Hunt (2003) provided the primary foundation for the author's taxonomy. According
to Hansman and Hunt (2003), a taxonomy has the following basic requirements:
∙ Acceptability and usefulness: If the community accepts it, the taxonomy will be
useful. This requirement can only be realised at a later time and is diﬃcult and
impractical to verify.
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∙ Comprehensibility and unambiguousness: The taxonomy should be understood by
novices as well as experts in the related ﬁeld. No doubt should exist as to what
a class or sub-class refers to. This taxonomy tries to enhance comprehensibility
speciﬁcally by diﬀerentiating between attacker and defender. For example, the At-
tack Mechanism is not shortened to Mechanism to clearly diﬀerentiate between the
mechanism used to attack and the mechanism under attack.
∙ Completeness: This requirement cannot be proven, or ever achieved. New tech-
nologies or too many subtle diﬀerences make it impossible to achieve completeness.
The Attack Mechanism class has over 30 sub-classes, and these sub-classes can be
further subdivided if required. For example, the Virus sub-class could be divided
into Boot Sector Virus, Polymorphic Virus and Macro Virus.
∙ Determinism and repeatability: The class or sub-class that is used should be simple
to determine. By clearly deﬁning what each class and sub-class represents, individu-
als should ﬁnd it simple to place. In most cases this could be easily achieved, except
for classes that specify unclear concepts. For example, it is diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate
between the Scope Size class and Medium Network and Large Network.
∙ Existing terminology should be used to avoid confusion and to build on previous
knowledge. Security terminology of previous taxonomies was used, where applicable.
The taxonomy developed in this chapter describes the attack from the point of view
of the attacker (aggressor) and defender (target). Thus both sides of a network attack
are described. The taxonomy presented in Section 4.2 was originally developed by the
author and presented by van Heerden, Leenen, Irwin, and Burke (2012a), although some
of the classes have since been updated. In Section 4.3, ten network attack scenarios are
explored. These scenarios were originally developed by van Heerden, Burke, and Irwin
(2012b). In Section 4.4, a temporal attack model is presented. Parts of this model were
ﬁrst presented by Grant, Burke, and van Heerden (2012). Section 4.5 concludes this
chapter with a summary of the taxonomy.
4.2 Taxonomy of Network Attacks
The main classes in the author's Network Attack Taxonomy are shown in Figure 4.1.
The classes are: Actor, Actor Location, Aggressor, Asset, Attack Goal, Attack Mechanism,
Attack Scenario, Automation Level, Effects, Motivation, Phase, Sabotage, Scope, Scope
Size, Target and Vulnerability. Each class has sub-classes that are described in the sections
below.
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Figure 4.1: Network Attack Taxonomy
The main goal of this taxonomy is to present all the factors that deﬁne or diﬀerentiate a
network-related attack. The secondary goal is to build an updated taxonomy that can be
understood and accepted by researchers in the ﬁeld of network attacks. The classes are
presented alphabetically, except for the Attack Scenario class, which is presented at the
end.
4.2.1 Actor Class
The Actor Class describes the entity that is performing the attack by coding malware,
executing malicious scripts or abusing the system. The Actor class is presented in Figure
4.2. This class has four main classes and seven sub-classes. This class was primarily
Figure 4.2: The Actor Class
derived from the work of Simmonds et al. (2004) and Rounds and Pendgraft (2009). The
taxonomy is presented in Section 3.3.5 and Rounds and Pendgraft's taxonomy in Section
3.3.7. From Simmonds et al., more detail was added to Group Actor to include Organised
Criminal Group, Protest Group and Cyber Army.
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The sub-class Organised Criminal Group refers to organisations that launch network and
computer attacks for ﬁnancial and other gain. For example, in Russia criminal organi-
sations have recruited hackers to launch attacks on their behalf (Savona and Mignone,
2004). The Organised Criminal Group sub-class is not placed in the Aggressor class be-
cause the Aggressor class refers to criminal groups that perform their own attacks and
not criminals who hire hackers. Choo (2008) stated that organised crime groups use the
Internet for criminal activity.
Protest groups refers to groups that attack networks based on an ethical agenda. This also
includes groups whose goals are driven by speciﬁc issues, and groups that use hacking to
eﬀect change or spread propaganda. Taylor (2001) referred to this practice as Hacktivism.
The hacking group Anonymous is an example of a protest group that launched network
attacks not as a criminal group, but rather as a protest group (Schwartz, 2012). The Cyber
Army sub-class refers to military personnel who perform computer-based attacks as part
of their normal duties. The concept of cyber-warriors and cyber-war had already became
mainstream in the mid-1990s with Time magazine (Figure 4.3) referring to cyber-war and
cyber-soldiers (Washington, 1995).
Figure 4.3: Time Magazine August 21, 1995 Cover Page
The Insider sub-class refers to a person who is a member of a target organisation or
is in some trusted relationship with the target. Magklaras and Furnell (2001) deﬁned
three main insider groups: System masters, Advanced users and Application users. The
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Advanced and Application users are classiﬁed as Normal users and System masters as
Administrators. The distinction between Advanced and Application users was considered
too vague for this taxonomy.
For this research it was decided to group Hacker, Cracker and Malevolent user in the
researcher's Hacker sub-class, where Rounds and Pendgraft (2009) used a ﬂat structure.
Rounds and Pendgraft hacker agents are listed in Section 3.3.7. The hacker agents of
Rounds and Pendgraft (2009) were used to verify the possible classes, although some of
their classes were used by the Aggressor class. The Hacker sub-class was subdivided into
Script Kiddie and Skilled Hacker. Script Kiddie refers to hackers that use freely available
tools without any in-depth knowledge of their inner workings (Murry, 2004). (Spitzner,
2000, p. 1) deﬁned a Script Kiddie as follows:
"The script kiddie is someone looking for the easy kill. They are not out for speciﬁc
information or targeting a speciﬁc company. Their goal is to gain root the easiest way
possible. They do this by focusing on a small number of exploits, and then searching
the entire Internet for that exploit. Sooner or later they ﬁnd someone vulnerable."
4.2.2 Actor Location Class
This class refers to the country or state from where an attack is launched, and derives
from the "location of attack" class developed by Undercoﬀer, Pinkston, Joshi, and Finin
(2004). These researchers categorised the location of an attack as Remote, Local or
Remote/Local. The only class not listed by Undercoﬀer et al. is one where the location
is not known. The Actor Location sub-classes are shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: The Actor Location Class
The actor location can thus be outside the target's national borders, i.e. Foreign. Foreign
refers to an Actor that is external to its own national borders. Lewis (2002) suggested that
foreign militaries, criminals or terrorists can initiate cyber-attacks and thus constitute a
cyber-threat. The second sub-class refers to an actor within the target's national borders.
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Sometimes an actor location cannot be determined or spans diﬀerent countries. In such
cases, the Indeterminate sub-class is used. Although the location of an attacking computer
can be determined, it does not necessarily correspond with the actor's physical location
as the attack can be executed via the Internet (Xin, Dickerson, and Dickerson, 2003).
4.2.3 Aggressor Class
This class refers to the perpetrator of an attack, and diﬀers from the Actor class in that
it describes an association with an Actor, rather than a type of Actor. The sub-classes of
the Aggressor class are shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: The Aggressor Class
State refers to a nation or state that sanctions an attack. Gandhi et al. deﬁned a similar
sub-class Nation States. Some researchers suggested that France, Russia, Japan, China,
Germany, Israel and South Korea are actively engaged in economic espionage by means
of the Internet and computer network attacks (Joyal, 1996; Kshetri, 2005; Brenner and
Crescenzi, 2006; Burstein, 2009). Commercial Aggressor refers to a corporate entity, for
example the News of the World British tabloid that authorised other entities to hack
celebrities' cellphones (Myler and Wapping, 2011). Commercial Aggressor has the sub-
classes Organised Group Aggressor and Flash Mob. Organised Group Aggressor refers to
a perpetrator with commercial associations, for example People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (PETA)1. Flash Mob refers to attackers that are not oﬃcially organised, and
participants do not necessarily know each other. The SCO computer network was attacked
in December 2003. Although no evidence exists, it is suspected that the attack was
instigated following a lawsuit against IBM concerning IBM's use of Linux, and that open-
source activists were the attackers (Argyraki and Cheriton, 2005). When the Aggressor
1http://www.peta.org/
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and Actor are the same entity, the Self Instigator sub-class is used. This sub-class refers
to lone hackers who are not motivated by an external party. The Unknown Aggressor sub-
class is used when the identity of the perpetrator is unknown. For example, up to 2010,
the instigators and perpetrators of the Conﬁcker Worm attack have not been identiﬁed
(Conﬁcker Working Group, 2011).
4.2.4 Asset Class
This class refers to the device class that is under attack. This class distinguishes between
diﬀerent assets that can be attacked. Examples of assets are information stored as data,
the system that uses computers, or the network infrastructure itself. The Asset class is
shown in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: The Asset Class
Typically, the goal of Denial-of-Service attacks is to deny users access to their own com-
puter resources or as described by Specht and Lee (2004):
"DoS attack is an attack with the purpose of preventing legitimate users from using a
speciﬁed network resource".
When an attack targets communication infrastructure, the aﬀected asset is classiﬁed as
Network. When attacks aﬀect information, Data is the asset under attack. This can
include changing data, stealing data and removing data. The Access sub-class refers to
unauthorised access to the situation where computers or computer networks have been
obtained.
Some attacks make use of computer networks. Two signiﬁcant examples are the Logic
Bomb (Section 2.4.2) and the Stuxnet Worm (Section 2.4.29), which aﬀected physical
assets outside the computer network. With the Logic Bomb, a pipeline was aﬀected, and
with Stuxnet centrifuges were aﬀected. These attacks are classiﬁed so as to aﬀect the
System asset.
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4.2.5 Attack Goal Class
This class refers to the purpose of the attack, and is subdivided as shown in Figure 4.7:
Steal Data, Change Data, Disrupt, Gain Control, Gain Resources and Spread.
Figure 4.7: The Attack Goal Class
Steal Data, Change Data, Disrupt correspond with the traditional CIA+ information secu-
rity principles and Simmonds et al. (2004) outcome classes. Examples of the Stealing Data
sub-class are Titan Rain (Section 2.4.14) and Operation Aurora 2009 (Section 2.4.28). A
hacker changed the grades of more than 60 current and former students from Santa Clara
University (Zetter, 2012b). This attack falls under the Change Data sub-class as well as
the attack on HP Gary (Section 2.4.32). Hansman and Hunt (2003) referred to this as
Corruption of Information.
The Gain Control goal represents instances where the network under attack is used only
as a staging post for attacks on a diﬀerent network. When information is disclosed without
permission (Hansman and Hunt, 2003), the Steal Data sub-class is used. The Conﬁcker
Worm's goal is to build a platform from where other attacks can be launched (Conﬁcker
Working Group, 2011), and thus can be classiﬁed as Spread. The Gain Resources goal
represents the goal of obtaining computer resources such as processing power, bandwidth
and disk memory. The Gain Control goal refers to gaining administrator rights to a
system.
4.2.6 Attack Mechanism Class
This class represents the attack methodology, and is linked to vulnerability maps devel-
oped by Simmonds et al. (2004). Attack mechanisms have also been listed by Hansman
and Hunt (2003). The sub-classes are presented in Figure 4.8, where Attack Mechanism
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Figure 4.8: The Attack Mechanism (AM) Class
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is shortened to AM. The ﬁrst sub-classes are presented in Figure 4.8a: Denial of Service
AM. System Abuse, Exploit, Information Gathering, and Malware.
The System Abuse sub-class refers to the abuse of computer resources (as shown in Figure
4.8b). Three main resources have been identiﬁed: Processing Power System Abuse, Band-
width System Abuse and Storage System Abuse. Although Krebs (2012) identiﬁed over 30
abuses of computer systems, these can be summarised as abuse of processing power, disk
space or bandwidth when the physical components of a system are considered.
Malware attacks can take the form of Trojans, Viruses or Worms, shown in Figure 4.8c.
Vasudevan and Yerraballi (2006) deﬁned malware as: "a generic term that encompasses
viruses, trojans, spywares and other intrusive code." There is currently no clear scientiﬁc
distinction between the diﬀerent types of malware-based attack methodologies. Yampol-
skiy and Govindaraju (2007) listed the most acknowledged deﬁnitions:
∙ Virus: a self-replicating malicious programme which requires a careless user or ex-
ternal software to replicate itself
∙ Worm: a self-replicating programme that automatically spreads through vulnera-
bilities
∙ Trojan Horse: a malware programme posing as a legitimate programme
The Information Gathering sub-class refers to the mechanisms used to acquire informa-
tion about a possible target, for example public information on websites. Information
Gathering sub-classes are shown in Figure 4.8d. Search engines such as Google can be
used to ﬁnd Open Information, even though the target does not realise that the infor-
mation is available. This technique is also referred to as Google Hacking (Long, 2007).
Information required for an attack can also be totally in the open. Corporate websites and
phone directories sometimes publicly list email addresses and telephone numbers that can
be used for attacks. One of the most popular methods to scan computers is to identity
which ports are open. Lee, Roedel, and Silenok (2003) found that port scans represented a
measurable portion of Internet traﬃc. Some information that an attacker uses is publicly
available. Scanning (also know as vulnerability scanning) refers to the process of probing
computers with the goal of identifying which services are running, which operating system
they are using or which applications are actively running with the goal of ﬁnding vulnera-
bilities. Social Engineering attack mechanisms refer to processes used to gain access to a
target by misleading people into granting access or giving away conﬁdential information
by means of social interactions (Goodchild, 2010). Social engineering is deﬁned by Rouse
(2006, p. 1) as follows:
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"Social engineering is a term that describes a non-technical kind of intrusion that relies
heavily on human interaction and often involves tricking other people to break normal
security procedures."
Spear Phishing refers to targeted social engineering-type email attacks (Jagatic, Johnson,
Jakobsson, and Menczer, 2007). Boerio and McCracken (2012) diﬀerentiated between
spear phishing and a general Phishing in that regular phishing targets a large amount
of people, with a small chance of success per person, and spear phishing targets a small
number of people with a large chance of success. Brody, Mulig, and Kimball (2007) state
that spear phishing is harder to detect since spear messages appear to be legitimately sent
from people known to have an established relationship with the target. Kevin Mitnick
often used social engineering as his favourite method of attack, and even wrote two books
on the subject (Mitnick et al., 2002; Mitnick and Simon, 2005).
Denial of Service Attack Mechanisms refers to attacks that use valid communication
methodologies in malicious methods or in great numbers to deny the correct users access
(as shown in Figure 4.8e). These attacks can be on one of the following vectors (Lau,
Rubin, Smith, and Trajkovic, 2000; Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004):
∙ Host Denial of Service Attack Mechanisms, an attack on a single hosts
∙ Network Denial of Service Attack Mechanisms, an attack that consumes all available
bandwidth
∙ Distributed Denial of Service Attack Mechanisms, an attack that uses or targets
multiple systems in the attacks
The Exploit attack mechanisms (Figure 4.8f) are used to present the methodologies that
are used to attack vulnerabilities directly. The main sub-classes for this sub-class are:
∙ Network-based Exploit (Figure 4.8g);
∙ Access Exploit (Figure 4.8h);
∙ Web Application Exploit (Figure 4.8i); and,
∙ Password Exploit (Figure 4.8j).
Network-based Exploit refers to attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the network. These
attacks use and abuse data that ﬂows on the network, using the following mechanisms:
∙ Spoofing. With a spooﬁng attack misleading context is created with the goal of hoax-
ing a victim into trusting malicious intended information (Felten, Balfanz, Dean,
and Wallach, 1997). This technique is typically used to change IP source packets
(Bremler-Barr and Levy, 2005).
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∙ Open Access. This refers to attacks that defeated systems because no security
existed, or that assumed that security by obscurity would be enough (Mercuri and
Neumann, 2003; Hoepman and Jacobs, 2007).
∙ Session Hijack. With this attack mechanism the attacker gains access to a user's
session by obtaining his session identiﬁcation information (Kol²ek, 2002).
Access Exploit attack mechanisms abuse access mechanisms to provide access on a false
premise. This can be achieved by:
∙ Buffer Overflow. The Buﬀer Overﬂow method can be used when systems do not
perform checks on the input limits. This oversight can be abused by overriding secu-
rity measures via specialised crafted input. The Morris Worm (Section 2.4.5) used
a buﬀer overﬂow vulnerability to propagate (Cowan, Pu, Maier, Walpole, Bakke,
Beattie, Grier, Wagle, Zhang, and Hinton, 1998).
∙ Physical Access. This refers to manual methods of gaining access, for example
physically removing the hard drive or breaking the access door to enter a secure
server room.
∙ Escalation. This is also known as privilege escalation, where administration rights
are obtained by attacking ﬂaws in the operating system or application design (Govin-
davajhala and Appel, 2006).
Web Application Exploit attack mechanisms refer to methods used speciﬁcally on websites
and web servers. Web servers are vulnerable to uniquely related attacks because of their
interactive nature, and they are designed to interact and exchange data which enables
them to use the following attack mechanisms:
∙ SQL injection. This uses common escape characters to execute user-deﬁned database
queries, thus bypassing authentications and other security measures (Mookhey and
Burghate, 2004).
∙ Cross-site scripting (XSS). This is a methodology that enables attackers to inject
client-side script into web pages. These pages can then be viewed by unsuspecting
users (Mookhey and Burghate, 2004).
∙ Web Crawl. This is a process used by search engines or crawling software to collect
information from web pages (Castillo, 2005).
Password Exploit attack mechanisms refer to methods used to obtain or bypass password
protection, such as:
∙ Brute force. These are attacks that attempt to bypass security by trying each pos-
sible key sequentially (Cowan, Wagle, Pu, Beattie, and Walpole, 2000; Steﬀan and
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Schumacher, 2002). This type of attack mechanism systematically uses all possible
character key combinations to uncover username and password combinations. This
process does not require skill and is thus referred to as brute force.
∙ Sniffing. This entails eavesdropping on communications to capture secrets such as
passwords (Oppliger, 1998).
∙ Guessing. This entails overcoming password protection by guessing popular pass-
words (Gong, 1995).
4.2.7 Automation Level Class
This class describes the degree to which network attacks are automated. The sub-classes
for the Automation Level class are shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: The Automation Level Class
The sub-classes were derived from Mirkovic and Reiher (2004)'s taxonomy. Manual refers
to an attacker selecting the attack target and methodology by hand. Automatic refers
to a system requiring minimum input from the attacker, even with regards to target
selection. Mudge (2011) lists methods and tools that can be used to automate attacks.
Many attacks are Semi-automatic, where a mixture of automation and manual methods
are used, and some user interaction is required, but tools are used to execute attacks.
4.2.8 Effect Class
This class refers to the impact of an attack. Mirkovic and Reiher (2004) discussed the
impact of diﬀerent attacks. The sub-classes for the Eﬀects class are shown in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10: The Eﬀect Class
Null refers to no eﬀect on the target, Minor to recoverable damage and Major to non-
recoverable damage. Catastrophic refers to damage of such a nature that the target ceases
to operate as an entity, for example declaration of bankruptcy.
4.2.9 Motivation Class
This class refers to an attacker's motivation for an attack. Rounds and Pendgraft (2009)
listed three kinds of possible motivations: political, socio-cultural and economical. These
classes were also used by Gandhi et al. (2011). The sub-classes are shown in Figure 4.11:
Figure 4.11: The Motivation Class
Financial refers to hacking for ﬁnancial or other gain, such as stealing money or manip-
ulating the stock market. The attack on SA Postbank (Section 2.4.33) was motivated by
possible ﬁnancial gain. The Financial motivation can be criminal in nature, but Crimi-
nal motivation refers in this case to criminal organisations that use network hacking to
supplement their operations. For example, attacking law enforcement agencies' networks
to disrupt investigations is motivated by criminal intent. The Financial and Criminal
mutually are not multilaterally exclusive. Fun refers to hackers looking for a challenging
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hack with no other evil intentions. Many of the most famous worms and viruses were not
developed with any harm intended, but got out of the creators' control. Ethical motiva-
tion refers to motivation that has an ethical aspect. This ethical aspect can be national
interest by spies, political reasoning or vigilantes.
4.2.10 Phase Class
The Phase class was derived from the temporal attack model in Section 4.4. Figure 4.12
presents the phase classes. Within the taxonomy, their temporal relationships are not
presented, but only their deﬁnitions.
Figure 4.12: The Phase Class
Target Identification refers to the action of an attacker choosing a target. The target
identiﬁcation phase ends when a speciﬁc device or entity (an individual, company or state
institution) has been identiﬁed.
Reconnaissance refers to the action of an attacker probing a target for a weakness. Probing
consists of scanning, Google queries and other network-related activities. No computer or
network system is changed or adversely aﬀected. The goal is to identify avenues of attack
whilst leaving network operations unaﬀected.
Attack refers to the action of compromising the target according to the CIA principles
(conﬁdentiality, integrity or availability), and has three sub-phases. The Ramp-Up sub-
phase refers to the action of an attacker preparing to achieve a goal. The target may be
aﬀected, but not necessarily adversely. An example of the Ramp-Up phase is installation
of a sniﬀer by an attacker on an unsuspecting user to harvest clear text passwords for
later use so as to steal data. The Damage sub-phase refers to the action of the attacker
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inﬂicting damage on the target. Damage may take the form of breached conﬁdential-
ity, compromised integrity or disrupted service availability. Damage can be inﬂicted via
data, physical means (computer-controlling hardware) or to the target's reputation. The
Residue sub-phase refers to damage or artefacts of the attack that occur after the attack
goal has been achieved, and occurs because the attacker loses control of some systems.
For example, after the launch of a DDoS attack, zombie computers may still connect to
the target for some days following the attack.
Post-Attack refers to actions undertaken by an attacker after the attack has occurred, and
takes the form of inspections to verify if backdoors are still available, or scans to verify
if security holes have been patched. The goal is not to inﬂict damage, but to verify the
target's status.
4.2.11 Sabotage Class
This class refers to the type of loss the target experiences during and after the attack. The
Sabotage class is inspired by Gandhi et al. (2011) Attack Consequences class. Sabotage
diﬀers from the Attack Goal, by referring to the damage of the target, not the attackers
goal (even though it usually is the same). The sub-classes are shown in Figure 4.13.
Figure 4.13: The Sabotage Class
Physical Sabotage refers to physical damage of a device; such as that caused to the Siberian
pipeline by the original Logic Bomb. Financial Loss sabotage refers to monetary loss.
Virtual sabotage occurs when computer resources are lost (such as processing, bandwidth
or memory). Reputational Loss is not a measurable tangible loss, but may result in other
related problems for a company later on. Operational Loss occurs when the system cannot
perform its required function. Secret Loss refers to when secrets have been compromised.
4.2. TAXONOMY OF NETWORK ATTACKS 88
(a) The Scope Class
(b) The Scope Size Class
Figure 4.14: Scope and Scope Size Classes
4.2.12 Scope and Scope Size Classes
This class refers to the type of entity that is targeted. The Scope class diﬀers from the
Target class in that it views the entity holistically, rather than looking at speciﬁc devices,
and it is based on the Gandhi et al. (2011) Attack Victim class. The sub-classes for
the Scope class are shown in Figure 4.14a. The Corporate Network sub-class refers to
networks controlled by private companies. The Government Network sub-class refers to
networks controlled by the government. Individual Scope is used when the target is a
single person or computer. The Military Network sub-class refers to networks under the
control of a military institution. Critical Information Infrastructure includes networks
that are essential to a nation's economy by providing vital services.
The Scope Size class refers to the size of entity that is targeted. The sub-classes for
this class are shown in Figure 4.14b. If the attacks aﬀect a large portion of the Internet
or multiple countries, the scope size is referred to as Global Network. Large Network
represents large cooperates or signiﬁcant government networks such as state departments.
There are no hard deﬁnitions that separate small, medium and large networks and thus
the separation is a subjective judgement. Single size is used to present attacks on a single
person or single computer.
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4.2.13 Target Class
This class refers to physical devices that are targeted by an attack, whereas the Hansman
and Hunt (2003) taxonomy included the software operating systems in its taxonomy.
Hansman and Hunt's level of detail is considered too ﬁne for the researcher's taxonomy.
The sub-classes are shown in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15: The Target Class
The Personal Computer sub-class refers to desktop PCs, laptops, tablets and similar de-
vices with a single user. Internet-based attacks on smartphones also falls within this class.
Network Infrastructure Device refers to devices such as routers and switches that only en-
able data ﬂow, but can still be attacked. Industrial Equipment refers to computerised
automation equipment used in industrial plants. This equipment is also referred to as
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. A PC has a lot of useful
information or other malicious uses that can be used by an attacker. Krebs (2009, 2012)
compiled a list of all the methods in which the information on a compromised PC can
be used for monetary gain (Section 3.3.9). Server subclass refers to computing devices
that provide services to clients. These clients either run on the same computer or other
computers via a network. Server has the following subclasses: Web Server, File Server,
Email Server and Application Server. Any server that falls outside of an Email Server, a
File Server or a Web Server can be classiﬁed as an Application Server.
4.2.14 Vulnerability Class
This class refers to the weaknesses exploited by the attacker. Simmonds et al. (2004)
constructed a Vulnerability map, as shown in Section 3.3.5. Undercoﬀer et al. (2004)
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listed the following vulnerabilities: input validation errors, buﬀer overﬂows, boundary
condition errors and other malformed input. The vulnerability map of Simmonds et al.
diﬀerentiates according to short and long terms. The researcher's Vulnerability does not
have a temporal aspect, and no distinction should therefore be made between short-
and long-term vulnerabilities. The ﬁrst level of sub-classes for this class is the same as
developed by Hansman and Hunt (2003). The sub-classes for the Vulnerability class are
shown in Figure 4.16.
Figure 4.16: The Vulnerability Class
Configuration vulnerabilities describe instances where vulnerabilities are exposed by in-
correct conﬁguration of a device or software. Two types of incorrect conﬁguration are
listed, namely Access Rights and Default Setup. Access Rights refers to an instance where
incorrect access rights have been allocated to normal users. For example, Citigroup was
hacked by thieves that penetrated the bank's defences by ﬁrst logging on to the site
reserved for its credit card customers (Schartz and Dash, 2011). Default set-up refers
to the use of default usernames and passwords to overcome the security of a system.
This vulnerability is often caused by inexperienced or lazy users. Lancor and Workman
(2007) described how Google can be used to hack systems by using default usernames and
passwords.
Design vulnerabilities render a system insecure because of design errors. Design errors
can be either in the protocol or in the access control. The "Ping-of-death" is an example
of a protocol vulnerability (Karig and Lee, 2001).
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Implementation vulnerabilities refer to vulnerabilities introduced by faulty coding or sys-
tem construction, and have the following sub-classes:
∙ Buffer Overflow refers to the ability of injecting an attack code (Cowan et al., 2000).
∙ Race Condition refers to the creation of a vulnerability in a programme due to a
short opening for an attacker also known as a timed window vulnerability (Bishop
and Dilger, 1996).
∙ An SQL Injection vulnerability enables an attacker to take advantage of ﬂawed
coding of websites. An attacker usually injects SQL commands into a website that
then allows him access to a database (Razvan, 2009).
∙ Variable Type Checking is also known as format string vulnerability, where an at-
tacker can abuse input variable strings to inject code or gain access (Shankar, Talwar,
Foster, and Wagner, 2001).
4.3 Attack Scenarios
In Section 2.5, ten network attack scenarios were identiﬁed. The attacks listed in Chapter
2 (Figure 4.17) are classiﬁed according to these listed attack scenarios.
Figure 4.17: The Attack Scenario Class
McDowell (2009, p. 1) from the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US CERT) deﬁned a Denial-of-Service attack as: "attempts to prevent legitimate users
from accessing information or services". Almeida and Mutina (2011) noted that they
were able to archive 1 419 203 examples of web defacements. Denial-of-Service attacks
can take many forms, such as Bandwidth Depletion Attacks (Ampliﬁcation Attacks or
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Flood Attacks) or Resource Depletion Attacks (Protocol Exploit Attacks or Malformed
Packet attacks) (Specht and Lee, 2004). When multiple computers are used to attack a
system and attempt to overwhelm it by sheer number of connections, it is referred to as
a DDoS. For example, the DDoS attack on U.S. ﬁnancial institutions in December 2012
peeked at 60 Gbps (Constantin, 2012). The Estonia Hack Attack, SCO Denial-of-Service
and Maﬁaboy exploits can be considered Denial-of-Service type attacks.
Industrial Espionage refers to network attacks of which the goal is to acquire commercial
secrets such as source code, industrial processes, customer lists, etc. Titan Rain, Op-
eration Aurora, and Operation Shady Rat can be considered Industrial Espionage-type
attacks.
Web Defacement refers to vandalism of a public website. The motive for defacing websites
could be for entertainment, looking for a challenge, patriotism, a political agenda or
revenge (Balakrishnan and Sarma, 2004). Almeida and Mutina (2011) noted with concern
that in 2010 they were able to archive 1 419 203 website defacements. The defacement of
Apache.org and HB Gary Hack can be considered Web Defacement attacks.
Unauthorised Data Access refers to curious or malicious individuals, spies or anyone snoop-
ing around for secrets. Most of Kevin Mitnick's attacks focused on looking for secrets.
The PlayStation hack can also be deﬁned as snooping for secrets.
Financial Theft refers to stealing money via computers. Computer networks in banks and
other ﬁnancial institutions can be compromised and money can be transferred electron-
ically to criminals. Individuals can also be targeted and attacked through web banking
interfaces. The attacks on Citi Bank and SA Postbank are examples of network attacks
with ﬁnancial theft as the main goal.
Resource Theft refers to the act of controlling computers so that the collection of computer
resources can be sold or used at a later date. For example, millions of "zombie" computers
are for sale on the Internet black market (Markoﬀ, 2007). MyDoom, Conﬁcker and Code
Red are examples of malware that attempted to amass computer resources. Industrial
Sabotage refers to damaging industrial capability of commercial or state entities. The
Logic Bomb and Stuxnet are examples of industrial sabotage.
The South Ossetia Incident and the Estonia Incident had elements of Cyber-Warfare even
though no war was declared. Beidleman (2009, p. 10,12,13) deﬁned cyber-war, cyber-
attacks and cyber-space as follows:
Cyber-war: when cyber-attacks reach the threshold of hostilities commonly recognized
as war by the international community and deﬁned by international law.
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Cyber-attacks: a subset of cyber-operations employing the hostile use of computers
and information technology infrastructure to achieve eﬀects or objectives in or through
cyber-space.
Cyber-space: global domain within the information environment consisting of the in-
terdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and con-
trollers.
Some attacks result from software that escapes control and spreads further than initially
intended. This malware is sometimes only written to prove a point or exploit a new
vulnerability, but then goes out of control. Many of the famous viruses and worms of
the 1980s and 1990s are examples of out-of-control software. The I-LOVE-YOU Worm,
Morris Worm, Melissa, SQL Slammer, Brain Virus, PC-Write Trojan, Chameleon Virus,
Michelangelo Virus, Laroux, Cabir Worm, Sony XPS and Ikee attacks listed in Chapter
2 fall within the Runaway Malware category.
When physical industrial equipment is targeted, rather than the information, network
or services, the attack is referred to as Industrial Sabotage. Stuxnet, which targeted the
centrifuges of Iran's nuclear programme, and the Logic Bomb attacks, which targeted the
gas pipeline, fall within this category.
The System Compromise scenario refers to unauthorised personnel or hackers gaining user
rights out of their scope. A system compromise attack refers to hackers breaking into a
single or multiple computers without authorisation and taking control of such a system.
Thus the computer system is considered compromised. Flame malware is an example of
an attack with the goal of compromising systems.
4.4 Model of Network Attacks
In this section, a temporal network attack model is described. This model is based on
the models presented in Section 3.2 and by van Heerden et al. (2012c). This attack
model consists of the multiple phases (also referred to as stages) of an attack. Four
basic phases were identiﬁed: Target Identification, Reconnaissance, Attack and Post-
attack Reconnaissance. The Attack phase was divided into three sub-phases: Ramp-up,
Damage and Residue. Each phase is unique, but their temporal instances can overlap.
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4.4.1 Network Attack Phase
The phases either follow each other discretely as shown in Figure 4.18a, or overlap tem-
porally to some extent, as shown in Figure 4.18b.
(a) Discrete Attack Model
(b) Non-Discrete Attack Model
Figure 4.18: Network Attack Model
The Target Identification phase represents actions undertaken by an attacker in choosing
a target. Identiﬁcation of these actions falls outside the scope of threat identiﬁcation, but
forms part of the overall threat model.
The Reconnaissance phase represents actions undertaken by an attacker to identify poten-
tial weak spots. These actions are the earliest indications that a network will fall under
attack, before any real damage has occurred. Popular reconnaissance actions include
network mapping and scanning with tools such as Nmap2, Nessus3 (Feng, 2003; Fyodor,
1998; Deraison, 2005) and Zmap4 (Durumeric, Wustrow, and Halderman, 2013).
Google and other search engines can also be used to identify potential weak spots. The
2http://www.nmap.org
3http://www.tenable.com/
4https://zmap.io/
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Attack phase represents modiﬁcation of the target system by the attacker. The system
can be modiﬁed in terms of the following aspects:
∙ conﬁdentiality;
∙ integrity; and
∙ availability.
These aspects are also known as the CIA triad (as shown in Section 3.3.5) . Conﬁdential-
ity is the term used to prevent the disclosure of information to unauthorised individuals
or systems. Integrity means that data cannot be modiﬁed undetectably. Availability
refers to the availability of information when required by the system to serve its pur-
pose. In computing, e-business and information security, it is necessary to ensure that
data, transactions, communications and documents are genuine. It is also important that
authentication validates the identities of both parties involved.
The Attack phase is subdivided into sub-phases. The ﬁrst sub-phase is the Ramp-up
phase. This sub-phase refers to the preparatory actions performed by an attacker before
his/her ﬁnal goal can be attained. The targeted computer network is modiﬁed in this
phase, but only in preparation for some other goal. This phase typically includes the
installation of backdoors and other malware.
The Damage sub-phase refers to actions undertaken by an attacker during the achievement
of his/her ﬁnal goal. In this sub-phase, the network is compromised in terms of the
Information Security CIA principles. For example, when an attacker launches a DDoS
attack on a network, the Damage sub-phase is entered as soon as the attack is launched.
The process of installing DDoS attack software falls under the Ramp-up state.
The Residue sub-phase refers to unintended communications and actions by malware after
an attack has been completed. For example, computers that have incorrect time settings
may attack their target at a later date and/or time than when the original co-ordinated
attack was planned. This is also noticed in DDoS attacks.
The Post-Attack Reconnaissance phase refers to scouting and other similar reconnaissance
actions performed by an attacker after completion of the Attack phase. The attacker's
goal in this phase is to verify the eﬀects of his/her attack and to assess whether the same
methodology can be used again in the future.
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4.4.2 Structured Analysis and Design Technique Analysis
Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) is used to specify the actions of sys-
tems in terms of functional processes (Marca and McGowan, 1987). SADT uses a graphical
notation to symbolise the system as a group of boxes connected by arrows. The boxes rep-
resent processes and the arrows interfaces between the processes. Information is passed
from each process concurrently to the next through the interface arrows. Arrows that
enter into the left side of a box represent input data. Arrows that enter into the top of
a box represent control inputs. Arrows that enter into the bottom of a box represent the
mechanisms or resources required. Arrows are only allowed to exit a box from the right
and represent data output. Only the input and output data is changed in a box; the
control and resource inputs are not aﬀected by these processes.
Each box (process) can be separated into sub-boxes (sub-processes). With the SADT
notation, this was symbolised by enclosing a group of boxes within a larger box. The
larger box inputs and outputs must be the same as the inputs and outputs of the smaller
boxes that are not interconnected. These inputs and outputs are referred to as free inputs
and free outputs. Marca and McGowan stated that SADT should topically have three to
seven boxes (processes). Grant et al. (2012) used the SADT process to evaluate diﬀerent
Oﬀensive Cyber Operations models. The attack model is presented as a SADT model in
Figure 4.19.
The model presented in Figure 4.19 consists of four main boxes: Target Identification,
Reconnaissance, Attack and Post-attack Reconnaissance. These boxes are the same as the
phases presented in Section 4.4. The Target Identification box has two inputs: potential
targets that can be attacked, and the motivation for the attack. The output of this block
is the attack goal and a list of targets.
The list of targets is the input for the Reconnaissance box. The mechanism which this
box uses is a predeﬁned list of weaknesses and attack avenues. The output of the Recon-
naissance box identiﬁes weaknesses and possible avenues for attack. Weakness refer to
the state of the target and avenues for attack methodologies that the attacker can use.
The Attack box uses four inputs: the attack goal and identiﬁed target outputs from the
Target Identification box, weaknesses identiﬁed, and possible avenues for attack outputs
from the Reconnaissance box. The output of the Attack box is the breached CIA and
artefacts that the attack caused. These artefacts are unintentional behaviour of the tar-
geted network because of the attack, for example when an attacker can lock out legitimate
users by repeatable failed logins.
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Figure 4.19: SADT Composition Attack Model
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The Post-attack Reconnaissance box uses the attack goal, breached CIA and attack arte-
facts as inputs. This box has a single output: the status of the target. The status is an
indication of how eﬀective the attack was.
The Attack box is expanded to three more boxes: Ramp-up, Damage and Residue. The
Residue box uses the identiﬁed targets, weaknesses and possible avenues for attacks as
inputs. Its output is malware and access. This malware now directly attacks its target,
or access to the required system or data has been achieved. The malware, access and
identiﬁed targets are then used as the input for the Damage box. This box represents
the place where the attacker goal is achieved. The Damage box output represents the
breached CIA principles, which along with the attack goal represents the inputs for the
Residue box. The Residue box represents eﬀects that are not planned, but caused by the
attack, and its output is attack-related artefacts.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, a taxonomy was presented whereby the elements of a computer-based
attack can be described. The taxonomy consists of the following classes: Actor, Actor
Location, Aggressor, Asset, Attack Goal, Attack Mechanism, Attack Scenario, Automation
Level, Effect, Motivation, Phase, Sabotage, Scope, Scope Size, Target and Vulnerability.
The taxonomy presents both the view of the attacker and defender. Each class in this
taxonomy has sub-classes that can be used to classify types of computer attacks in more
detail.
The Phase class is used to build a temporal model of network attacks. This model consists
of the following phases: Target Identification Reconnaissance Attack and Post-attack
Reconnaissance. The Attack phase consists of Ramp-up, Damage and Residue. These
phases are used in Chapter 8 when a network attack prediction system is developed.
The relationships between the classes are explored in the next chapter with the develop-
ment of an ontology. An ontology builds on the knowledge of a taxonomy by deﬁning and
constraining the relationships between the classes. The ontology is formally described
and the ontology editor Protégé and automated reasoner HermiT are introduced.
CHAPTER
FIVE
NETWORK ATTACK ONTOLOGY
"Deep in the human unconscious is a pervasive need for a logical
universe that makes sense. But the real universe is always one step
beyond logic."
Frank Herbert, Dune
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, an ontology is presented whereby the classes that were introduced in
the taxonomy described in Chapter 4 are used in the ontology. Each attack scenario in
Section 4.3 is described in detail with an illustrative example. The ontology is formally
described in Section 5.4. The same is done for the Denial-of-Service scenario.
Noy and McGuinness (2001) deﬁned an ontology as a formal, explicit description of con-
cepts of discourse classes, with the properties of each class describing various attributes
of the concepts (slots) and their restrictions. Classes are the focal point of ontologies,
and can be divided into sub-classes which represent more detailed concepts. The ontol-
ogy presented in this chapter used the main classes in Chapter 4 as the focal point, and
the sub-classes are used to present a more detailed picture. Noy and McGuinness (2001)
further stated that developing an ontology requires:
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∙ deﬁnition of classes;
∙ arrangement of classes in a taxonomy;
∙ description of the attributes of slots;
∙ deﬁnition of allowed values for attributes; and
∙ deﬁnition of events according to classes and slots.
Grüninger and Fox (1995) stated that an ontology is used to formally describe objects,
their properties and relations, and stated:
"The development of ontologies is motivated by scenarios that arise in the applications.
In particular, such scenarios may be presented by industrial partners as problems which
they encounter in their enterprises. The motivating scenario often has the form of story
problems or examples which are not adequately addressed by existing ontologies."
Figure 5.1: Design and Evaluation Procedure for Ontology by Grüninger and Fox (1995)
The network attack ontology presented in this chapter is presented as stories regarding the
diﬀerent types of scenarios. Grüninger and Fox (1995) noted that one of the ﬁrst steps in
verifying an ontology is providing scenarios from which the motivation of the ontology can
be understood (Figure 5.1). In this chapter, the ontology is formally described and then
implemented within Protégé. Grüninger and Fox noted that the ﬁrst steps in specifying
an ontology entails the identiﬁcation of the objects in the domain, which was done as seen
in the taxonomy in Chapter 4.
The relationships between objects are deﬁned in this chapter. In Section 5.2, the Protégé
ontology editor is presented. A story that describes network attacks utilising the taxonomy
is presented in Section 5.3. A formal description of the ontology is presented in Section
5.4 to verify the ontology implementation. Network attack individuals are inferred from
their respective scenarios in Section 5.5.
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5.2 Protégé
Protégé is an editor that represents ontologies and their relationships. This editor was
developed by Stanford University and is freely available1. Protégé is the most popular
ontology editor and according to Cardoso (2007) has a 68% market share. The Protégé
editor facilitates the building of ontologies via deﬁnitions of their relationships, properties
and individuals (Akinbode and Longe, 2011; Malviya, Mishra, and Sahu, 2011). The
Protégé editor enables a simple method for:
∙ deﬁnition of classes;
∙ relationships between classes;
∙ properties of these relationships; and
∙ class hierarchies.
To aid with the visualisation process, Protégé has additional plug-in packages such as
OWLViz2 and OntoGraf3. In Figure 5.2, the class editor of Protégé is shown, in Figure
5.3, an example of the visualisation tool OWLViz is shown and in Figure 5.4, an example
of the visualisation tool OntoGraf is shown.
Figure 5.2: Example of Protégé Editor
1http://protege.stanford.edu/
2http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/OWLViz/
3http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/OntoGraf/
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Figure 5.3: Example of OWLViz Visualisation Tool
Figure 5.4: Example of OntoGraf Visualisation Tool
Protégé allows the user to store the ontology in Web Ontology Language (OWL) format.
"The Semantic Web" was proposed by Berners-Lee, Hendler, and Lassila (2001) to link
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data on the web so that the information can be re-used across multiple applications
and lead to a common understanding. The OWL format is the accepted standard for
implementing the "The Semantic Web" information in the form of ontologies (Antoniou
and Van Harmelen, 2009; Akinbode and Longe, 2011). The oﬃcial OWL overview is
available at World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) standards website4.
5.2.1 Automated Reasoner
One of Protégé's main features is its automated reasoners. Gong, Guo, Yu, Zhang, and
Xue (2008) stated that the role of an automatic reasoner is to establish that the ontology
is correct and consistent. The automatic reasoner has the ability to ﬁnd contradictions
regarding the ontology and thus ensure that the ontology is consistent. Bock, Haase, Ji,
and Volz (2008) described some of the functionalities of an automated reasoner:
∙ ability to satisfy (verify if a class can have instances)
∙ subsumption (verify if a class is subsumed by another class)
∙ consistency (verify the consistency of individuals within the ontology)
∙ instance checking (verify the assertions within the ontology)
∙ retrieval problem (given a property and individual, determine all other individuals
related to them)
∙ conjunctive queries (class selection, projection or renaming queries)
The researcher uses the HermiT5 OWL automatic reasoner to answer the following ques-
tions (Shearer, Motik, and Horrocks, 2008):
∙ In which scenario does a speciﬁc network attack fall (subsumption relationships of
individuals)?
∙ Can some attack scenario classiﬁcations be merged when scenarios in near real-time
are considered (subsumption relationships of classes)?
∙ Which attack scenarios do network-based sensors indicate?
5.3 Network Attack Ontology
The Network Attack ontology maps all the classes of the Network Attack taxonomy into
a single concept, with the Attack Scenario as the base class. This mapping is presented
4http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/
5http://www.hermit-reasoner.com/
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in Figure 5.5 and as the following story (the classes are in bold and within brackets):
An [Actor] based at [ActorLocation] with the goal of [AttackGoal] is sponsored by
[Aggressor] with a [Motivation] motivation. The attack effected [ScopeSize] [Scope]
scope. A [Target] was attacked via [Vulnerability]. This attack effected [Asset] and
resulted in [Sabotage] to [Effect] during each attack phase. During each phase the
[AttackMechanism] was used, and was automated to [AutomationLevel] level.
The story listed above is not intended to be grammatically perfect, but is used as a ﬂexible
skeleton. This skeleton is used to illustrate the scenarios and their individuals. Thus to
maintain similar storylines, the grammatical presentation has to be ﬂexible.
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Figure 5.5: Network Attack Ontology
In Figure 5.5, the relationships between the formal classes are shown along with their use
in the story. Each of the Attack Scenarios listed in Section 2.5 have unique constraints
within the Network Attack ontology, and have a unique mapping.
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5.3.1 Denial-of-Service Scenario
A story for each Attack Scenario can be constructed. Their stories diﬀer where the classes
are deﬁned as sub-classes. The Denial-of-Service Attack Scenario story is as follows:
An Hacker based at [ActorLocation] location with the goal of Disrupt sponsored by
[Aggressor] with a [Motivation] motivation. The attack effected [ScopeSize] [Scope]
scope. A Network Infrastructure was attacked via [Vulnerability]. This attack ef-
fected Access and resulted in Operational Loss to Major effect during the Damage
attack phase and to Null effect during the Ramp-up attack phase. During the Ramp-up
and Damage phase the Denial-of-Service Mechanism was used, and was automated
to Automatic level.
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Asset
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Effect
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Network 
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AttackScenario
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Scenario Hacker
Disrupt
Access
Automatic Network Based
Sabotage
Operational 
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Major
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Dam
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Damage
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Denial-of-Service 
AM
Figure 5.6: Denial-of-Service Attack Scenario
The Denial-of-Service Attack Scenario constrains are shown in Figure 5.6 and two in-
dividuals, the SCO, and Spamhaus DDoS attacks are shown in Figure 5.7 and Figure
5.8. In these ﬁgures, the sub-classes for each scenario are shown as sub-classes within the
main classes and extra information that identiﬁes individuals is shown in the rectangular
blocks.
The attacks on the SCO network and SpamHaus (discussed in sections 2.4.18 and 2.4.35)
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are examples of a Denial-of-Service attack scenario and their stories can be formatted in
the same way:
SCO Attack:
Hackers based at Indeterminate location with the goal of Disrupting sponsored by
Flash Mob with a Vigilantism motivation. The attack effected Medium Network
Corporate (SCO) scope. A Network Infrastructure was attacked via Protocol Er-
ror vulnerability. This attack effected Access and resulted in Operational Loss to Ma-
jor during Damage phase and to Null effect during the Ramp-up attack phase. During
the Ramp-up and Damage phase the Denial-of-Service Mechanism was used, and was
automated to Automatic level.
SpamHaus Attack:
Hackers based at Foreign (Netherlands) location with the goal of Disrupting spon-
sored by Commercial (CyberBunker) with a Vigilantism motivation. The attack
effected Large Network Corporate (SpamHaus) scope. A Network Infrastructure
was attacked via Protocol Error vulnerability. This attack effected Access and resulted
in Operational Loss to Major during Damage phase and to Null effect during the
Ramp-up attack phase. During the Ramp-up and Damage phase the Denial-of-Service
Mechanism was used, and was automated to Automatic level.
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Figure 5.7: SCO Denial-of-Service Attack Scenario Example
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Figure 5.8: SpamHaus Denial-of-Service Attack Scenario Example
The rest of the scenarios, stories and examples are presented in Chapter 6.
5.4 Formal Description of Network Attack Ontology
The HermiT automated reasoner (Section 5.2.1) can infer from an ontology in which
scenarios individuals fall and which scenarios can be merged. Thus to verify the ontology
design, a formal description of ontology was developed.
An ontology can be deﬁned as a 4-tuple according to Scharﬀe and de Bruijn (2005);
Chaudhri, Farquhar, Fikes, Karp, and Rice (1998); Zhai, Chen, Yu, Liang, and Jiang
(2009):
𝑂 =< 𝐶,𝑅, 𝐼, 𝐴 >
where
𝑂 is an ontology;
𝐶 is a set of concepts deﬁned for the domain;
𝑅 is a set of binary semantic relations deﬁned between concepts in 𝐶;
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𝐼 is a set of instances where each instance can be one one or more classes linked by
relations (Davies, Studer, and Warren, 2006) and
𝐴 is a set of axioms.
An axiom is a real fact or reasoning rule and a concept is considered to be a class in an
ontology.
This deﬁnition assumes there is an implicit assumption of a set, 𝐷, which represents the
domain of interest. It follows that:
𝐶 ⊆ 𝐷 (5.1)
𝑅 ⊆ 𝐷 ×𝐷 (5.2)
The network ontology is deﬁned in Statement 5.3:
𝑁𝐴 =< 𝐶𝑁𝐴, 𝑅𝑁𝐴, 𝐼𝑁𝐴, 𝐴𝑁𝐴 > (5.3)
where 𝑁𝐴 deﬁnes an ontology related to a network attack. The set of concepts (or base
classes) 𝐶𝑁𝐴 is described in Section 5.4.1. Section 5.4.2 deﬁnes all the relations between
the concepts, i.e. the set 𝑅𝑁𝐴. An example of an individual is discussed in Section 2.4.18.
5.4.1 Network Attack Concepts
The subsets of the set 𝐶𝑁𝐴 are shown in Statement 5.4 and contain all the base classes
of the taxonomy listed in Chapter 4.
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟,
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡, 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙, 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚,
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜, 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙,
Effect,𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒,
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡, 𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ⊆ 𝐶𝑁𝐴
(5.4)
The 15 subsets of 𝐶𝑁𝐴 are deﬁned in the following statements: 5.5, 5.9, 5.10, 5.12, 5.13,
5.14, 5.24, 5.25, 5.26, 5.27, 5.29, 5.30, 5.31, 5.32 and 5.34. Some of these subsets are
deﬁned in more detail below. The class Actor and its sub-classes as displayed in Figure
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4.2 are presented in statements 5.5 to 5.8.
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟,𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟,
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑈𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
(5.5)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝,
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝, 𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦 ⊆ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
(5.6)
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑒, 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 (5.7)
𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟,𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 (5.8)
The class ActorLocation and its sub-classes are displayed in Figure 4.4 and are presented
in statement 5.9.
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (5.9)
The class Aggressor and a sub-class Commercial are described in statements 5.10 and
5.11.
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙, SelfInstigator
𝑈𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟
(5.10)
𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑜𝑏,𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 ⊆ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 (5.11)
The classes Asset, AttackGoal and AttackMechanism are described in statements 5.12 to
5.14. Statements 5.15 to 5.23 give more detail regarding the sub-classes of AttackMecha-
nism.
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎,𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (5.12)
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙, 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘,
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎,𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙
(5.13)
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DenialOfService𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚,
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚,
InformationGathering𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚,
𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚,
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐴𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚
(5.14)
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔,
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔,
OpenInformation ⊆ InformationGathering𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚
(5.15)
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑚 ⊆ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 (5.16)
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑚, 𝑉 𝑖𝑟𝑢𝑠, 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑎𝑛 ⊆𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 (5.17)
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑DenialOfService,
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘DenialOfService,
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡DenialOfService ⊆ DenialOfService𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚
(5.18)
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠,WebApplication,
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡 ⊆ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡
(5.19)
𝐵𝑟𝑢𝑡𝑒𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒, Sniffing, 𝐺𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ⊆ 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡 (5.20)
𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,BufferOverflow, 𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 (5.21)
𝑆𝑄𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,WebCrawl, 𝑋𝑆𝑆 ⊆WebApplication (5.22)
𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑆𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑘,𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡 (5.23)
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Statements 5.24 to 5.27 describe AttackScenario, Automation Level , Effect and Motiva-
tion. Statement 5.28 describes a sub-class of Motivation, namely Ethical.
DenialOfService,
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒,
WebDefacement,
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒,
FinancialTheft,
𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒,
CyberWarfare,
ResourceTheft,
𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜
(5.24)
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙, 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐, 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 = ⊆ 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 (5.25)
𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙,𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟,𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟, 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 ⊆ Effect (5.26)
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙, 𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙, 𝐹𝑢𝑛,𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 ⊆𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (5.27)
𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙, 𝑉 𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚 ⊆ 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 (5.28)
Statements 5.29 - 5.33 address the classes Sabotage, Scope, ScopeSize and Target.
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,
𝐹 𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,
𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒,
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠, 𝑉 𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
(5.29)
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CriticalInformationInfrastructure,
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒,𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦,
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒
(5.30)
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙, 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒,𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ⊆ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (5.31)
NetworkInfrastructure, 𝑃𝐶, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (5.32)
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟, 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟, 𝐹 𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟,WebServer ⊆ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 (5.33)
The last subset of 𝐶𝑁𝐴, Vulnerability, is described in Statement 5.34, and its sub-classes
in statements 5.35 to 5.37.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔,𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛, 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⊆ 𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (5.34)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠,DefaultSetup ⊆ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔 (5.35)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⊆ 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (5.36)
BufferOverflow𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,
𝑆𝑄𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑉 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 ⊆ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
(5.37)
5.4.2 Relations
One of the main beneﬁts of an ontology is its capability to express the meaning of domain
knowledge. Whilst a taxonomy provides a hierarchical classiﬁcation of concepts in a do-
main, an ontology also represents the relationships between the concepts. In this section,
the authors describe the relationships between the diﬀerent classes in the ontology by
means of mathematical relations. Statement 5.38 deﬁnes the set 𝑅𝑁𝐴, whilst statements
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5.39 to 5.57 deﬁne the elements of 𝑅𝑁𝐴, i.e. the relations.
𝑅𝑁𝐴 = {ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟, ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡, ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙,
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚, ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙,
hasEffect, ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒,
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒, ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦}
(5.38)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜× 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (5.39)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (5.40)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 (5.41)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡× 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (5.42)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 (5.43)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜× 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 (5.44)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛,
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝,
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒
⊆ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚
(5.45)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜× AttackMechanism
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜× AttackMechanism
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜× AttackMechanism
(5.46)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚× 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 (5.47)
ℎ𝑎𝑠Effect ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒× Effect (5.48)
ℎ𝑎𝑠Effect𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛, ℎ𝑎𝑠Effect𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝, ℎ𝑎𝑠Effect𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 ⊆ ℎ𝑎𝑠Effect (5.49)
ℎ𝑎𝑠Effect𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒× Effect
ℎ𝑎𝑠Effect𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒× Effect
ℎ𝑎𝑠Effect𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒× Effect
(5.50)
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ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⊆ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ×𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (5.51)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡× 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (5.52)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜× 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 (5.53)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ⊆ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒× 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (5.54)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜× 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (5.55)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡× 𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (5.56)
Some of the relations are formed by composition. The compositions of two relations 𝑆
and 𝑅 are deﬁned by 𝑆 ∘𝑅 below:
𝑅 ⊆ 𝑋 × 𝑌
𝑆 ⊆ 𝑌 × 𝑍
𝑆 ∘𝑅 = {(𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑋 × 𝑍 | ∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 : (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑅 ∧ (𝑦, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑆}
(5.57)
In statements 5.58 to 5.69, the composited relationships are presented (as shown in Figure
5.9):
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (5.58)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 = ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 (5.59)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 = ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 (5.60)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (5.61)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 = ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (5.62)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (5.63)
hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffect =
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∘ hasEffect
(5.64)
hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRecon,
hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup,
hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage
⊆ hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffect
(5.65)
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ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (5.66)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
(5.67)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
= ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
(5.68)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛,
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝,
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒
⊆ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
(5.69)
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Figure 5.9: Composition Relationships
5.4.3 Constraints on Classes
In this section, the set Attack Scenario (AS) is described (refer to Figure 5.5). The symbol
∃ is the ﬁrst-order existential quantiﬁer: there exists at least one element. The symbol
∋ is used to express the words: such that. The symbol ∈ represents to the classical set
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theory operator: element of. The symbol ∧ represents to the logical operator: and. The
constrained deﬁnition of the set AS is presented in Statement 5.70.
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 = {𝑥|(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(5.70)
Statement 5.70 further constrains the Attack Scenario set such that for every element 𝑥
of the set 𝐴𝑆, as depicted in Figure 5.10. The following conjunction hold:
∙ At least one element exists, 𝑧, which is a member of the set 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒, and is such that
the ordered pair (𝑥, 𝑧) participates in the relation ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒.
∙ At least one element exists, 𝑣, which is a member of the set 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, and is such that
the ordered pair (𝑥, 𝑣) participates in the relation ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟.
∙ At least one element exists, 𝑤, which is a member of the set 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚, and
is such that the ordered pair (𝑥,𝑤) participates in the relation ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚.
∙ At least one element exists, 𝑢, which is a member of the set 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡, and is such
that the ordered pair (𝑥, 𝑢) participates in the relation ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡.
Similarly, constraints for the sets 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚, 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡,
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 and 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 are deﬁned.
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)} (5.71)
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = {𝑥|(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟)}
(5.72)
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)} (5.73)
Figure 5.10: Statement 5.70
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𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 = {𝑥|(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙)}
(5.74)
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 = {𝑥|(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑉 𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)}
(5.75)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒)} (5.76)
𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡)} (5.77)
5.4.4 Denial-of-Service Scenario Formal Definition
The goal of a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is to prevent or impair the legitimate use
of computer networks (Houle and Weaver, 2001). One of the most frequent methods
that DoS attacks use, is to ﬂood a single network point with network traﬃc. This ﬂood
of traﬃc will then prevent normal network operations. DDoS attacks disrupt networks
by ﬂooding them with traﬃc from multiple sources. These sources can number in the
millions.
The Denial-of-Service scenario set is deﬁned in statements 5.78 to 5.84 (also refer to Figure
5.6). In Figure 5.6, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Denial-of-Service scenario
are displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the Denial-of-Service
attack scenario is presented. For example, only the OperationalLoss sub-class is used from
Sabotage class. Note Attack Mechanism may be shortened to AM and Denial-of-Service
is shortened to DenialOfService or DoS.
𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (5.78)
𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (5.79)
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 (5.80)
DenialOfService𝐴𝑀_𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆
DenialOfService𝐴𝑀 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚
(5.81)
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𝐷𝑜𝑆 = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ DenialOfService𝐴𝑀 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ DenialOfService𝐴𝑀 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈ NetworkInfrastructure ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(5.82)
NetworkInfrastructure𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ NetworkInfrastructure ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (5.83)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (5.84)
𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ⊆ Effect (5.85)
𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 ⊆ Effect (5.86)
𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑜𝑆 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙} (5.87)
DenialOfService𝐴𝑀_𝐷𝑜𝑆 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙)}
(5.88)
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 ⊆ 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 (5.89)
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑜𝑆 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)} (5.90)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (5.91)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑜𝑆 = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒} (5.92)
𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑜𝑆 = ({𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝∧
∃𝑧 ∈𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(5.93)
5.5 Inferring Class Membership of Individuals
This section demonstrates how Protégé is able to infer to which class an individual be-
longs (van Heerden, Leenen, and Irwin, 2013a). The ontology classes and relationships
were implemented in Protégé and information about attacks was used to populate the
individual's properties. Two of the signiﬁcant attacks discussed in Section 5.3.1, the SCO
and SpamHaus attacks (discussed in sections 2.4.18 and 2.4.35), ﬁt the description of the
Denial-of-Service scenario. The SCO individuals were deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
5.5. INFERRING CLASS MEMBERSHIP OF INDIVIDUALS 119
– Hacker Actor deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Denial-of-Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship;
– Denial-of-Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup
relationship;
– Automatic Level deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relationship;
– Indeterminate Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation rela-
tionship;
– Flash Mob Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
– Vigilantism Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation rela-
tionship;
– Disrupt Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Medium Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– Access Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Operational Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Major Loss Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage rela-
tionship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relationship;
– Protocol Error Vulnerability deﬁned by hasChainTargetVulnerability relation-
ship;
– Corporate Network deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– Network Infrastructure Device Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By setting an individual using the properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT
plug-in for Protégé was able to determine that the SCO attacks fall within the Denial-of-
Service scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 5.11, with the automated reasoner-
inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom.
The SpamHaus individual was deﬁned in Protégé with the following characteristics:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Hacker Actor deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Denial-of-Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship;
– Denial-of-Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup
relationship;
– Automatic Level deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relationship;
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Figure 5.11: SCO Attack Inferred a Denial-of-Service Scenario
– Foreign Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– Commercial Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
– Vigilantism Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation rela-
tionship;
– Disrupt Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Large Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– Access Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Operational Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Major Loss Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage rela-
tionship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relationship;
– Protocol Error Vulnerability deﬁned by hasChainTargetVulnerability relation-
ship;
– Corporate Network deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– Network Infrastructure Device Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By creating an individual using the properties as shown above, the automated reasoner
HermiT plug-in for Protégé was able to determine that the SpamHaus attack belongs to
the Denial-of-Service scenario. Figure 5.12 shows the entry for this individual in Protégé:
the properties of the individual are shown in the ﬁrst two blocks and the output of the
automated reasoner-inferred class is highlighted in the bottom block, i.e. this individual
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is a member of the Denial-of-Service Attack Scenario.
Figure 5.12: SpamHaus Attack Inferred a Denial-of-Service Scenario
Refer to Chapter 6 for examples of individuals of the other attack scenarios. In Chapter
6, the formal description and individuals for Web Defacement, Unauthorised Data Access,
Cyber-Warfare, Industrial Espionage, Financial Theft, Resource Theft, Industrial Sabotage
and Runaway Malware are presented.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, the ontology that describes computer network attacks is presented. This
ontology used the classes of the taxonomy and binds them with relationships that de-
scribe how the classes are related. The ontology is presented in story form, formally, and
implemented within the Protégé editor6. Two attack individuals are represented within
Protégé, and the HermiT automated reasoner is used to determine to which attack sce-
nario they belong. Thus the ontology and automated reasoner can classify network attacks
into their associated scenario. In the next chapter, the impact on the ontology in a near
real-time environment is explored. The ontology relationships are relaxed to only include
classes that have an impact in a near real-time environment.
6http://www.networkattackontology.com/Ontology/
CHAPTER
SIX
DETAILED ONTOLOGY
"Men rise from one ambition to another: first, they seek to secure
themselves against attack, and then they attack others."
Niccolo Machiavelli – 1513
6.1 Introduction
The chapter describes in detail the ontologies for each of the attack scenarios, similar to
how the Denial-of-Service scenario is described in Section 5.3.1. For each of the scenar-
ios, their stories with an example is presented and detailed mathematical deﬁnitions are
presented. In sections 6.2 to 6.10, the attack scenarios stories, formal descriptions and
individuals are presented. A conclusion of this chapter is presented in Section 6.11.
6.2 Web Defacement
Web defacement can be considered graﬃti of the digital world (Lewis, 2007). Websites are
the public face of commercial and other entities in the digital world, and their reputations
are negatively eﬀected by defacing it. The web defacement scenario refers to attacks
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Figure 6.1: Web Defacement Attack Scenario
directed at a website's content. Web defacement is an attack on a website, which performs
unauthorised changes to a speciﬁc web page. Such changes include altering the visual
appearance, written content or overall message of the website into a form that is oﬀensive
and can potentially harm a company's reputation.
The story that describes the Web Defacement Scenario follows (Figure 6.1):
A Hacker based at [ActorLocation] location with the goal of Change Data sponsored
by [Aggressor] with a Fun OR Ethical motivation The attack effected [ScopeSize]
Corporate OR Government Network scope. A Server was attacked via [Vulner-
ability]. This attack effected Data and resulted in Reputation Loss to Minor OR
Major effect during the Damage attack phase. During the Reconnaissance phase Web
Crawl was used, during the Ramp-up phase Web Application was used and during the
Damage phase Web Application was used. The attack was automated to [Automa-
tionLevel] level.
The Apache.org (Section 2.4.15) is an attack that can be classiﬁed as a Web Defacement
Attack Scenario (Figure 6.2):
A Hacker based at Foreign (Netherlands) location with the goal of Change Data
sponsored by Self Instigator with a Fun motivation The attack effected Medium Cor-
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porate (Apache.org) scope. A Server was attacked via Configuration vulnerability.
This attack effected Data and resulted in Reputation Loss to Minor effect during the
Damage attack phase. During the Reconnaissance phase Web Crawl was used, dur-
ing the Ramp-up phase Web Application was used and during the Damage phase Web
Application was used. The attack was automated to Manual level.
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Figure 6.2: Apache.org Web Defacement Attack Scenario Example
6.2.1 Web Defacement Formal Description
The Web Defacement scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.2 to 6.12 (also refer to Figure
6.1). In Figure 6.1, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Web Defacement scenario
are displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the Web Defacement
attack scenario is presented. For example, only the OperationalLoss sub-class is used from
the Sabotage class. The Web Defacement class name is shortened to WD in statements
6.1 to 6.12.
WebDefacement ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.1)
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WD = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈WebCrawl ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈WebApplication ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈WebApplication ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑡 ∈ (𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∪ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑡) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈WebServer ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(6.2)
HackerWD ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.3)
HackerWD = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∋
(𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙}
(6.4)
WebServerWD ⊆WebServer ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (6.5)
WebServerWD = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡} (6.6)
DataWD ⊆ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.7)
DataWD = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒} (6.8)
ReputationalLossWD ⊆ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (6.9)
ReputationalLossWD = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 ∪𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.10)
AggressorWD ⊆ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 (6.11)
AggressorWD = {𝑥|(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝐹𝑢𝑛 ∪ 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙) ∋
(𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)}
(6.12)
6.2.2 Web Defacement Individual
The Apache.org attack (Section 2.4.15) was inferred as part of the Web Defacement sce-
nario. The Apache.org attack individual was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Hacker Actor deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
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– Web Application Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship;
– Web Application Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup
relationship;
– Web Crawl Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRecon relation-
ship;
– Manual Automation Level deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relation-
ship;
– Foreign Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– Self Instigator Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
– Fun Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relationship;
– Change Data Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Medium Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– Data Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Reputational Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Minor Loss Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage rela-
tionship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRecon relationship;
– Configuration Error Vulnerability deﬁned by hasChainTargetVulnerability re-
lationship;
– Corporate Network deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– Web Server Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By setting an individual using the properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT
plug-in for Protégé was able to determine that the Apache.org attacks fall within the
Web Defacement scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.3, with the automated
reasoner-inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom. Note, the terms Web Defacement
and Web Defacing are interchangeable.
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Figure 6.3: Apache.org Attack Inferred a Web Defacement Scenario
6.3 Unauthorised Data Access
This scenario refers to hackers/insiders gaining access data which they don't have permis-
sion to access. Unauthorised data access refers to a situation where a person has access
to a location that is hidden or contains sensitive data. This can lead to the unauthorised
entry of data into a ﬁle, reading a ﬁle, changing the contents of the ﬁle or for any other
malicious purpose.
The story that describes the Unauthorised Data Access Scenario follows (Figure 6.4):
A Hacker based at [ActorLocation] location with the goal of Steal Data OR Change
Data sponsored by [Aggressor] with a [Motivation]. The attack effected [ScopeSize]
Corporate OR Government Network OR Military scope. A Server was attacked
via [Vulnerability]. This attack effected Data and resulted in Secret Loss to Null
effect during the Reconnaissance attack phase, to Null OR Minor effect during the
Ramp-up attack phase and to Minor OR Major effect during the Damage attack phase.
During the Reconnaissance phase Open Information was used, during the Ramp-up
phase Scanning was used and during the Damage phase Exploit was used. The attack
was automated to [AutomationLevel] level.
6.3. UNAUTHORISED DATA ACCESS 128
Attack Goal
    Scope
Actor
Aggressor
Attack Mechanism   
Automation Level   
Asset
Actor Location
Motivation
Effect
Vulnerability 
Scope Size
Target
Server
AttackScenario
Unauthorised Data 
Access  Hacker
Steal Data
Data
Scanning
Sabotage
Secret Loss
Ram
p-up
Damage
DamageRamp-up
CorporateGoverment OR
Null
Reconnaissance
Ram
p-up
Exploit
Open 
Information
D
am
age
Reconnaissance 
Major
Military
OR
Minor
Change DataOR
Figure 6.4: Unauthorised Data Access Attack Scenario
Kevin Mitnick (Section 2.4.8) gained unauthorised access to multiple classiﬁed computer
systems (Figure 6.5):
A Hacker (Kevin Mitnick) based at Local (USA) location with the goal of Steal
Data sponsored by Self Instigator with a Fun motivation. The attack effected Large
Corporate scope. A Server was attacked via Access Rights vulnerability. This attack
effected Data and resulted in Secret Loss to Null effect during the Reconnaissance attack
phase, to Minor effect during the Ramp-up attack phase and to Minor effect during the
Damage attack phase. During the Reconnaissance phase Open Information was used,
during the Ramp-up phase Scanning was used and during the Damage phase Access
Attack Mechanism was used. The attack was automated to Manual level.
6.3.1 Unauthorised Data Access Formal Description
The Unauthorised Data Access (UDA) scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.13 to 6.22
(also refer to Figure 6.4). In Figure 6.4, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Unautho-
rised Data Access scenario are displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used
6.3. UNAUTHORISED DATA ACCESS 129
Attack Goal
Scope
Actor
Aggressor
Attack Mechanism   
Automation Level   
Asset
Actor Location
Motivation
Effect
Vulnerability 
Scope Size
Target
Server
AttackScenario
Unauthorised Data 
Access, Kevin Mitnick  Hacker
Steal Data
Data
Sabotage
Secret Loss
Ram
p-up
Ramp-up
Damage
Corporate
Null
Reconnaissance
D
am
age
Reconnaissance 
Minor
Self Instigator
Fun
Local
Large
Access Rights
Manual
Scanning
Access 
Attack Mechanism 
Open 
Information
Figure 6.5: Kevin Mitnick Unauthorised Data Access Attack Scenario Example
when the Unauthorised Data Access attack scenario is presented.
UDA ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.13)
UDA = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ OpenInformation ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑡 ∈ (𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∪ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦) ∪ (𝑥, 𝑡) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(6.14)
HackerUDA ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.15)
HackerUDA = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∪ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙} (6.16)
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟UDA ⊆ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (6.17)
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟UDA = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)} (6.18)
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𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎UDA ⊆ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.19)
𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎UDA = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒} (6.20)
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠UDA ⊆ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (6.21)
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠UDA = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ (𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 ∪𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.22)
6.3.2 Unauthorised Data Access Individual
The Kevin Mitnick attack individual (Section 2.4.8) was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Hacker Actor deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Access Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage relation-
ship;
– Scanning Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup relation-
ship;
– Open Information Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRecon
relationship;
– Manual Automation Level deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relation-
ship;
– Local Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– Self Instigator Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
– Fun Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relationship;
– Steal Data Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Large Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– Data Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Secret Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Minor Loss Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage rela-
tionship;
– Minor Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relation-
ship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRecon relationship;
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– Access Rights Vulnerability deﬁned by hasChainTargetVulnerability relation-
ship;
– Corporate Network deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– Server Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By setting an individual using the properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT
plug-in for Protégé was able to determine that the Kevin Mitnick attacks fall within the
Unauthorised Data Access scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.6, with the
automated reasoner-inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom.
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Figure 6.6: Kevin Mitnick Attacks Inferred to Unauthorised Data Access Scenario
6.4 Cyber-Warfare
Cyber-Warfare is the practical use of hacking and other information operations method-
ologies by a state against another state (Ophardt, 2010). The story that describes the
Cyber-Warfare scenario follows (Figure 6.7):
A Cyber Army based at Foreign location with the goal of Disrupting sponsored by
State with a Political motivation, The attack effected Large Corporate OR Military
OR Government scope. A Network Infrastructure was attacked via [Vulnera-
bility]. This attack effected Access and resulted in Operational Loss to Major OR
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Catastrophic effect during the Damage attack phase and resulted in Minor OR Null
effect during the Ramp-up attack phase. During the Ramp-up and Damage phase the
Denial-of-Service Mechanism was used, and was automated to [AutomationLevel]
level.
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Figure 6.7: Cyber-Warfare Attack Scenario
The cyber-attack on Estonia (Section 2.4.24) is presented in Figure 6.8.
A Cyber Army based at Russia (Foreign) with the goal of Disrupting sponsored by
State with a Political motivation The attack effected Large Corporate OR Govern-
ment scope. A Network Infrastructure was attacked via [Vulnerability]. This attack
effected Access and resulted in Operational Loss to Catastrophic effect during the
Damage attack phase and resulted in Minor effect during the Ramp-up attack phase.
During the Ramp-up and Damage phase the Denial-of-Service Mechanism was used,
and was automated to [AutomationLevel] level.
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Figure 6.8: Estonia Cyber-Attack Scenario
6.4.1 Cyber-Warfare Formal Description
The Cyber-Warfare (CW) scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.23 to 6.36 (also refer
to Figure 6.7). In Figure 6.7, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Cyber-Warfare
scenario are displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the Cyber-
Warfare (CW) attack scenario is presented.
𝐶𝑊 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.23)
𝐶𝑊 = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ DenialOfService𝐴𝑀 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ DenialOfService𝐴𝑀 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈ (𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∪ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)}
(6.24)
𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦𝐶𝑊 ⊆ 𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.25)
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𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑦𝐶𝑊 = {𝑥|(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)}
(6.26)
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑊 ⊆ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (6.27)
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑊 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)} (6.28)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐶𝑊 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.29)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒} (6.30)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐶𝑊 ⊆ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (6.31)
𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = {(𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ (𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 ∪ 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.32)
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑊 ⊆ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 (6.33)
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶𝑊 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛} (6.34)
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝐶𝑊 ⊆ (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 ∪𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) ⊆ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 (6.35)
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝐶𝑊 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒} (6.36)
6.4.2 Cyber-Warfare Individual
The attack on Estonia (Section 2.4.24) was inferred as part of the Cyber-Warfare scenario.
The Estonia attack individual was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Cyber Army deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Denial-of-Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship;
– Denial-of-Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup
relationship;
– Foreign Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– State Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
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– Political Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relation-
ship;
– Disrupt Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Large Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– Access Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Operational Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Minor Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relation-
ship;
– Catastrophic Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage re-
lationship;
– Corporate Network OR Government Network deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– Network Infrastructure deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By setting an individual using the properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT
plug-in for Protégé was able to determine that the Apache.org attacks fall within the
Cyber-Warfare scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.9, with the automated-
reasoner inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom.
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Figure 6.9: Estonia Attack Inferred a Cyber-Warfare Scenario
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6.5 Industrial Espionage
Industrial Espionage refers to network attacks with the goal of stealing secret corporate
information. This information can consist of various types of information such as deﬁned
by the FBI (1996). "...ﬁnancial, business, scientiﬁc, technical, economic or engineering
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs,
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes."
The story that describe the Industrial Espionage Scenario follows (Figure 6.10):
A HackerActor based at [ActorLocation] location with the goal of Stealing Data
sponsored by State or Commercial Aggressor with a Espionage or Financial mo-
tivation. The attack effected [ScopeSize] Corporate scope. A FileServer Target was
attacked via [Vulnerability]. This attack effected Data and resulted in Secret Loss to
Null effect during the Reconnaissance attack phase, to Null OR Minor effect during
the Ramp-up attack phase and to Minor OR Major effect during the Damage attack
phase. During the Reconnaissance phase Open Information was done, during the Ramp-
up phase Scanning was used and during the Damage phase, Exploit was used. These
mechanisms were automated to [AutomationLevel] level.
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Figure 6.10: Industrial Espionage Attack Scenario
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The Titan Rain (Section 2.4.14) network attack can be classiﬁed as an example of Indus-
trial Espionage (Figure 6.11):
A HackerActor based at Foreign, China location with the goal of Stealing Data
sponsored by State Aggressor with a Espionage motivation The attack effected Large
Corporate scope. A FileServer Target was attacked via [Vulnerability]. This attack
effected Data and resulted in Secret Loss to Null effect during the Reconnaissance attack
phase, to Minor effect during the Ramp-up attack phase and to Major effect during the
Damage attack phase. During the Reconnaissance phase Open Information was done,
during the Ramp-up phase Scanning was used and during the Damage phase, Exploit
was used. These mechanisms was automated to Manual level.
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Figure 6.11: Titan Rain Industrial Espionage Attack Scenario Example
6.5.1 Industrial Espionage Formal Description
The Industrial Espionage scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.37 to 6.48 (also refer to
Figure 6.10). In Figure 6.10, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Industrial Espionage
scenario are displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the Industrial
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Espionage (IE) attack scenario is presented.
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.37)
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ OpenInformation ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑡) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈ 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(6.38)
HackerIE ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.39)
HackerIE = {𝑥|(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∪ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)}
(6.40)
𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐸 ⊆ 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (6.41)
FileServerIE = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡} (6.42)
DataIE ⊆ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.43)
DataIE = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒} (6.44)
SecretLossIE ⊆ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (6.45)
SecretLossIE = ({𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ (𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 ∪𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.46)
AggressorIE ⊆ (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∪ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) ⊆ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 (6.47)
AggressorIE = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ (𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∪ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛} (6.48)
6.5.2 Industrial Espionage Individual
The Titan Rain (Section 2.4.14) was inferred as part of the Industrial Espionage scenario.
The Titan Rain attack individual was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
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∙ has at least one:
– Hacker deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Exploit Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage relation-
ship;
– Scanning Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup relation-
ship;
– Open Information Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRecon relation-
ship;
– Manual deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relationship.
– Foreign Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– State Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
– Espionage Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relation-
ship;
– Steal Data Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Large Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– Data Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Secret Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRecon relationship;
– Minor Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRamp relationship;
– Major Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage relation-
ship;
– Corporate Scope deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– File Server deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By setting an individual using the properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT
plug-in for Protégé was able to determine that the Titan Rain attacks fall within the In-
dustrial Espionage scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.12, with the automated
reasoner-inferred class shown at the yellow at the bottom.
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Figure 6.12: Titan Rain Attack Inferred an Industrial Espionage Scenario
6.6 Financial Theft
The Financial Theft scenario refers to the use of computer networks to steal money, or
hacking directly for money. A famous bank robber, Willie Sutton, is credited with the
following answer to why he robbed banks (Yoder, 1951):
"I rob banks because that's where the money is."
The same motivation holds true in the information age, where computer networks are
used as the means to rob banks or other institutions for ﬁnancial gain.
The story that describes the Financial Theft Scenario follows (Figure 6.13):
An Organised Criminal Group based at [ActorLocation] location with the goal of
Changing Data sponsored by [Aggressor] with a Financial motivation. The attack
effected [ScopeSize] Corporate scope. A ServerTarget was attacked via [Vulnerabil-
ity]. This attack effected Data and resulted in Financial Loss to Null effect during
the Reconnaissance attack phase, to Null OR Minor effect during the Ramp-up attack
phase and to Minor OR Major effect during the Damage attack phase. During the
Reconnaissance phase Open Information was used, during the Ramp-up phase Scan-
ning was used and during the Damage phase, Exploit was used. These mechanisms was
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automated to [AutomationLevel] level.
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Figure 6.13: Financial Theft Attack Scenario
The PostBank (Section 2.4.33) network attack can be classiﬁed as an example of a Finan-
cial Theft Scenario (Figure 6.14):
An Organised Criminal Group based at Local location with the goal of Changing
Data sponsored by Self Instigator with a Financial motivation. The attack effected
Large Corporate scope. A ServerTarget was attacked via Access Rights Vulnera-
bility. This attack effected Data and resulted in Financial Loss and resulted in Secret
Loss to Null effect during the Reconnaissance attack phase, to Null effect during the
Ramp-up attack phase and to Major effect during the Damage attack phase. During the
Reconnaissance phase Open Information was used, during the Ramp-up phase Scan-
ning was used and during the Damage phase, Physical Access Exploit was used. These
mechanisms was automated to Manual level.
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Figure 6.14: Post Bank SA Financial Theft Attack Scenario Example
6.6.1 Financial Theft Formal Description
The Financial Theft scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.49 to 6.60 (also refer to Figure
6.13). In Figure 6.13, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Financial Theft scenario are
displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the Financial Theft (FT)
attack scenario is presented.
FinancialTheft ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.49)
FinancialTheft = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ OpenInformation ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑡) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(6.50)
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𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝐹𝑇 ⊆ 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.51)
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝐹𝑇 =
{𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙}
(6.52)
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (6.53)
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑇 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)} (6.54)
𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐹𝑇 ⊆ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.55)
𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐹𝑇 = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒} (6.56)
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐹𝑇 ⊆ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (6.57)
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐹𝑇 = ({𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ (𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 ∪𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.58)
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑇 ⊆ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 (6.59)
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑇 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛} (6.60)
6.6.2 Financial Theft Individual
The PostBank SA (Section 2.4.33) was inferred as part of the Financial Theft scenario.
The PostBank SA attack individual was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Organised Criminal Group deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Physical Exploit Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship;
– Scanning Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup relation-
ship;
– Open Information Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRecon relation-
ship;
– Local Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– Self Instigator Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
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– Financial Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relation-
ship;
– Change Data Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Large Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– Data Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Financial Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRecon relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relationship;
– Major Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage relation-
ship;
– Manual deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relationship.
– Corporate Scope deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– Server deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By setting an individual using the properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT
plug-in for Protégé was able to determine that the PostBank SA attacks fall within the
Financial Theft scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.15, with the automated
reasoner-inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom.
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Figure 6.15: PostBank SA Attack Inferred a Financial Theft Scenario
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Figure 6.16: Resource Theft Attack Scenario
6.7 Resource Theft
The Resource Theft scenario refers to gaining control of computer resources. The com-
puter resources can typically be used to attack other computers via DDoS. The main
resources that are targeted are bandwidth, processing power or memory.
The story that describes the Resource Theft Scenario follows (Figure 6.16):
A Hacker based at [ActorLocation] with the goal of Gain Resources is sponsored by
[Aggressor] with a [Motivation] motivation The attack effected [ScopeSize] Govern-
ment OR Corporate network scope. A [Target] was attacked via [Vulnerability].
This attack effected System and resulted in Operational Loss OR Financial Loss
to Minor OR Major effect during Damage attack phase, to Minor OR Null effect
during Ramp-up attack phase, and to Null effect during Reconnaissance attack phase.
During the Reconnaissance phase Open Information was used, during the Ramp-up
phase Scanning was used and during the Damage phase, System Abuse was used.
These mechanisms were automated to [AutomationLevel] level.
The Phone Phreaking (Section2.4.1) incident can be classiﬁed as an example of a Resource
Theft scenario (Figure 6.17):
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A Hacker based at Local with the goal of Gain Resources is sponsored by Self In-
stigator with a Financial motivation The attack effected Large Corporate network
scope. A Industrial Equipment was attacked via Access Rights. This attack effected
System and resulted in Financial Loss to Minor effect during Damage attack phase.
During the Reconnaissance phase Open Information was used, during the Ramp-up
phase Vulnerability Scanning was used and during the Damage phase, System Abuse
was used. These mechanisms was automated to Manual level.
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Figure 6.17: Phone Phreaking Resource Theft Attack Scenario Example
6.7.1 Resource Theft Formal Description
The Resource Theft scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.61 to 6.69 (also refer to Figure
6.16). In Figure 6.16, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Resource Theft scenario are
displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the Resource Theft attack
scenario is presented.
ResourceTheft ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.61)
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ResourceTheft = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐴𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑡 ∈ (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∪𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑡) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)}
(6.62)
HackerResourceTheft ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.63)
HackerResourceTheft = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙} (6.64)
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡} (6.65)
SystemResourceTheft ⊆ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.66)
SystemResourceTheft =
{𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∪𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒}
(6.67)
𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒ResourceTheft ⊆ (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∪𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (6.68)
𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒ResourceTheft = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ (𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 ∪𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.69)
6.7.2 Resource Theft Individual
The Phone Phreaking (Section 2.4.1) was inferred as part of the Resource Theft scenario.
The Phone Phreaking individual was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Hacker Actor deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– System Abuse Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage re-
lationship;
– Scanning Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup relation-
ship;
– Open Information Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRecon relation-
ship;
– Manual deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relationship.
– Local Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
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– Self Instigator Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
– Financial Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relation-
ship;
– Gain Resources Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Large Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– System Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Financial Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRecon relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relationship;
– Minor Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage relation-
ship;
– Access Rights Vulnerability deﬁned by hasChainTargetVulnerability relation-
ship;
– Corporate Scope deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– Industrial Equipment deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By setting an individual with properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT plug-
in for Protégé was able to determine that the Phone Phreaking attacks fall within the
Resource Theft scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.18, with the automated
reasoner-inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom.
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Figure 6.18: Phone Phreaking Attack Inferred a Resource Theft Scenario
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6.8 Industrial Sabotage
The Industrial Sabotage scenario refers to using computer networks to damage an indus-
trial complex or product.
The story that describes the Industrial Sabotage Scenario follows (Figure 6.19):
A Hacker based at [ActorLocation] with the goal of Disrupt is sponsored by Commer-
cial OR State with a Criminal motivation. The attack effected [ScopeSize] [Scope]
scope. A Industrial Equipment was attacked via [Vulnerability]. This attack effected
System and resulted in Operational Loss to Catastrophic OR Major effect during
Damage attack phase, to Null OR Minor effect during Ramp-up attack phase, and to
Null effect during Reconnaissance attack phase. During the Reconnaissance phase In-
formation Gathering was used, during the Ramp-up phase Scanning was used and
during the Damage phase, Exploit was used and was automated to [AutomationLevel]
level.
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Figure 6.19: Industrial Sabotage Attack Scenario
The Stuxnet worm (Section 2.4.29) can be classiﬁed as an example of an Industrial Sab-
otage scenario (Figure 6.20):
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A Hacker based at Foreign with the goal of Disrupt is sponsored by State with a
Criminal motivation. The attack effected Large Government scope. A Industrial
Equipment was attacked via Configuration vulnerability. This attack effected System
and resulted in Operational Loss to Major Loss effect during Damage attack phase,
to Null effect during Ramp-up attack phase, and to Null effect during Reconnaissance
attack phase. During the Reconnaissance phase Information Gathering was used, during
the Ramp-up phase Scanning was used and during the Damage phase, Exploit was used.
was automated to Automatic level.
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Figure 6.20: Stuxnet Industrial Sabotage Attack Scenario Example
6.8.1 Industrial Sabotage Formal Description
The Resource Theft scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.70 to 6.81 (also refer to Figure
6.19). In Figure 6.19, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Industrial Sabotage scenario
are displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the Industrial Sabotage
(IS) attack scenario is presented.
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.70)
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𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑡 ∈ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑡) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(6.71)
𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑆 ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.72)
𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑆 = {𝑥|(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∪ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟)}
(6.73)
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑆 ⊆ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
(6.74)
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑆 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ∋
(𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡}
(6.75)
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑆 ⊆ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.76)
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑆 = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒}
(6.77)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐼𝑆 ⊆ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
(6.78)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐼𝑆 = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑣 ∈ (𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 ∪𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.79)
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑆 ⊆ (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∪ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙)
⊆ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟
(6.80)
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑆 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 ∋
(𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}
(6.81)
6.8.2 Industrial Sabotage Individual
The Stuxnet (Section 2.4.29) was inferred as part of the Industrial Sabotage scenario. The
Stuxnet individual was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
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∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Hacker Actor deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Exploit Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage relation-
ship;
– Vulnerability Scanning Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanism-
Rampup relationship;
– Information Gathering Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRecon re-
lationship;
– Automatic deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relationship.
– Foreign Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– State Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
– Political Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relation-
ship;
– Disrupt Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Large Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– System Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Operational Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRecon relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relationship;
– Major Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage relation-
ship;
– Config Vulnerability deﬁned by hasChainTargetVulnerability relationship;
– Government Scope deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– Industrial Equipment deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
By setting an individual with properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT plug-
in for Protégé was able to determine that the Stuxnet worm falls within the Industrial
Sabotage scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.21, with the automated reasoner-
inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom.
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Figure 6.21: Stuxnet Attack Inferred an Industrial Sabotage Scenario
6.9 Runaway Malware
Runaway Malware is malicious software that has the ability to rapidly spread within a
computer network. Such malware often comes in the form of viruses or computer worms,
and has the potential ability to exploit weaknesses in a computer system that will allow
the malware to spread to uninfected machines. The story that describes the Runaway
Malware Scenario follows (Figure 6.22):
A Hacker based at [ActorLocation] with the goal of Spreading is sponsored by Self
Instigator with a Fun motivation. The attack effected Global All networks scope. A
PC OR Server was attacked via [Vulnerability]. This attack effected Network OR
System and resulted in Operational Loss to Minor OR Null effect during Ramp-up
attack phase, and to Minor OR Major effect during Damage attack phase. During the
Ramp-up phase Malware was used and during the Damage phase, Denial-of-Service
was used, and was automated to Automatic level.
The I-LOVE-YOU worm (Section 2.4.12) can be classiﬁed as an example of a Runaway
Malware scenario (Figure 6.23):
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Figure 6.22: Runaway Malware Attack Scenario
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Figure 6.23: I LOVE YOU Worm Runaway Malware Attack Scenario Example
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A Hacker based at Foreign with the goal of Spreading is sponsored by Self Instiga-
tor with a Fun motivation. The attack effected Global All networks scope. A PC
OR Server was attacked via Access Rights Vulnerability. This attack effected Net-
work and resulted in Operational Loss to Major effect during Damage attack phase,
to Minor effect during Ramp-up attack phase. During the Ramp-up phase Malware was
used and during the Damage phase, Denial-of-Service was used, and was automated to
Automatic level.
6.9.1 Runaway Malware Formal Description
The Runaway Malware scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.82 to 6.97 (also refer to
Figure 6.22). In Figure 6.22, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the Runaway Malware
scenario are displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the Runaway
Malware attack scenario is presented.
𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.82)
𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑓𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒)∧
(∃𝑡 ∈ (𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∪ 𝑃𝐶) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑡) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(6.83)
𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.84)
𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 = {𝑥|(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)}
(6.85)
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ⊆ (𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∪ 𝑃𝐶) ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (6.86)
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ∪ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡} (6.87)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ⊆ (𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ∪ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚) ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.88)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒} (6.89)
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𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ⊆ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (6.90)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
{𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ (𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.91)
SelfInstigatorRunawayMalware ⊆ 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 (6.92)
SelfInstigatorRunawayMalware = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐹𝑢𝑛 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛} (6.93)
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 (6.94)
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒} (6.95)
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 ⊆
(𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑀 ∪𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚
(6.96)
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
{𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}
(6.97)
6.9.2 Runaway Malware Individual
The I LOVE YOU (Section 2.4.12) was inferred as part of the Runaway Malware scenario.
The I LOVE YOU individual was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Hacker Actor deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Denial-of-Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship;
– Malware Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup relation-
ship;
– Automatic deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relationship;
– Foreign Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– Self Instigator Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
– Fun Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relationship;
– Spread Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– Global Network deﬁned by hasChainScopeScopeSize relationship;
– Network Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
6.9. RUNAWAY MALWARE 157
Automated reasoner
infers 
Runaway Malware 
Access Scenario  
Individual 
Properties
Individual 
Name
Figure 6.24: I LOVE YOU Inferred a Runaway Malware Scenario
– Operational Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Minor OR Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup
relationship;
– Major Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage relation-
ship;
– All Networks Scope deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– PC OR Server Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
– Access Rights Vulnerability deﬁned by hasChainTargetVulnerability relation-
ship;
By setting an individual with properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT plug-in
for Protégé was able to determine that the I LOVE YOU worm falls within the Runaway
Malware scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.24, with the automated reasoner-
inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom.
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Figure 6.25: System Compromise Attack Scenario
6.10 System Compromise
The System Compromise scenario refers to unauthorised personnel or hackers gaining user
rights out of their scope. A system compromise attack refers to breaking into a single or
multiple computers without authorisation. Such a compromise is often achieved by using
another individual's identiﬁcation and/or password to achieve privilege escalation and
then compromise the computer system The story that describes the System Compromise
Scenario follows (Figure 6.25):
A Hacker based at [ActorLocation] with the goal of Gaining Control is sponsored by
[Aggressor] with a [Motivation] motivation. The attack effected [ScopeSize] [Scope]
scope. A [Target] was attacked via [Vulnerability]. This attack effected System and
resulted in Operational Loss to Minor OR Major effect during Damage attack phase,
to Minor OR Null effect during Ramp-up attack phase and to Null effect during Recon-
naissance attack phase. During the Reconnaissance phase Open Information was used,
during the Ramp-up phase Scanning was used and during the Damage phase, Exploit
was used. These mechanisms was automated to [AutomationLevel] level.
The Flame malware (Section2.4.34) can be classiﬁed as an example of System Compro-
6.10. SYSTEM COMPROMISE 159
mise scenario (Figure 6.26):
A Hacker based at Foreign location with the goal of Gaining Control is sponsored
by State aggressor with a Espionage motivation. The attack effected [ScopeSize] All
Networks scope. PCs were attacked via Access Rights vulnerability. This attack ef-
fected System and resulted in Operational Loss to Major effect during Damage attack
phase, to Minor effect during Ramp-up attack phase and to Null effect during Recon-
naissance attack phase. During the Reconnaissance phase Open Information was used,
during the Ramp-up phase Scanning was used and during the Damage phase, Exploit
was used. These mechanisms was automated to Automatic level.
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Figure 6.26: Flame System Compromise Attack Scenario Example
6.10.1 System Compromise Formal Description
The System Compromise scenario set is deﬁned in statements 6.98 to 6.105 (also refer to
Figure 6.25). In Figure 6.25, the sub-classes that are speciﬁc to the System Compromise
(SC) scenario are displayed. This demonstrates which sub-classes are used when the
Financial Theft attack scenario is presented.
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𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (6.98)
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ OpenInformation ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑠) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.99)
𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐶 ⊆ 𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (6.100)
𝐻𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐶 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙} (6.101)
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑆𝐶 ⊆ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (6.102)
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑆𝐶 = {𝑥|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒} (6.103)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑆𝐶 ⊆ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (6.104)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑆𝐶 = {𝑥|(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ (𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∪𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑧 ∈ (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟 ∪𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟) ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑆𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)}
(6.105)
6.10.2 System Compromise Individual
The Flame (Section 2.4.34) was inferred as part of the System Compromise scenario. The
Flame individual was deﬁned in Protégé as follows:
∙ is a member of the Attack Scenario class; and
∙ has at least one:
– Hacker Actor deﬁned by hasActor relationship;
– Exploit Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismDamage relation-
ship;
– Scanning Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRampup relation-
ship;
– Open Information Attack Mechanism deﬁned by hasAttackMechanismRecon
relationship;
– Foreign Actor Location deﬁned by hasChainActorActorLocation relationship;
– State Aggressor deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressor relationship;
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– Espionage Motivation deﬁned by hasChainActorAggressorMotivation relation-
ship;
– Gain Control Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– System Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Operational Loss deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotage relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRecon relationship;
– Null Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectRampup relationship;
– Major Effect deﬁned by hasChainTargetAssetSabotageEffectDamage relation-
ship;
– Access Rights Vulnerability deﬁned by hasChainTargetVulnerability relation-
ship;
– Automatic deﬁned by hasChainAMAutomationLevel relationship;
– All Networks Scope deﬁned by hasScope relationship;
– PC Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship.
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Figure 6.27: Flame Inferred a System Compromise Scenario
By setting an individual with properties as above, the automated reasoner HermiT plug-in
for Protégé was able to determine that the Flame malware falls within the System Com-
promise scenario. Protégé output is shown in Figure 6.27, with the automated reasoner-
inferred class shown in yellow at the bottom.
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6.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, the stories and formalised descriptions of the remaining attack scenarios
are presented. For each scenario an example individual is presented and it is demonstrated
how the automated reasoner classiﬁes the individual to its respected attack scenario class.
The following attack scenarios are presented:
∙ Web Defacement,
∙ Unauthorised Data Access,
∙ Cyber-Warfare,
∙ Industrial Espionage,
∙ Financial Theft,
∙ Resource Theft,
∙ Industrial Sabotage,
∙ Runaway Malware and
∙ System Compromise.
This concludes the theoretical part of the thesis. In the next part, the implications of a
near real-time environment are investigated and a prototype system that classiﬁes network
attacks is developed and tested.
Part III
Near Real-time
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CHAPTER
SEVEN
EVALUATION OF NEAR REAL-TIME FITNESS
"These blast points – too accurate for sand people. Only imperial
storm troopers are so precise."
Obi-Wan Kenobi – Star Wars
7.1 Introduction
In Part III, the researcher will investigate the eﬀect of network attacks in a near real-time
environment. The eﬀect of a near real-time environment with the taxonomy developed in
Chapter 4 is explored in this chapter. In the following chapter, a prototype system that
identiﬁes network attacks is presented. This part concludes with a validation chapter.
In the validation chapter, two test beds are presented according to which the prototype
system was veriﬁed.
The degree to which each class can be quantiﬁed or measured is determined by investiga-
ting the accuracy of various assessment methods, and then classifying the class as either
deﬁned, high, low or not quantiﬁable. For example, it may not be possible to determine
the instigator of an attack (Aggressor), but only that the attack has been launched by
a hacker (Actor). In addition, modeling malware depends on information reported by
industry, media and academic papers. Thus the full functionality of malware may not
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be known until much later than its initial discovery. Some classes can only be quantiﬁed
with low conﬁdence or not at all in (near real-time) time. The IP address of an attack can
easily be faked (Bellovin, 1989), thus reducing the conﬁdence regarding the information
obtained from it, and thus determining the origin of an attack with low conﬁdence. This
determination itself is subjective. All the evaluations of the classes in this chapter are
subjective, but due to the very basic grouping (high, low or not quantiﬁable) a subjective
value can be used.
By relaxing the scenario deﬁnition to only classes that can be quantiﬁed in near real-
time, some of the relaxed attack scenario classes were found to be equivalent. Thus the
scenarios are reduced to the following:
∙ Denial-of-Service
∙ Web Defacement
∙ Resource Theft
∙ Unauthorised Data Access
∙ System Comprise
∙ Runaway Malware
Each of the classes and sub-classes can be quantiﬁed either directly or indirectly. They
can also be deﬁned by the conﬁguration of the system under attack. Some classes cannot
be quantiﬁed in a near real-time environment. This chapter describes the three levels of
quantiﬁcation wherein each class is placed with respect to measurement. Some classes
are not measured, but deﬁned by the nature of the attack. Thus the accuracy of the
quantiﬁcation is assigned. Three levels of accuracy are assigned: high, low or not quan-
tiﬁable (Fenz and Neubauer, 2009; Fenz, Tjoa, and Hudec, 2009). Fenz and Neubauer
state:
"Since the threat probability or in inﬂuencing factors cannot be determined quantita-
tively, a qualitative rating is used in this approach. In contrast to a quantitative rating
with which it is hardly possible to determine the occurrence of a certain threat with a
67% and not with a 68% chance, a qualitative rating (e.g. high, medium, and low)."
Since the accuracy of quantifying the classes can also be deﬁned, the researcher also
eﬀectively uses three levels of qualitative ratings. In Section 7.2 the quantiﬁcation of the
classes within the taxonomy is presented. In Section 7.3 a relaxed attack scenarios are
presented formally, and relaxed scenarios which are equivalent are shown.
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7.2 Taxonomy Quantification
Each of the classes deﬁned in Chapter 4 are investigated as to how they can be measured
or quantiﬁed in near real-time. Some of the classes are quantiﬁed by deﬁnition and do not
require any sensors to determine their value. These classes are referred to as "deﬁned".
For example, the target of an attack is not measured or quantiﬁed, but is rather "deﬁned"
by the attack. Some attacks are named after the target, such as in the cases of the SCO
and SpamHaus attacks (sections 2.4.18 and 2.4.35). Some classes cannot be measured
in a near real-time environment. The values of these classes only become apparent long
after an attack and even then there is sometimes only speculation. For example, the
Aggressor cannot be determined in a near real-time environment and for some attacks,
the real power behind the attack is never determined or proven.
7.2.1 Actor Quantification
The Group Actor sub-class and its sub-classes Organised Criminal Group, Protest Group
and Cyber Army can be quantiﬁed by their IP addresses. An IP address can be used to
ﬁnd the physical location of a Group Actor. Free and subscription geolocation databases
exist, which claim to be capable of identifying the physical location of any IP address
worldwide. Thus looking up IP addresses is considered a direct quantiﬁcation. The group
that owns/rents that location can be determined from the IP location. By using the IP,
the Group Actor can be determined indirectly. Shavitt and Zilberman (2011) studied
the accuracy of geolocation databases and found that the results of most databases are
similar and that the accuracy cannot be trusted. Errors included wrongful estimation
of distances and incorrect identiﬁcation of country. IP addresses can be spoofed, and
intermediate computers located anywhere in the world can be used for attack. For these
reasons, using IP to locate the Group Actor is assigned a low accuracy.
The Hacker sub-class and its sub-classes Script Kiddie and Skilled Hacker can be quan-
tiﬁed by looking at the pattern of an attack. One of the ﬁrst detailed documented deter-
minations that a system was hacked by a skilled hacker was done by Stoll (1989), where
Stoll determined that the hacker was extremely skilled by printing out all the keystrokes
of the attack. Script Kiddies use standardised tools of which the characteristics (or ﬁnger-
print) are static and can be identiﬁed. For example, the pattern of standard Nmap scans
can easily be identiﬁed (Staniford, Hoagland, and McAlerney, 2002; Ezzeldin, 2008). By
using an elaborate honeypot, the skill level of a Hacker Actor can also be determined
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(Ramsbrock, Berthier, and Cukier, 2007; Aliyev, 2010; Kibret, 2011). Script Kiddies will
attack the honeypot directly with standard tools such as Metasploit1 with all the possible
exploits (Sigholm, 2013), whereas skilled hackers will use more subtle techniques and only
targeted exploits and try to hide their origin (Yung, 2002). The skill level of hackers can
also be deduced by the consequences of their attacks. Meyers et al. (2009) stated that
skilled hackers are rare and dangerous, and that information about them is rare. If the
attack was successful in web defacement or a secure server was compromised, it can be
assumed that a skilled hacker was involved. Tripwire2 and other host-based IDSs can
alert system administrators to compromises, although they cannot prevent attacks. They
notify administrators that some secure data has been accessed or modiﬁed. Thus the
Hacker Actor can be measured indirectly, and the accuracy is low.
Insider threats can be detected by internally orientated honeypots or telescopes (Spitzner,
2003; Myers, Grimaila, and Mills, 2009; Maybury, Chase, Cheikes, Brackney, Matzner,
Hetherington, Wood, Sibley, Marin, and Longstaﬀ, 2005). These insider honeypots work
according to the same principle as externally orientated honeypots, but reside within a
network and are not accessible from outside. Externally orientated honeypots are con-
nected to external networks and capture traﬃc from attackers from outside the scope of
the defender's network. Insider honeypots can detect Normal User, but not Administra-
tor. Administrators have access to most of the network. No network can be made safe
against its own administrators, thus administrators fall within the immeasurable group,
whereas normal users can be measured directly. When such honeypots are triggered, the
odds of it being an insider is low due to possible false positives or attackers masquerading
as insiders. All the sub-classes of the Actor class have low accuracy, thus in summary,
the Actor class accuracy is deﬁned as low.
7.2.2 Actor Location Quantification
The Actor Location class and its sub-classes can be measured in a similar way to the Group
Actor sub-class by means of IP location. Only a single look-up in a geolocation database
is required and it is therefore considered to be directly measurable. The values of the
geolocation database are also considered unreliable, with Poese, Uhlig, Kaafar, Donnet,
and Gueye (2011) stating that these geolocation databases are accurate at a country level,
but not at a city level. (Hunter and Irwin, 2011) developed a framework to track malware
1http://www.metasploit.com/
2http://www.tripwire.org/
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via their IP address. An alternative method to ﬁnd the location of IP addresses is to use
latency measurements (Katz-Bassett, John, Krishnamurthy, Wetherall, Anderson, and
Chawathe, 2006). Katz-Bassett et al. were able to achieve a medium error of 67 km in
optimal circumstances. The same accuracy problems as stated for the Group Actor apply
to the Actor Location sub-classes. Thus the accuracy is considered to be low.
7.2.3 Aggressor, Motivation, Effect and Sabotage Quantification
The Aggressor cannot be quantiﬁed in near real-time. In most cases, the aggressor is
only determined months after an attack. For example, it took a few months before the
aggressor behind the Stuxnet attack was conﬁrmed (Sanger, 2012). The aggressor and
people behind most viruses are diﬃcult if not impossible to ﬁnd (Shiﬀman and Gupta,
2013). The Aggressor class and its sub-classes are not considered to be quantiﬁable. The
same is true regarding the motivation of an aggressor, which can also not be determined in
near real-time. The type of sabotage caused by an attack can only be calculated after the
full impact of the attack is known, and cannot thus be measured in near real time. The
eﬀects of an attack can only be quantiﬁed with a full investigation into the compromised
systems and assessments of the damage done. Thus the Aggressor, Effect, Motivation and
Sabotage class and its sub-classes cannot be measured in near real-time.
7.2.4 Asset Quantification
The Access and System sub-classes of the Asset class can be measured with automated
testing scripts. These testing scripts simulate human requests at a very basic level and
can thus indicate when access to the system or the system functionally have been al-
tered. Stout (2001) stated that automated testing is critical to a quality website and his
statement holds true for all servers. The scripts directly measure access and the system's
functionality, and the accuracy of these quantiﬁcations are regarded to be as high.
The Data sub-class of the Asset class can be quantiﬁed by host-based IDSs. These
sensors are capable of determining alterations to data. Typically, two main aspects of the
data can be measured, namely unauthorised access or unauthorised manipulation of the
data (Lunt, 1993). These quantiﬁcations are direct and occur in the Application layer.
Although the possibility of false alarms exists (Tjhai, Papadaki, Furnell, and Clarke,
2008), these quantiﬁcations are considered to be very accurate.
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The Network sub-class of the Asset class can be quantiﬁed indirectly by considering the
networking performance of devices or testing whether systems in the network can commu-
nicate (Hariri, Qu, Dharmagadda, Ramkishore, and Raghavendra, 2003). Communication
errors, hardware breakdown or system misconﬁguration can be possible reasons for disrup-
tion of communication. The accuracy of quantifying an attack on the network is regarded
as high. All the sub-classes of the Asset class are very accurate and thus, in summary,
the accuracy of the Asset class is deﬁned as high.
7.2.5 Attack Goal Determination
The Attack Goal can be determined indirectly by ascertaining which asset is under attack.
Similar to the Data sub-class of the Asset class, the Destroy Data, Steal Data, Gain
Control, Spread and Change Data sub-classes can be determined by host-based IDSs
(Lunt, 1993). The Disrupt sub-class can be determined indirectly by looking at the type
of attack that is launched on a honeypot or similarly to the Network sub-class of the
Asset class, by monitoring the network performance (Lunt, 1993; Kuwatly et al., 2004).
The accuracy of determining the goal is considered to be high.
The Gain Resources sub-class of the Attack Goal class can be determined by intercepting
communications that do not ﬁt the normal proﬁle. Strayer, Lapsely, Walsh, and Livadas
(2008) developed a system that identiﬁes networks that support malicious traﬃc3. Thus
malicious traﬃc bound for addresses listed in their system can be null-routed. The Finding
Rogue Network project has since been discontinued, but similar work is done commercially
by Lastline4. It can be determined if local systems are being used as a springboard for
attacks on others. Since this determination depends on the accuracy of the identiﬁcation
of malicious networks, and the possibility of misconﬁgured networks looking like botnets,
the determination of Gain Control is not considered to be very accurate.
Since ﬁve out of the six sub-classes are of high accuracy the Attack Goal class accuracy
is deﬁned as high.
7.2.6 Attack Mechanism Determination
The Information Gathering sub-class of the Attack Mechanism class can be indirectly
measured by detecting scans. These scans can be detected by interpreting access logs or
3http://maliciousnetworks.org/
4http://www.lastline.com/
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Figure 7.1: The Diﬀerence between False Negative and False Positive
analysing network traﬃc (Lee et al., 2003; Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, and Kalita, 2011).
Port scanning and vulnerability scan determination have a high accuracy rate.
The Brute Force, Escalation, Spoofing, Session Hijack and Buffer Overflow sub-classes
can be identiﬁed by network-based IDSs and by looking at access logs. These are directly
identiﬁed by matching known methods to observed events. The accuracy of identifying
these attacks mechanisms is high.
The Spear Phishing and Social Engineering sub-classes can be identiﬁed by specially
crafted traps that lure such attackers to a fake target (Harley and Lee, 2007; Merritt,
2011). Due to the diﬃculty of detecting social engineering attacks, detection of such
attack mechanisms have low accuracy.
The Network Based sub-class can be identiﬁed indirectly by intercepting strange commu-
nications or by monitoring the amount of traﬃc on the system (Heberlein, Dias, Levitt,
Mukherjee, Wood, and Wolber, 1990). Although it is diﬃcult to distinguish between at-
tacks and innocent network anomalies, it is simple to detect and it is thus highly accurate.
The Malware attack mechanism can be identiﬁed either on the Open Systems Intercon-
nection (OSI) Application layer with Antivirus software, or in the OSI Network layer with
IDS software (Christodorescu and Jha, 2004). Malware can be identiﬁed directly and the
accuracy of the identiﬁcation is high with a low false positive rate. False positive refers
to when a classiﬁer incorrectly classiﬁed an item as harmful (Owen, 2010). Malware that
is not detectable is also a concern (Christodorescu and Jha, 2004). False negative refers
to malware that was not detected. In Figure 7.1, the diﬀerence between False Negative
and False Positive is shown. The detection of Malware is highly accurate.
If a sub-system is abused, it can be measured simply by looking at systems logs. The
processing utilisation and disk usage can be measured directly on systems. A ﬁrewall and
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some advanced routers can measure the network throughput, thus identifying bandwidth
abuse. The detection of System Abuse is highly accurate.
A Web Application such as a SQL Injection or a Web Crawl attack mechanism can be
detected directly with specially crafted traps or logging of unusual web behaviour (Rietta,
2006; Fu, Lu, Peltsverger, Chen, Qian, and Tao, 2007; Manmadhan and Manesh, 2012).
Error messages can also be used to detect SQL Injection attacks (Ciampa, Visaggio, and
Di Penta, 2010). Win and Htun (2013) used SQL normal queries to identify safe request
and then identity attacks by restricting the allowed queries. Misuse of Web applications
have a high accuracy level.
XSS Web Application attack mechanisms can be detected indirectly by comparing posted
URLs to blacklisted sites (Jim, Swamy, and Hicks, 2007), by identifying typical Cross-
site Scripting (XSS) coding patterns (Mookhey and Burghate, 2004; Scholte, Robertson,
Balzarotti, and Kirda, 2012). The detection and prevention of XSS attacks are diﬃcult be-
cause of incomplete implementations, inherent limitations, the complexity of development
frameworks and the requirement for run-time compatibility (Rao, 2012). The eﬃciency
of this detection method is determined by the quality of the blacklist, and the accuracy
level is low.
Denial-of-Service attack mechanisms can mostly be detected by ﬁltering incoming network
traﬃc (Karig and Lee, 2001; Argyraki and Cheriton, 2005). Mirkovic and Reiher (2004)
present a taxonomy in defences that can be used against DoS attacks, which includes:
system security, protocol security, resource accounting, resource multiplication, pattern
matching, anomaly detection, ﬁltering, automated reconﬁguring, rate limiting and agent
identiﬁcation. The accuracy of detecting DoS attack mechanisms is high.
Since most of the sub-classes of the Attack Mechanism class are of high accuracy, the
accuracy of the Attack Mechanism class is high.
7.2.7 Automation Level Quantification
The Automatic sub-class of the Automation Level class can be indirectly quantiﬁed by
observing the scanning pattern and other features with honeypots and other scan detection
sensors. Kuwatly et al. (2004) and Staniford et al. (2002) were able to detect Nmap5
scans by training their detection systems to recognise Nmap-speciﬁc scan characteristics.
5http://nmap.org/
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Similarly, it should be possible to detect automated tools by their speciﬁc behaviour. A
lack of automation can point to the Manual or Semi-automatic automation level. The
accuracy level of these quantiﬁcations is low since the diﬀerence between automation and
the other modes is diﬃcult to determine and thus diﬃcult to quantify.
7.2.8 Phase Classification
The Phases of an attack are set by the attack scenario. Thus the phase of an attack
is considered to be deﬁned rather than quantiﬁable. The process of determining which
phase of an attack is currently happing is discussed in Section 8.4.1, and is an outcome
of the research presented in this thesis.
7.2.9 Scope and Scope Size Measurement
The target scope and the scope size are deﬁned by the entity under attack. These classes
represent physical attributes of the target, which cannot be measured or quantiﬁed, and
should rather be considered so as to be deﬁned.
7.2.10 Target Monitoring
The Target class and its sub-classes can be monitored indirectly by observing which
systems are not performing as expected. The Network Infrastructure sub-class can be
observed by monitoring network performance in the Network layer. Attacks that aﬀect
the PC sub-class can be observed using anti-virus software. The Server sub-class can
be monitored by using heart-beat sensors or data integrity sensors (Bhide, Elnozahy,
and Morgan, 1991). Industrial Equipment is monitored directly via its control software
(Yang, Usynin, and Hines, 2006). Industrial equipment can monitor communications in
the Physical, Network and Application layers. Even though system problems or other
errors can also lead to system failures, monitoring these classes is considered to be highly
accurate.
7.2.11 Vulnerability Identification
The Vulnerability class and its sub-classes can be identiﬁed directly using a combination
of IDSs and honeypots (Gula, 2011). Although IDSs can have false positives (incorrectly
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Table 7.1: Summary of the Measurement Taxonomy
Class Quantification Accuracy
Actor Indirect Low
Actor Location Direct Low
Aggressor Not Quantiﬁable N/A
Asset Direct High
Attack Goal Indirect High
Attack Mechanism Indirect High
Automation Level Indirect Low
Eﬀect Not Quantiﬁable N/A
Motivation Not Quantiﬁable N/A
Sabotage Not Quantiﬁable N/A
Scope Deﬁned N/A
Scope Size Deﬁned N/A
Target Indirect High
Vulnerability Direct High
identify attacks), their accuracy is considered to be high.
7.2.12 Quantification Summary
In Table 7.1, a summary of the required quantiﬁcation is shown. This table lists all the
classes with respect to quantiﬁcation methodology and accuracy. Only ﬁve of the classes
are considered quantiﬁed or measurable for high accuracy: Asset, Target, Vulnerability,
Attack Mechanism and Attack Goal. Three classes are considered to have low accuracy:
Automation Level, Actor and Actor Location. Four classes cannot be measured or quan-
tiﬁed in a near real-time environment: Sabotage, Effect, Aggressor and Motivation. The
remaining two classes are deﬁned: Scope and Scope Size.
7.3 Attack Scenarios Quantification
Not all the attack scenarios that were identiﬁed in Chapter 2 and formally described in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 can be identiﬁed in near real-time. Eﬀectively, only the Attack
Mechanism, Asset, Target and Vulnerability classes can be quantiﬁed to a high accuracy
level in a near real-time environment. In Figure 7.2, the impact of the quantiﬁcation
options on the ontology is shown. As shown in Figure 7.2; only a subset of the classes
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Figure 7.2: Impact of Quantiﬁcation on the Ontology
are of signiﬁcance in a near real-time environment. This environment is referred to as:
relaxed. A relaxed environment only used classes and relationships that are quantiﬁable
and measurable in near real-time. Thus a scenario will be a subset of the relaxed sce-
nario. In the following sub-sections the relaxed Denial-of-Service and Cyber-Warfare are
explored in detail. These were selected as they demonstrate how two diﬀerent scenarios'
relaxed versions can be equivalent.
7.3.1 Relaxed Denial-of-Service and Cyber-Warfare Scenarios For-
mal Descriptions
In this sub-section, the formal description of the Denial-of-Service and Cyber-Warfare
scenarios of sections 5.4.4 and 6.2.1 are described with only the classes that have a high
quantiﬁcation accuracy. Attack scenarios with only the near real-time classes are consid-
ered relaxed attack scenarios. These relaxed scenarios are used to describe scenarios with
only classes that have high accuracy in a near real-time environment. Thus the conditions
for the relaxed scenarios are less strict than the corresponding scenarios.
This relaxed deﬁnition of the Denial-of-Service scenario, 𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑, can formally be
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written as:
𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (7.1)
𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 = {𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑀 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑀 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(7.2)
NetworkInfrastructure𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ⊆ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (7.3)
NetworkInfrastructure𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 = {𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡} (7.4)
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 (7.5)
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 = ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∘ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 (7.6)
The relaxed deﬁnition of the Cyber-Warfare scenario, CyberWarfare𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑, can formally
be written as:
CyberWarfare ⊆ CyberWarfare𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ⊆ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 (7.7)
CyberWarfare𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 =
{𝑥|(∃𝑣 ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑣) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)∧
(∃𝑤 ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑀 ∋ (𝑥,𝑤) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑝)∧
(∃𝑦 ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑀 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒)∧
(∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑢) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)}
(7.8)
NetworkInfrastructureCyberWarfare𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ⊆
NetworkInfrastructure ⊆ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
(7.9)
NetworkInfrastructureCyberWarfare𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 =
{𝑥|∃𝑧 ∈ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∋ (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡}
(7.10)
7.3.2 Inferring Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service Scenarios
The deﬁning statements for the relaxed Denial-of-Service and relaxed Cyber-Warfare are
the same, thus in a near real time environment these scenarios can be merged into a
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single scenario. This deduction is supported by the automatic reasoner. Within the
Protégé editor, the HermiT reasoner was able to infer that the relaxed Cyber-Warfare
and Denial-of-Service scenarios are the same as shown in Figure 7.5. In Figure 7.5,
the automatic reasoner results are shown highlighted, indicating that the Relaxed Cyber-
Warfare and Relaxed Denial-of-Service scenarios are the same. The two scenarios are
shown together in Figure 7.3. In Figure 7.3, the classes that are not used in a near real-
time environment are greyed out, and the classes that can be quantiﬁed in near real-time
are left open. Eﬀectively only the Attack Mechanism, Asset, Target and Vulnerability
classes are used in the relaxed near-real time environment. The subset-relationships were
given in statements 7.2 and 7.7:
CyberWarfare ⊆ CyberWarfare𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 (7.11)
𝐷𝑜𝑆 ⊆ 𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 (7.12)
In Figure 7.3a, Access is the sub-class of Asset for Cyber-Warfare scenario and in Figure
7.3b, Access is the sub-class of Asset for Denial-of-Service scenario. Similarly, both sce-
narios' attack goal is Disrupt and their target is Network Infrastructure. It follows that
the requirements for DoS Relaxed and Cyber-Warfare Relaxed are exactly the same, thus:
𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ≡ CyberWarfare𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 (7.13)
Figure 7.4 displays the relaxed Cyber-Warfare and Denial-or-Service subsets. In Figure
7.4a, the two scenario classes Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service are shown as a sub-
class of the Attack Scenario. These two classes are disjointed (thus they do not overlap).
Each of the sub-classes have individuals  South Ossetia an individual of the Cyber-
Warfare sub-class and SCO an individual of the Denial-of-Service sub-class.
The relaxed sub-classes are shown in Figure 7.4b. The Cyber-Warfare is contained within
the Relaxed Cyber-Warfare class. Similarly, the Relaxed Denial-of-Service fully contains
the Denial-of-Service class. The relaxed classes are thus more encompassing than other
sub-classes. An individual to one of the sub-classes will also be an individual to the related
relaxed class. Thus the SCO individual belongs to the Relaxed Denial-of-Service as well
as the Denial-of-Service sub-classes. Similarly, the South Ossetia individual belongs to
both the Relaxed Cyber-Warfare and Cyber-Warfare classes.
The two relaxed sub-classes were shown to be equivalent in Statement 7.13. This is shown
in ﬁgures 7.4c and 7.4d. In Figure 7.4d, it is shown that the two sub-classes Cyber-Warfare
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(a) Relaxed Cyber-Warfare Scenario
(b) Relaxed Denial-of-Service Scenario
Figure 7.3: Relaxed Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service Scenarios
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(a) Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service Subsets
(b) Relaxed and Original Subsets
(c) Relaxed Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service are Equivalent
(d) Relaxed Denial-of-Service Subset
Figure 7.4: Relaxed Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service Subset Visually Presented
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Figure 7.5: Protégé and HermiT Inferring the Relaxed Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-
Service Scenarios
and Denial-of-Service fall within the single Relaxed Denial-of-Service sub-class. Since the
two relaxed classes are equivalent and the sub-classes are contained within them, they
can be shown as a single sub-class that contains the respective sub-classes.
In Figure 7.4c an individual 𝑧 is shown. Any individuals that are detected in the Relaxed
Denial-of-Service sub-class can either later be shown to be within the Cyber-Warfare or
Denial-of-Service sub-class. It is also possible that the individual 𝑧 is not a member of
either sub-class. Individuals detected in the near real-time environment would fall within
the relaxed sub-class. For example, in the initial states South Ossetia and SCO attacks,
it would be classiﬁed within the Relaxed Denial-of-Service sub-class.
The automated reasoner HermiT showed that the Relaxed Cyber-Warfare and Relaxed
Denial-of-Service sub-classes are equivalent. In Figure 7.5, Protégé shows that the Cyber-
Warfare and Denial-of-Service classes are subsets of both Relaxed Cyber-Warfare and
Relaxed Denial-of-Service sub-classes. The relaxed classes are highlighted in blue. Pro-
tégé and the automated reasoner also automatically deduced the ﬁndings presented in
statements 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13.
The relaxed scenarios are shown as a diagram in Figure 7.3. In Figure 7.3a, the Cyber-
Warfare scenario is shown with all the sub-classes greyed out that cannot be accurately
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determined. Similarly, in Figure 7.3b the Denial-of-Service is shown. Through inductive
reasoning it is clear that the non-greyed-out sub-classes are the same for Cyber-Warfare
and Denial-of-Service scenarios.
7.3.3 Inferring Unauthorised Data Access, Industrial Espionage
and Financial Theft Scenarios
Since the automated reasoner deduction was shown to be correct in detail in Section
7.3.2 its deductions are trusted. The HermiT reasoner is used to determine which of the
remaining relaxed scenarios are equivalent or sub-set of each other. Within the Protégé
editor, the HermiT reasoner was able to infer that the Relaxed Industrial Espionage and
Relaxed Financial Theft scenario are subsets of the Relaxed Unauthorised Data Access
scenario. Since statements 7.14, 7.15 and 7.16 is deﬁned as follows:
𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 ⊆ 𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 (7.14)
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 ⊆ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 (7.15)
FinancialTheft ⊆ FinancialTheftRelaxed (7.16)
Figure 7.6: Relaxed Unauthorised Data Access, Industrial Espionage and Financial Theft
Scenarios
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It follows that the requirements for FinancialTheftRelaxed and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑
is subsets of 𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 scenario, and in Figure 7.6 displays how
the HermiT automated reasoner was able to infer the following holds:
FinancialTheftRelaxed ⊆
𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑
(7.17)
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ⊆
𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑
(7.18)
7.4 Summary
This chapter investigated how each class can be quantiﬁed in near real-time, and how this
inﬂuences the diﬀerent attack scenarios. The only classes that can be quantiﬁed to a high
accuracy level were: Attack Mechanism, Target, Asset, Attack Goal and Vulnerability.
By relaxing the deﬁnitions of each scenario to only include these classes, some of the
scenarios could be collapsed. The Relaxed Web Defacement and Relaxed Denial-of-Service
scenarios are equivalent, and the Relaxed Industrial Espionage and Relaxed Financial
Theft scenarios are sub-classes of the relaxed Relaxed Unauthorised Data Access class.
These six scenarios are practically measurable in near real-time. Thus in a near real-time
environment (as deﬁned in Section 1.5), only the following scenarios can be measured to
a degree of certainty (as shown in Figure 7.7):
∙ Denial-of-Service (and Cyber-Warfare)
∙ Web Defacement
∙ Resource Theft
∙ Unauthorised Data Access (and Industrial Espionage, Financial Theft)
∙ System Compromise
∙ Runaway Malware
Although the relaxed scenarios are simpler than the original scenarios, they represent how
network attacks behave in a near real-time environment. The most signiﬁcant deduction
from these relaxed scenarios is that some of these scenarios are equivalent. For example, it
was shown that the Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service scenarios are not distinguishable
in near real-time. This ﬁnding was proven formally, intuitively and deduced via the
HermiT automated reasoner. The formal description proved that the automated reasoner
can be trusted, and thus used for the remaining deductions.
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Figure 7.7: Relaxed Attack Scenarios
The goal of detecting network-based attacks is to mitigate against them. By understand-
ing the type (scenario) of attack, correct mitigation actions can be taken. For example,
the action taken against a Denial-of-Service attack diﬀers signiﬁcantly from a Web De-
facement attack. Mitigation of an attack can only be eﬀective if it is done at the start of
the attack, or before signiﬁcant damage has been done.
Thus in the next chapters, a prototype system was developed that only concentrates on
the scenarios that can be detected in near real-time. In the next part, the prototype
developed is presented. The goal of the prototype is just to verify that network attacks
can be classiﬁed according to their scenario and phase, and not act as a comprehensive
and complete system.
CHAPTER
EIGHT
ATTACK ESTIMATION NETWORK EVALUATION
ARCHITECTURE SYSTEM
"I fear the Greeks even when bearing gifts."
Virgil, The Aeneid
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, six attack scenarios were identiﬁed that can be detected in
near-real time. These scenarios are: Denial-of-Service, Web Defacement, Resource Theft,
Unauthorised Data Access, System Compromise and Runaway Malware. In Section 4.4, a
temporal attack model was presented. The attack model has the following phases: Target
Identiﬁcation, Reconnaissance, Attack (Ramp-up, Damage, Residue) and Post Attack.
This chapter demonstrates how to identify attack scenarios by mapping sensor outputs
to the temporal attack model and attack scenarios. A prototype system called Aeneas is
presented in this chapter.
When a computer network is under attack, mitigating actions depend on which type
of attack has taken place. To take mitigating action after the attack has taken place
may protect against the next attack, but it has no use during the attack. Some attack
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scenarios can only be realistically determined long after an attack has reached its damage
phase, such as the Cyber-Warfare scenario. During the attack, a Cyber-Warfare scenario
is indistinguishable from a Denial-of-Service scenario. Thus the Aeneas system only
tries to detect the relaxed scenarios, which were identiﬁed in Chapter 7. The Aeneas was
developed speciﬁcally to provide early warning of network attacks and relevant information
about the attacks.
In Section 8.2, the rationale of the prototype is explored and a high-level description of
the sub-systems is shown. In sections 8.3 to 8.4.2, the main components of the Aeneas
system are presented. Three sensors that provide the input data for Aeneas are presented
in Section 8.5. The remaining sensors are available in Appendix C.
8.2 Design Rationale
The Aeneas demonstrates how to classify network attacks according to the most probable
attack scenario in near real-time. Network attacks are classiﬁed according to their related
scenario and phase. Traditional network sensors such as an IDS and a Network Telescope
do not provide direct information related to the attack scenarios or temporal phases of
an attack. The Aeneas uses the information of sensors by means of Event Query (EQ) to
determine if a scenario-related event has taken place. The Reconnaissance, Ramp-up and
Damage temporal phases map the EQs to each attack scenario. The Target Identiﬁcation
phase is not mapped because it takes place outside the scope of the targeted network or
is indistinguishable from normal activity. The Residue and Post Attack phases are not
used: Attacks that fall within these phases are rather classiﬁed as new attacks.
The Aeneas consists of four main parts: Sensors, Central Information Server (CIS),
Database and Graphic User Interface (GUI), as shown in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: The Aeneas Prototype
The sensors provide raw information, such as network activity, unauthorised access or
malicious activity detected. The sensors include systems that directly detect attacks and
8.3. CENTRAL INFORMATION SERVER 185
systems that monitor network or user activity. They can be very simple devices that report
data received directly or they can have a high level of sophistication, such as Network or
Host IDSs.
The CIS has two main roles: to collate all the sensor data and to determine the state of
the attacks by looking at which events have been triggered. If an event has been triggered,
the CIS determines the state of an attack as follows (Figure 8.2):
∙ Sensors collect data from an attack. They are software based and run independently
from the rest of the Aeneas system. The role of these sensors is to collect raw data
and send it through with minimal processing. A sensor would typically ﬁlter data
to remove the most noise before sending it to the CIS.
∙ The sensor data is sent to the CIS. The data is transmitted through a network via
the TCP/IP protocol. The format of the sensor data is described in Section 8.5.
∙ The CIS determines which Event Query has been triggered and in which phase it
is. By mapping sensors and their outputs to respective phases and scenarios, the
CIS reports back the type and stage of detected attacks. The mapping of an Event
Query and its phases is shown via two examples in Section 8.4.1.
Figure 8.2: Aeneas Prototype Process
8.3 Central Information Server
The CIS has three distinct activities: collecting the data from the sensors, executing the
Event Query and determining in which scenario and phase the attack has been detected.
The Aeneas uses a web server to collect all the sensor data. An Apache1 server was
selected as Aeneas web server. The data is copied directly into a database. The overall
design of the Threat Identiﬁcation Prototype is shown in Figure 8.3.
1http://www.apache.org/
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Figure 8.3: Attack Estimation Network Evaluation Architecture System
All communication from the sensors only ﬂow from the sensors to the database: the CIS
does not communicate back to any sensor. The CIS has a service that executes every
ﬁve seconds. This service determines which Event Query has been triggered and which
scenarios and phase combinations have been detected. Each Event Query's results are
mapped to a scenario (or scenarios) and a phase, as shown in Figure 8.4.
8.4 Scenario Algorithm, Event Queries and Database
In Figure 8.4, all the EQs are shown in relation to the attack scenario and temporal
phases. Each of the blocks in Figure 8.4 represent an Event Query. Each Event Query
uses data from one or more sensors to identify if an attack is in the corresponding state.
To determine if a speciﬁc scenario and phase have been triggered, their corresponding
Event Query must be set. The ontology reasoner is used to determine which scenarios are
detected by each Event Query.
8.4.1 Event Queries Example
In this section, two Event Querys will be explored in detail, namely Unusual Web Activity
and Port Scan. The Unusual Web Activity and Port Scan Event Queries take place during
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Figure 8.4: Event Queries Mapped to Attack Scenarios and Attack Phases
Listing 1 Unusual Web Activity Question
if Non-human-like activity on the website has been detected. then
Yes, at time 𝑇 , non-human activity has been detected within a given conﬁdence level.
else
No, at time 𝑇 , no non-human activity has been detected.
end if
the Reconnaissance phase.
The Unusual Web Activity uses the Crawler Detector sensor, which detects non-human-
type web page activity. This sensor is described in detail in Section 8.5.3. This Event
Query (Listing 1) uses only the web-crawler sensor and is triggered directly if the web-
crawler sensor detects any activity. The Unusual Web Activity basically asks the following
question:
The same question rephrased in relation to the ontology in Chapter 5 asks the questions
as follows:
For which Attack Scenario, during the reconnaissance phase has an Attack Mech-
anism, namely Web Crawler, been launched against the Web Server Target?
Thus, for the ontology the question is asked which scenario has the limitations that the
Open Information sub-class of the Attack Scenario class is speciﬁed and that the Web
Server sub-class of Target class is speciﬁed. The automated reasoner (refer to Section
5.2.1) determines that only the Web Defacement scenario is a match. The result of the
Protégé query is shown in Figure 8.5.
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Listing 2 Port-scans Question
if Network port scans been detected then
Yes, at time T, port scans have been detected from the following IPs on these IPs
and ports.
else
No, at time T, no port scans have been detected.
end if
Figure 8.5: Web Crawler Scan Query Result
In the top textbox, the query that is used, is shown. The result of the query is two descen-
dant attack scenario classes: Web Defacement and Relaxed Web Defacement. Dependant
classes are classes that the automated reasoner determined which comply with the query.
The Port Scan Event Query uses a Network Telescope and a Snort IDS to detect port
scans. Port scans are deﬁned as follows(Lee et al., 2003):
"... (They) consist of sending a message to a port and listening for an answer. The
received response indicates the port status and can be helpful in determining a host's
operating system and other information relevant to launching a future attack [p1]."
Port scans are detected when the Network Telescope detects scan-like activities. The
Network Telescope sensor is described in detail in Section 8.5.1. The Port Scan basically
asks the following question (also shown in Listing 2):
The same question rephrased in relation to the ontology (Chapter 5) asks the question as
follows:
Which Attack Scenario, during the reconnaissance phase has an Attack Mechanism,
namely Open Information?
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Listing 3 Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query
Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query Start
Load Traﬃc Inﬂux Settings
Retrieve Bandwidth Sensor Data
Calculate Bandwidth used
Calculate Bandwidth Threshold
if Bandwidth exceeds Bandwidth Threshold then
Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query detected
end if
Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query End
Using Protégé, the query resulted in identifying that System Compromise, Unauthorised
Data Accesses and Resource Theft (Industrial Sabotage falls outside the scope of this
system and Industrial Espionage is the same as Unauthorised Data Accesses). The result
of the Protégé query is shown in Figure 8.6. The reasoner determined that a port scan
is an indication of a System Compromise, Unauthorised Data Access or Resource Theft
scenario.
Figure 8.6: Protégé Port Scan Query Result
For example, to determine if a Denial-of-Service scenario is in the Ramp-up phase, the
Traffic Influx Event Query will have to be triggered. The algorithm that describes the
Traffic Influx Event Query is shown in Listing 3. The algorithm that is used to determine
the state of the DOS scenario is shown in Listing 5. The Traffic Influx Event Query
determines if the traﬃc volume has increased signiﬁcantly and that the traﬃc is above a
speciﬁed threshold. The Traffic Influx Event Query uses the SYN and bandwidth sensors.
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Listing 4 Servers Running Event Query
Servers Running Event Query Start
Servers Running Settings
Retrieve IsAlive Sensor Data
Calculate the number of the servers are communicating
if Servers down greater than set threshold OR IsAlive Sensor stopped communicating
then
Servers Running Event Query detected
end if
Servers Running Event Query End
Listing 5 DoS Algorithm
DoS Scenario Start
Execute Traffic Influx Event
Execute Server Running Event
if Traffic Influx is true AND Server Running is false then
DoS Scenario detected
DoS Scenario inRamp-up phase
else if Server Running is true then
DoS Scenario detected
DoS Scenario inDamage phase
end if
DoS Scenario End
To determine if a Denial-of-Service attack has reached the Damage phase, the Servers
Running Event Query will have to be triggered. The algorithm that describes the Servers
Running Event Query is shown in Listing 4. The algorithm that is used to determine
the state of the DOS scenario is shown in Listing 5. The Servers Running Event Query
determines if the servers have stopped communicating. When the servers cannot com-
municate anymore, the IsAlive sensor would communicate this fact, or if the sensor itself
stopped communicating, the Denial-of-Service attack has reached Damage phase. (Refer
to Appendix C.2 for detail about the IsAlive sensor.)
The algorithm that set the Denial-of-Service is shown in Listing 5. The algorithm checks
if the Traffic Influx and Server Running events have been triggered and then sets the
detected scenario accordingly.
For the rest of the scenarios, similar algorithms are executed to determine their state.
These algorithms are presented in Appendix B. The process of executing the Event
Query and determining which scenario and phase of the attack have been detected are
shown in Listing 6.
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Listing 6 Threat Identiﬁcation Prototype Process
while true do
for all Scenarios do
for all Scenario's Events do
Load Event settings
Calculate Event information
Execute Event logic
Set Event state
end for
Execute Scenario logic
if Scenario detected then
Set Scenario ﬂag
end if
Maintain database
end for
Delay 10 Seconds
end while
8.4.2 Database
The database of the Aeneas has to keep the relevant information for each sensor, the
results of the EQs and some of the system settings. A simple database design was used to
simplify the prototype. The database only has to store incoming sensor data and handle
data requests from the Scenario Service. The output of the Scenario Service is also stored
in the database. The database has three tables:
∙ LiveEventTable
∙ EventDetection
∙ Scenarios
The LiveEventTable collects all the data directly from the sensors. This table is constantly
receiving new data from all of the sensors, and thus grows signiﬁcantly in time. The
EventDetection table stores the data of each detected event. Scenarios table store the
detected scenarios and their phases. The database was implemented on MySQL2.
8.5 Sensors
The sensors are used by the Event Query to determine if an attack scenario has been
triggered. These sensors do not have to be directly related to security. Some sensors
2http://www.oracle.com/us/products/mysql/overview/index.html/
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use security-related software and use IDSs such as Snort and Bro, while others are basic
applications whose outputs can be used to determine a network state.
The sensors were developed by parsing application log ﬁles in the researcher's Standard
Communications Framework (SCF). The SCF was custom-developed for the Aeneas sys-
tem and is used because of its simplicity. Since the Aeneas is only proof of concept, other
frameworks such as Common Event Expression (CEE)3, Splunk4 and similar Security In-
formation and Event Management (SIEM) products were considered to be cumbersome.
The Mosaic Security research group has compiled a list of over 80 SIEM products5. The
SCF uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML) format and has the following data ﬁelds
(also shown in Figure 8.7):
∙ Time
∙ Source IP
∙ Destination IP
∙ Source Port
∙ Destination Port
∙ Message
Figure 8.7: XML Schema
Dickerson and Dickerson (2000) used a similar scheme for their Fuzzy Intrusion Recogni-
tion Engine (FIRE). The FIRE system used TCP control bits, packet length and did not
have ﬁelds to represent the message.
3http://cee.mitre.org/about/
4http://www.splunk.com/
5http://mosaicsecurity.com/categories/85-log-management-security-information-and-event-
management/
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8.5.1 Network Telescope Sensor
The Network Telescope's main advantage is to identify probing and other Reconnais-
sance activities (refer to Section 3.5.5). The Network Telescope sensor was developed by
adapting multiple open-source Unix network tools and coding the required functionality.
Figure 8.8 depicts how the Network Telescope sensor is constructed. The Farpd6 software
replies to any Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) request for an IP address. It matches
the speciﬁed destination with the hardware Media Access Control (MAC) address of the
speciﬁed destination, but only after determining if another host has not already claimed
it.
Figure 8.8: The Network Telescope
Tshark7 is a command-line network protocol analyser that is used to capture data packets.
Thus, as shown in Figure 8.8, the Network Telescope consists of Farpd, Tshark and an IP
ﬁlter. In the Network Telescope text ﬁle, the date, event type and source and destination
IP address, source and destination port are stored. The date is represented in "%b %d
%Y %H:%M:%S.%F" time format (refer to Appendix D). An example of raw data from
the Network Telescope is shown below:
Feb 23, 2013 03:01:24.12531800:10.0.1.13;10.0.1.141;2414;3001;0x06;eth:ip:tcp
Feb 23, 2013 03:01:24.37774400:10.0.1.25;10.0.1.144;35663;3004;0x06;eth:ip:tcp
Feb 23, 2013 03:01:24.46749500:10.0.1.7;10.0.1.229;2411;3008;0x06;eth:ip:tcp
Feb 23, 2013 03:01:24.46750900:10.0.1.7;10.0.1.243;2049;3002;0x06;eth:ip:tcp
8.5.2 Honeypot and IDS Sensor
This sensor uses a combination of an IDS and a honeypot. The honeypot lures the attacks
while the IDS classiﬁes them. This sensor uses Honeyd8 as the honeypot and Snort9 for
an IDS. Anagnostakis, Sidiroglou, Akritidis, Xinidis, Markatos, and Keromytis (2005)
6http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/hardy/man8/farpd.8.html/
7http://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html/
8http://www.honeyd.org/
9http://www.snort.org/
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introduced "Shadow Honeypots" that combined features from honeypots and anomaly
detection systems. The work of Anagnostakis et al. inspired this sensor. Honeyd10 was
chosen as the Honeypod sensor. Honeyd is an ideal sensor for the following reasons:
∙ Honeyd is freely available (open-source software).
∙ Honeyd enables a safe FTP and Telnet simulation without endangering the host
operating system.
∙ The FTP, Telnet and SSH simulations are conﬁgurable.
Snort is an open-source network IDS developed by Sourceﬁre11. Combining the bene-
ﬁts of signature, protocol, and anomaly-based inspection, Snort is one of the most widely
deployed IDS technologies worldwide (Gandhi and Srivatsa, 2008). With millions of down-
loads and nearly 400 000 registered users, Snort has become the de-facto standard for an
IDS. Snort is highly conﬁgurable and has many specialised rule sets. These rule sets can
be used to detect a speciﬁc attack or attack phase. Third-party rule sets such as those
developed by Bleeding Snort12 can also be used.
The Honeyd system generates a fake target that is monitored by Snort for suspicious
activity. An attacker will usually try to attack the simplest target ﬁrst. The target
generated by Honeyd therefore lures an attacker into the open before an attack on the
real network is attempted. Figure 8.9 depicts how the Honeyd and Snort combination
sensor is constructed.
Figure 8.9: The Honey Snort Sensor
10http://www.honeyd.org/
11http://www.sourcefire.com/
12http://www.bleedingsnort.com/
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Additionally, the Farpd13 application is used to direct traﬃc into the honeypot. The
sensor uses the text log ﬁle that the Snort IDS generates in response to any intrusions
detected at the honeypot.
In the Snort raw text ﬁle, the date, source IP, source port, destination IP, destination
port and event type are used. The date is represented in "%m/%d/%y-%H:%M:%S" time
format (refer to Appendix D). The source and destination IPs are represented in Internet
Protocol version Four (IPv4) human readable format. The source and destination ports
are represented by an integer value. The event type is presented by a text string that
indicated a Snort-generated warning. The raw output of the sensor is shown below:
02/25/13-13:20:25.487090 ,10.0.1.4,10.0.1.162,,,,
"(portscan) TCP Portsweep",templogfile (END)
8.5.3 Crawler Detector Sensor
The Crawler Detector sensor uses a custom script to detect if any ﬁles have been accessed
via a web crawler. These scripts are placed in locations that no human user would need
to access. The scripts detect dictionary attacks, web vulnerability scans and crawlers that
speciﬁcally target contact information. The output of these scripts are logged to a single
log ﬁle. This text ﬁle is shown as follows:
1361772842 10.0.2.8 80 Brute Force crawler Detected
1361772925 10.0.2.8 80 Vulnerability Scan: Nikto Detected
Stored in the log ﬁle is the time, source IP address, source port, destination IP address,
destination port and a description of the crawl event type. The time is stored in Epoch
time format and the IP addresses are in IPv4 format. The web crawler sensor is classiﬁed
as a host-type sensor and indicates when hidden web pages have been accessed. The
algorithm used to parse to the web crawler monitor's output is shown in Listing 7.
In Appendix C, the remaining sensors are discussed. Some of the sensors were built on
existing security applications such as Tripwire and Bro IDS. Other sensors used Linux
log ﬁles from which security information could be deduced. The Apache web server and
ﬁrewall were also used as sensors. Custom applications were also developed as sensors.
13http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/hardy/man8/farpd.8.html/
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Listing 7 Crawler Detector Sensor Algorithm
Crawler Detector Sensor Start
if Hidden Web Site Accessed then
Read in Web Defacement Raw Output
Parse Time, Event Type and Destination IP
Parse Crawler Raw Output
Send Parse Output to Aeneas Server
end if
Wait 30 Seconds
Crawler Detector Sensor Start
8.6 Summary
In this chapter, the Aeneas prototype was introduced. The Aeneas prototype consists
of sensors, a Central Information Server and a GUI. The Central Information Server
determines if an attack is in progress by means of an Event Query and sensor data. Each
Event Query was mapped to an attack scenario and phase, thus when an Event Query is
triggered, a speciﬁc attack scenario is detected in its phase. The sensor data, Event Query
statuses, attack scenario and phase detected were stored and maintained in a database.
Three sensors were presented in detail: the Network Telescope, Honeypot and IDS and
Crawler Detector sensors. The remaining sensors are presented in Appendix C.
In the next chapters, Aeneas is validated with some empirical experimentation. The envi-
ronment in which the Aeneas prototype was tested is presented in the next chapter. This
environment must emulate a topical network and network attacks without endangering
other networks. The Aeneas is validated by verifying each of the Event Queries.
CHAPTER
NINE
EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
"It doesn’t matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn’t matter
how smart you are. If it doesn’t agree with experiment, it’s
wrong."
Richard P. Feynman
9.1 Introduction
This chapter describes how the Aeneas system was veriﬁed. The goal is not to conduct
statistically signiﬁcant or performance experiments, but rather to look for corrective test-
ing to verify that the principles explored in the previous chapters are valid. The Event
Query deﬁned in Section 8.4.1 and Appendix B were tested empirically.
Two main methodologies are used to test the eﬀects of computer attacks and defence
mechanisms. One approach is to reproduce the eﬀects through simulations. This approach
is useful when simulating large networks (Zeng, Bagrodia, and Gerla, 1998; Baumgart,
Heep, and Krause, 2007). The second approach is to build a test bed on which real
operating systems and applications are installed and used. Although this approach can
only be used on a smaller scale, it presents a more accurate platform for testing. The
challenge in building a test bed is to construct an environment in which tests can be
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repeated from a baseline, and it should also prevent any malware from infecting other
systems.
Two test beds were developed. The ﬁrst test bed implemented virtual computers on an
ESXi server, connected them via a ﬁrewall to the Internet and simulated user traﬃc via
randomised traﬃc scripts. The goal of this test bed was to recreate a realistic network
in which to test the Aeneas system using a real operating system and hardware. The
second test bed used the Common Open Research Emulator (CORE) tool to simulate the
network environment. The goal of the second testbed is to test how the Aeneas would
perform in a stressful environment such as a DDoS attack. The second test bed used
external tools such as the CORE Emulator and BreakingPoint system to generate a test
environment and test data.
Within the two test environments three kinds of sensors of Event Query combinations were
veriﬁed: Interrupt binary sensors, Continuous polling sensors and Interrupt information
sensors. Each of the Event Queries is veriﬁed via an empirical test described in this
chapter. In Section 9.2, other available test beds are presented. The design constraints
of the test beds are discussed in Section 9.3, and the implementation of the test beds are
presented in Section 9.4. The performance of the test beds is presented in sections 9.5
and 9.6. Three types of validation for the Aeneas system are discussed in sections 9.7,
9.8, 9.9 and 9.10. The chapter is concluded in Section 9.11.
9.2 Test beds
The test bed section of this chapter is based on work published by van Heerden, Pieterse,
Burke, and Irwin (2013b). Six other test bed environments are presented, which have
shortcomings that prevented their use to validate the Aeneas system.
9.2.1 Global Mobile Information System Simulator
The Global Mobile Information System Simulator (GloMoSim) is a scalable simulation
library that uses parallel execution to eﬀectively reduce the simulation time for large com-
munication networks (Zeng et al., 1998; Bajaj, Takai, Ahuja, Tang, Bagrodia, and Gerla,
1999). This simulation environment can simulate large-scale networks linked by a stan-
dard communication structure. This structure includes multicast, asymmetric communi-
cations, multi-hop wireless communications and traditional Internet protocols. GloMoSim
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supports performance prediction of large-scale network models via parallel execution. Al-
though GloMoSim provides an adequate library for testing purposes, it was not used due
to the complexity associated with it.
9.2.2 User-defined and Organised Network
The User-deﬁned and Organised Network (UDON) architecture provide Application Pro-
gram Interfaces (APIs) to control virtual test bed network resources (Horib, Yamamoto,
and Sekiya, 2012). This design allows the test bed to deﬁne a virtual experimental net-
work topology, and has the ability to modify speciﬁc properties and test scenario scripts.
UDON focuses on the topology of the simulated network and provides its users with the
ability to modify their experimental network. Since UDON does not support simulation
of larger quantities of network traﬃc it is not an optimal solution as a test bed for Aeneas.
9.2.3 NetSim
NetSim is a simulation architecture that supports distributed cyber-exercises1. NetSim
consists of a collection of applications that include the simulation engine, web servers,
Computer Generated Imagery (CGI) applications, MySQL databases and Perl scripts.
Normal and attack conditions can be simulated. The devices represented in the simula-
tion include workstations, routers, servers, and ﬁrewalls. NetSim provides the required
functionality, but as it is aimed at being used as a cyber-exercise it was not used to test
the Aeneas system.
9.2.4 Network HTTP Simulator
The Network HTTP Simulator (NHS) was developed by the University of Patras, Greece,
and measures the load of HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traﬃc (Aravantinos,
Bouras, and Ganos, 2002). It also acts as a network-stressing tool to evaluate HTTP
requests and responses. The operation of NHS consists of three phases. The ﬁrst phase
provides the user with the ability to select simulation scenarios. The second phase cre-
ates HTTP traﬃc. The third phase presents the results of the simulation. NHS oﬀers a
stable platform for network simulation, but due to its singular focus on HTTP, it was not
selected as an environment to test the Aeneas system.
1http://www.iseesystems.com/softwares/NetSimWizard.aspx/
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9.2.5 Virtual Environment for Learning Networking
The Virtual Environment for Learning Networking (Velnet) provides a secure learning
environment for the teaching of computer networking (Kneale, De Horta, and Box, 2004).
Velnet consist of a host machine, a host operating system, VMware-based virtualisation
and a virtual network. This simulation environment creates a platform aimed at teaching
network architecture to students and was not designed to act as a viable attack platform
to test the Aeneas system.
9.2.6 Real-time Immersion Network Simulation Environment for
Network Security Exercises
The Real-time Immersion Network Simulation Environment for Network Security Exer-
cises (RINSE) simulator supports large-scale network security preparedness and training
exercises (Liljenstam, Liu, Nicol, Yuan, Yan, and Grier, 2006). The goal of RINSE is to
simulate large-scale, real-time human/machine-in-the-loop network architectures with the
focus on security exercises and training. The RINSE architecture consists of the following
components: the network simulator, database, manager, server and network viewers. The
large-scale architecture presented by RINSE is not viable to test the Aeneas system as
the scope is too large.
9.3 Test Bed Design Considerations
In order to test the eﬀects of network attack scenarios, a stable re-usable platform is
required. Some of the signiﬁcant problems with test environments are as follows:
∙ Trade-oﬀ between complexity and size, also referred to as ﬁdelity (Rosenblum, Her-
rod, Witchel, and Gupta, 1995). Fidelity represents how real the simulation environ-
ment is. A high-ﬁdelity simulation emulates all the communications and computer
interactions within a network, but the simulations are hardware- and processing
power-intensive. Thus, for high-ﬁdelity the number of systems emulated is low.
Low-ﬁdelity emulates the minimum network communications, but at a bigger scale.
Thus with similar processing power, many more systems and their interactions can
be emulated, but not with the same detail as with a high-ﬁdelity simulation.
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∙ Preventing malware from escaping and inﬂuencing the test equipment (Benzel,
Braden, Kim, Neuman, Joseph, Sklower, Ostrenga, and Schwab, 2006; Cavallaro,
Saxena, and Sekar, 2008). The test bed may require a connection to the Internet
or Intranet to emulate such communications. While connecting to other networks,
the test bed itself should not be an infector or spreading agent of malware. If a new
virus/worm's inﬂuence and behaviour must be tested, the test bed must ensure that
the malware does not spread to surrounding networks. Apart from the damage it
can cause, the test bed tests should also not be inﬂuenced by malware from outside
their domain.
∙ The ability to reset and redo tests from a standard baseline (Nilsson, Oﬀutt, and
Mellin, 2006; Vigna, Robertson, and Balzarotti, 2004; Kornexl, Paxson, Dreger,
Feldmann, and Sommer, 2005). To ensure that a previous test does not inﬂuence
the current tests, the test bed must have the ability to restore itself to a clean state
(baseline). For example, a test that determines what the acceptable background
network activity is must not be inﬂuenced by botnet communications from a previous
test.
To test the Aeneas system, a test bed was developed that represents the environment of a
small software development company. This pseudo company consists of 30 odd computer
users, half of which use Unix, and the other half the Windows Operating Systems (OSs).
The company has three network segments. The ﬁrst segment is used by the users. The
second segment is a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) that is accessible from the Internet. The
third segment is used to host the internal servers, such as a Subversion repository and
File server. The company also has web, email and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) servers
within the DMZ. All the segments are separated physically by means of a switch and
ﬁrewall. The architecture used for the test bed is shown in Figure 9.1a. This design was
based on the most common DMZ architecture (Bauer, 2001). Bauer architecture diﬀers by
separating the DMZ physically from the internal network. This is a more secure method,
but as the goal of the test bed is to test for network attacks, the architecture used in
Figure 9.1a was chosen over the architecture shown in Figure 9.1b.
The test bed only includes appropriate components for the purpose of validation testing.
The size of the network was chosen as a compromise between complexity and the magni-
tude of the network. The size of the text network was constrained by the availability of
hardware, but could still present an environment to test the various scenarios.
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(a) Implemented Test Bed Architecture
(b) Architecture After Bauer (2001)
Figure 9.1: Test Bed Architecture
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9.4 Test Bed Implementation A: ESXi and Firewall
The test bed was implemented with the following hardware:
∙ VMware ESXi Server2
∙ Lucidview Firewall3
∙ Network Switch
∙ Administrator Computer
In Figure 9.2, the physical setup is shown. The workstations and servers are implemented
within the ESXi 5 server. The ESXi server has the following hardware and software:
∙ Memory Capacity: 192 GB
∙ CPU Cores: 8 CPUs x 2.659 GHz
∙ Processor type: Intel (R) Xeon (R) CPU E5640 @ 2.67 GHz
∙ Storage: 2x1 TB, RAID 1 (Mirror)
∙ ESXi 5.0 Operating System
Figure 9.2: Physical Implementation of the Test Bed
2http://www.vmware.com/files/pdf/VMware-ESX-and-VMware-ESXi-DS-EN.pdf/
3http://www.lucidview.net/products-and-services/lucidview-guardian/
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The ESXi server is a production-level hypervisor which abstracts computer hardware
such as storage, the processor, and network and memory resources into multiple virtual
computers that can each run their own unmodiﬁed operating system. The vSphere client
is used to monitor and control the ESXi server's virtual computers. Through the vSphere
client, virtual computers can be viewed and controlled. Each virtual machine can be
restarted from a saved snapshot. Thus all the computers and servers can be restored to
a base state. The ESXi can be programmed though a script to restore all computers to
a base snapshot. Thus the process of restoring the system to an initial state is trivial.
Snapshots can also be used to store computer and server states after an experiment. These
snapshots can be exported for oine external analysis.
Each of the network segments (as shown in Figure 9.1a) are logically separated on a
separate network interface in the ESXi server. The Server, Client and DMZ segments
are all virtualised computers within the ESXi server. Each segment uses its own network
interface and therefore all traﬃc between diﬀerent segments will have to pass through
a physical switch. When the workstations communicate with the servers, physical data
packets are generated, which ﬂow through a real switch between the virtualised computers.
The Lucidview ﬁrewall has the following main functions:
∙ It only allows access from the Internet to the DMZ.
∙ It acts as an Internet proxy for all the virtualised computers and servers.
∙ It protects the Internet from malware tested on the test bed.
∙ It logs the traﬃc ﬂow between the test bed and the Internet.
The Lucidview ﬁrewall can display the amount of traﬃc according to preset deﬁnitions.
9.4.1 Simulated Network Traffic
The network developed in this section has a signiﬁcant shortcoming: It does not have any
user traﬃc. The only traﬃc visible on the network is generated by the operating system,
such as update requests, Microsoft-related DNS queries, etc. No two networks are the
same with respect to their network traﬃc (Hassan, Garcia, and Brun, 2005). The traﬃc
has temporal, protocol, bandwidth and destination properties that need to be simulated.
A corporate computer network is used mostly during working hours with diﬀerent pro-
tocols taking precedence at diﬀerent times. For example, web browsing may be popular
during lunch, and email in the mornings. The temporal aspect of the network traﬃc
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is dependent on the network users or company culture. Thus the simulation should be
adjustable to represent diﬀerent usage temporal patterns. Network usage has a certain
aspect of randomness. No two users will reply to their email at the exact same time, and
browse the same websites at the same time.
To compensate for the lack of traﬃc, a custom script was developed that generates network
traﬃc. This script generates traﬃc by performing a network request that is similar to
users on the network. Traﬃc is generated by browsing the web, downloading FTP data,
sharing ﬁles and using a repository, which is similar to human users of a network. In the
following section, the traﬃc-generating script is presented in more detail.
9.4.2 Network Traffic Type
To simulate network traﬃc, the following constraints have to be addressed:
∙ Network Traﬃc Type (Protocol) (Rizzo, 1997). Traﬃc simulation has to handle
diverse applications deployed on the Internet. These diverse applications can be
simpliﬁed by the protocol used. Although there are more than 20 000 protocols used
with TCP/IP networks (Touch, Lear, Mankin, Ono, Stiemerling, Eggert, Melnikov,
and Eddy, 2013), the most Internet-popular ones are HTTP connections (Smith,
Campos, Jeﬀay, and Ott, 2001).
∙ Temporal Variations (Deng, 1996; Kornexl et al., 2005; Hernández-Campos, Kar-
aliopoulos, Papadopouli, and Shen, 2006). Human temporal behaviour inﬂuences
the type of traﬃc ﬂow on the network at diﬀerent times. For example, during
working hours, a company's network should be more active than at night. During
working hours, the behaviour should diﬀer according to other patterns, such as re-
laying to email during the morning, or saving source code to the repository in the
afternoon.
∙ Data Destination (Barford and Crovella, 1998). Data does not distribute randomly,
but rather according to users' requirements. For example, in South Africa some
sites that receive the most Internet traﬃc are: news24.co.za, bidorby.co.za, iol.co.za,
gumtree.co.za and mybroadband.co.za (Enikeev, 2013).
Each network traﬃc type is dependent on what the network is used for and what the
users require from the network. For the setup, four network traﬃc types were identiﬁed
to represent the majority of network traﬃc for a small software development company
(Barford and Crovella, 1998):
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Listing 8 Network Simulation Algorithm
Start Protocol Speciﬁc Simulation
Select Destination (IP, Popularity)
Determine Pseudo Time Interval (Temporal map)
if Time Interval has been reached then
Simulate Traﬃc
end if
Return to Destination Selection
∙ web browsing (Aravantinos et al., 2002)
∙ email (Zou, Towsley, and Gong, 2007)
∙ subversion4
∙ FTP
∙ Intranet ﬁle access
Web browsing would typically be more active during lunch and after working hours, and
email at the start of the working day (Karlson, Meyers, Jacobs, Johns, and Kane, 2009).
Subversion is a revision control and software-versioning system. Many revision control
and software-versioning applications are used today, but a single small company would
typically standardise to a single system. Intranet ﬁle access should peak at the start and
end of a working day. These assumptions give the test bed a more realistic ﬂavour, but
are not meant to represent deﬁnitive usage.
9.4.3 Traffic Algorithm
The algorithm in Listing 8 describes how the time interval between network activity is
calculated. The algorithm requires input in the form of a protocol required, destination
address, the popularity of the address and the temporal map.
The traﬃc algorithm is used for each required protocol that has to be simulated. Multiple
destinations for the traﬃc can be set, and with each destination a popularity can be
assigned. For example, some websites are visited more often and should therefore be
more popular with the simulator. This popularity is demonstrated with the web traﬃc
example in Section 9.4.5. The interval between simulated traﬃc is set with a temporal
map. Each protocol temporal map diﬀers according to its speciﬁc behaviour pattern. In
Section 9.4.4, an example of the temporal map for web browsing is shown.
4http://subversion.apache.org/
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9.4.4 Temporal Map
The temporal map describes the tempo at which network connections are made. When the
temporal map has a higher value, more frequent network connections should be made.
Thus the temporal map allows the simulation of diﬀerent network temporal patterns
according to the time of day, and time intervals diﬀer depending on the time of the day.
The pseudo time interval is determined by the value assigned for the hour interval in the
temporal map. In Figure 9.3, the temporal map for web browsing is shown.
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Figure 9.3: Web Traﬃc Temporal Map
From 20:00 to 07:00 no web traﬃc is expected on the network, and thus the interval
value is presented as a zero. The web traﬃc peaks at 10:00 and 16:00, representing
active browsing during tea-time and late afternoon. The pseudo random time interval is
determined by using the appropriate temporal map time value, adding a random value
(between -10 and 10) to it and dividing by 60 (minutes in an hour). For example, the
temporal map value at 08:00 is 50 with a random number of 10 the pseudo time interval
will be 1 minute. Thus after a minute, a request will be made to the web page.
9.4.5 Web Traffic Example
To simulate a reasonable representation of websites that are accessed, a list of websites
and their relative probabilities were used: each time a website destination is requested,
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Table 9.1: Most Visited Websites (eBizmda.com)
Rank Domain Unique Hits per Month Popularity
1 Facebook.com 9,753,424 20.57
2 Twitter.com 6,471,809 13.65
3 Google.com 6,315,679 13.32
4 Youtube.com 5,213,892 11.00
5 Wordpress.org 4,010,710 8.46
6 Adobe.com 3,883,600 8.19
7 Blogspot.com 3,384,289 7.14
8 Godaddy.com 3,040,779 6.41
9 Wikipedia.org 2,987,226 6.30
10 Wordpress.com 2,349,888 4.96
a website is selected according to popularity. The list and popularity of websites were
obtained at eBizmda.com (April 2013)5. The top 10 websites visited in 2013 (April)
according to Moz.com are listed in Table 9.1.
For each of the selected protocols, a temporal map was made. Thus each protocol has its
own temporal variations. Web browsing, FTP and email traﬃc destinations were selected
according to lists. The lists contain the destination and the frequency of choosing the
destination. The FTP and email lists are similar to the list shown in Table 9.1, but
with arbitrary addresses constructed by the researcher. For each new request, a new
destination was selected randomly according to the frequencies. For example, for each
new web browsing request, Facebook will have a 20.57% probability, and YouTube will
have an 11% probability to be selected. Subversion and Intranet File Access do not have
multiple destinations: a single repository server and single ﬁle server were used.
9.5 Test Bed A Performance
The performance of the test bed was evaluated using simulated network traﬃc in the
virtualised test bed. The simulation consisted of 30 corporate workstations, of which 15
used Windows and 15 used Unix. Each workstation simulated web, email, subversion and
ﬁle access traﬃc types. Each traﬃc type has its own temporal map.
The ESXi server CPU load increased from an average of 47% load without simulation
running to 55% load with the simulations running. Thus the CPU load by average only
5http://www.moz.org/top500/
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Figure 9.4: Firewall Traﬃc Incoming without Traﬃc Simulation
increases 8% when the workstations generate traﬃc. The ESXi memory use without simu-
lation traﬃc averages 34 gigabyte usage and with the simulation 60 gigabyte usage. Thus
the simulation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on memory usage. 60 gigabyte is still signiﬁcantly
less than the system's 192 gigabyte capacity.
9.5.1 Firewall Data
The Lucidview ﬁrewall has the ability to log all incoming and outgoing traﬃc. The ﬁrewall
has the ability to separate traﬃc according to its predeﬁned groups. For evaluating the test
bed performance, the experiment focused on the total bandwidth and not the individual
bandwidth usage as the ﬁrewall logging settings were not aligned to the exact protocols
that were simulated. In ﬁgures 9.4 and 9.5, the incoming and outgoing bandwidth into
the test bed are shown.
In Figure 9.4, the maximum traﬃc is 32 kilobytes per second. Although no traﬃc is
simulated, the traﬃc usage still has a form similar to the temporal maps. This shape is
most inﬂuenced by other entities that try to scan or communicate with the test bed from
the Internet. In Figure 9.5, the maximum traﬃc is 26 kilobytes per second. The outgoing
traﬃc does not correspond to temporal maps, but rather is ﬂatline, except for an outlier
at 08:00. This represents the base state communications from the Windows and Unix
workstations.
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Figure 9.5: Firewall Traﬃc Outgoing without Traﬃc Simulation
In ﬁgures 9.6 and 9.7, the incoming and outgoing traﬃc through the ﬁrewall with the
simulated traﬃc are shown. The red and blue bars show the simulated traﬃc at diﬀerent
dates. This illustrates how the overall pattern of the traﬃc is the same, but it still has
subtle diﬀerences.
The incoming and outgoing traﬃc peaks at 350 kilobytes per second. The traﬃc shape is
as expected, with usage during oﬃce hours much higher than outside oﬃce hours, and with
a dip in usage during lunchtime. The dark blue bars have a higher maximum bandwidth
usage, and although the shape diﬀers slightly it maintained the expected shape. Thus the
network simulation is successful in generating pseudo traﬃc.
9.6 Test Bed Implementation B: ESXi and Core Emu-
lator
Test Bed B diﬀers from Test Bed A by using external hardware and software to generate
and shape traﬃc. With this test bed, the BreakingPoint system is used to generate
attack-type traﬃc. The BreakingPoint system is designed to be used to qualify network
hardware by generating increasing levels of traﬃc. This feature is used by the researcher
to emulate DDoS and related attacks.
The BreakingPoint system can simulate millions of users' interaction and traﬃc up to
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Figure 9.6: Firewall Traﬃc Incoming with Traﬃc Simulation
Figure 9.7: Firewall Traﬃc Outgoing with Traﬃc Simulation
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1 gigabyte line speed on eight physical network ports. The BreakingPoint6 system has
the following features:
∙ It generates up to 4 Gbps of stateful application traﬃc.
∙ It conducts 7.5 million concurrent ﬂows.
∙ It generates 2 100 SSL transactions per second.
∙ It has eight gigabyte Ethernet network ports.
The test bed is implemented within the CORE simulation environment. The CORE
emulation environment allows for the emulation of the eﬀect of network devices such as
routers and switches in a controlled repeatable environment. CORE can also emulate
workstations that respond to basic network communications such as ICMP requests. The
CORE emulation environment is used due to its ease of integration and its availability to
the researcher.
Test Bed B was implemented with the following hardware:
∙ VMware ESXi server
∙ CORE server
∙ Breaking Point server
In Figure 9.8, the physical setup for Test Bed B is shown. The ESXi server is similar to
the setup of Test Bed A. The physical CORE server has the following speciﬁcations:
∙ memory capacity: 32 GB
∙ CPU cores: 8 CPUs x 2.4 GHz
∙ Processor type: Intel R○ Xeon R○ E5-2400 @ 2.4 GHz
∙ Storage: 2x1 TB, RAID 1 (Mirror)
∙ Broadcom 5729 Quad Port 1 GB Network Interface Card (NIC)
∙ Ubuntu 13.04 operating system
The CORE emulator software is used on these servers. This software has been developed
by the Boeing Research and Technology division (also known as Boeing Phantom Works)
(Ahrenholz, Danilov, Henderson, and Kim, 2008). The CORE emulator is freely available
from the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)7. This emulator is a tool that enables network
emulations on a single or multiple computers. These simulations can also be connected
to live networks, such as the Aeneas system for this test bed.
6http://www.ixiacom.com/pdfs/datasheets/ds-4-port-storm.pdf/
7http://downloads.pf.itd.nrl.navy.mil/core/
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Figure 9.8: Core Emulator and ESXi Test Bed
The CORE server emulates a router, three switches, Core virtual computers and their
connections, as shown in Figure 9.8 under the blue label. The ESXi server with its
three segments (servers, workstations and DMZ) are connected via their own network
interface to the CORE emulator. Thus, for network traﬃc to ﬂow between the computers
from diﬀerent segments of the ESXi server, the data will have to ﬂow though the CORE
emulator.
The CORE emulator display with BreakingPoint connected to Interface C is shown in
Figure 9.9. Within the CORE display, new network connections and network devices can
be emulated. The setup in Figure 9.9 was used for Test Bed B experimentations, with
the BreakingPoint interface moved to where it was required.
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Figure 9.9: Core Emulator Display
Test Bed B can be set up to launch the network attacks from four possible connection
points. These connection points are shown as BreakingPoint Interface A to D, in Figure
9.8. The server segment within the ESXi server has production servers and sensors. This
segment is shown in orange in Figure 9.8. The user workstations are within the client
segment of the ESXi server (green segment in Figure 9.8). The email, web servers and
related sensors of the DMZ segment are hosted by the ESXi server DMZ segment and are
shown in red in Figure 9.8.
9.6.1 Traffic Simulation
User traﬃc is simulated similar to Section 9.4.1, without the temporal map. One short-
coming is that the simulated Internet traﬃc will not be viable, since Test Bed B is not
connected to the Internet, but the traﬃc generation abilities of BreakingPoint compen-
sates for it.
The BreakingPoint can simulate typical user traﬃc or specialised network attacks. In
Figure 9.10, the main setup screens for BreakingPoint are shown. With BreakingPoint,
the user can set a source and destination IP range, the transmission tempo and type of
network data proﬁle. The network data proﬁle can be set up from the application to
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data OSI. In Figure 9.10a, the network setup for the BreakingPoint system is shown.
It generates data from the client in Figure 9.10a and sends them via the "Device Under
Test" to the server. The "Device Under Test" is the test bed. If a device has the same
IP as the server, it will try to respond to the traﬃc generated by BreakingPoint. For
Figure 9.10a, BreakingPoint will attempt to transmit data from the client side, using the
10.0.3.100/24 source IP addresses and the server-side destination IP address of 10.0.1.8.
Thus the test bed uses 10.0.1.8 as its source IP address, BreakingPoint will generate traﬃc
from the client side on the BreakingPoint interfaces to the test bed.
In Figure 9.10b, the type of test and its parameters are shown. The test type is "Session-
Sender", which refers to test attempts to create new network connections (also referred to
as network session). In this setup, the maximum number of sessions per second (ﬂows) is
set to 900 000. Each ﬂow is a single network request (also known as a Synchronise (SYN)
request). Within BreakingPoint, every detail of the emulated data can be set. For the
use of BreakingPoint in Test Bed B, only the ability to generate a DDoS attack was used
and the only parameter set was the number of sessions requested per second.
In Figure 9.10c, the temporal proﬁle of the test is shown. The top part of 9.10c displays
with a graph how the number of sessions per second will increase and decrease according
to a pattern set in the bottom part of the Figure. In this test, the tests increase the
frequency of the attack every six seconds until a maximum of 900 000 ﬂows is reached at
60 seconds. After 120 seconds, the test is gradually slowed down, until it stops at 150
seconds.
9.7 Validation
The aim of this research is not to try and build a prediction system, but to validate the
ontology and attack scenarios. In this section, empirical experimentation to validate the
Aeneas system is presented. Each of the Event Queries is validated in sections 9.8 to
9.10.2 by presenting single examples or test cases only. The Event Query used three main
types of sensors:
∙ Interrupt binary sensors. These are sensors that only send data if an event has been
triggered. They usually map directly to an Event Query and to a speciﬁc phase and
scenario.
∙ Continuous polling sensors. These sensors continuously provide data, and by inte-
grating their output, Event Query could be triggered.
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(a) BreakingPoint Network Neighbourhood Diagram Screen
(b) BreakingPoint Session Test Setup Screen
(c) BreakingPoint Session Test Profile Screen
Figure 9.10: Breaking Point Screens
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∙ Interrupt information sensors. These sensors only provide data after an event has
been triggered, but the data still has to be integrated by an Event Query before
phase and scenario can be triggered.
Figure 9.11: Three Types of Sensors Used with Event Queries
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Each Event Query sensor type is shown in Figure 9.11. The experiments discussed in this
chapter were not intended to be an exhaustive test of the Aeneas system, but rather a
small sample set of tests designed to prove that the prototype works in principle. Each of
the Event Queries shown in Figure 9.11 are veriﬁed only by one test, thus proving that
the mapping of sensor and Event Queries to scenario and phase works. The sensors and
the Event Queries can be optimised and expanded signiﬁcantly in the future to build an
extensible and robust system.
The experiments were chosen to present realistic attacks on the testbeds. The attacks used
in the experiments range from manual hacking (as used in Section B.9), automated tools
(Section 9.8.1) to crafted malware (Section 9.8.6). By generating examples of attacks, the
Aeneas system could be experimentally veriﬁed, and thus by inference the network attack
ontology as well.
9.8 Event Queries that use Interrupt Binary Sensors
Some of the sensors only send data if an event has been triggered. These sensors usually
map directly to an Event Query and to a speciﬁc phase and scenario. Thus if an interrupt
binary sensor is triggered, the corresponding Event Query should be triggered directly.
In this section, sensors, Event Queries, phases and scenarios that are directly related were
tested. In these tests, interrupt sensors were tested on Test Bed A and Test Bed B. Both
test beds delivered the same successful results.
9.8.1 Unusual Web Activity
By scanning the test bed website with a web crawler, the Unusual Web Activity Event
Query is triggered. This Event Query is triggered directly by the Unusual Web Activity
sensor. The Web Crawler Security8 software was used to scan the test bed website. This
test resulted in a successful indication that a Web Defacement attack scenario is in the
Reconnaissance phase.
8http://sourceforge.net/p/webcrawler-py/wiki/Home/
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9.8.2 Failed Login Attempt
By using incorrect usernames and passwords while trying to log into one of the production
servers in the test bed, the Failed Login Attempts Event Query was triggered. This Event
Query is triggered directly by the failed login sensor. The attempted login was done
from a workstation with Secure Shell (SSH). The test resulted in a successful indication
that the System Compromise and Unauthorised Data Access attack scenarios are in the
Reconnaissance phase. Since it is not possible to determine at this stage of the attack
which of the two scenarios are happening, both were expected to trigger.
9.8.3 Unauthorised Super User
By gaining remote access to an administration server, the Unauthorised Super User Event
Query was triggered. This Event Query is triggered when an administration user (also
known as root) logs into the administration server. This server should only be logged into
from its own terminal (also known as localhost). Any remote logins indicated that the
system has been compromised. The remote login was done from a workstation computer
with SSH using a correct username and password. The test resulted in a successful
indication that the System Compromise attack scenario has entered the Damage phase.
9.8.4 Hidden Data Accessed
The production server has a hidden directory. By accessing this hidden directory, the
Hidden Data Accessed Event Query was triggered. This Event Query is triggered after
access has been obtained to a directory that should never have been accessed, and thus
the data is already compromised. The hidden data was accessed from a workstation with
SSH using a correct username and password. The test resulted in a successful indication
that the Unauthorised Data Accessed attack scenario has entered the Damage phase.
9.8.5 Web Defacement
When any part of the web page (apart from forums) was changed, the Web Defacement
Event Query was triggered. The web page is changed by manually editing the website
Index.html page. This event is triggered independently from the methodology used, for
9.9. EVENT QUERIES THAT USE CONTINUOUS POLLING SENSORS 220
example if the page was altered via SQL Injection, the Web Defacement sensor would still
be triggered. The test resulted in a successful indication that the Web Defacement attack
scenario has entered the Damage phase.
9.8.6 Runaway Malware
The Runaway Malware EQ is triggered by the Network Telescope sensor. The Runaway
Malware: Single gets triggered when the Network Telescope sensor is triggered from a sin-
gle source, and the Runaway Malware: Multiple is triggered when the Network Telescope
sensor is triggered from multiple sources. The test resulted in a successful indication that
the Runaway Malware attack scenario has entered the Ramp-up and Damage phases.
9.9 Event Queries that Use Continuous Polling Sensors
Some sensors provide continuous data, and by integrating their output, Event Query
could be triggered. Such sensors typically monitor a resource such as bandwidth. The
data from the sensor must also be interpreted to determine if the corresponding Event
Query is triggered. The Event Query that uses continuous polling sensors was tested on
Test Bed B.
9.9.1 Traffic Influx
The Traffic Influx EQ uses two sensors to determine if the traﬃc has increased to an
out-of-norm level. The Bandwidth and Connections sensors are used to determine if
the amount of traﬃc has increased to a level at which the Traffic Influx Event Query
should be triggered. The Bandwidth sensor measures the amount of network traﬃc, and
the Connections sensor measures the amount of SYN packets. These sensors are placed
within the Servers and DMZ sections of the test bed and are able to monitor all incoming
traﬃc because the ESXi interfaces were set to promiscuous mode.
BreakingPoint was used to generate a DDoS attack called SYN Flood (Trammell and
Manning, 2009). SYN ﬂood attacks used a ﬂaw in the TCP protocol (Bellovin, 1989; Lau
et al., 2000). The TCP protocol uses a three-way handshake: SYN, SYN/ACK and ACK.
This attack overwhelms a target with SYN packets without acknowledging the SYN/ACK
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Figure 9.12: Session Attack Experiment 1
packets. Thus in eﬀect the target network resources keep waiting for the ACK packets
at a rate slower than incoming SYNs packets, in eﬀect preventing any other legitimate
network connections.
The BreakingPoint system was set up to send a maximum of 900 000 SYN requests per
second. BreakingPoint setup is shown in Chapter 9, ﬁgures 9.10a, 9.10b and 9.10c. The
sessions per second are increased stepwise every six seconds by 90 000 connections until
a maximum of 900 000 connections. After two minutes, the attack gradually stopped.
Two experiments were conducted. In the ﬁrst experiment, BreakingPoint was connected to
the DMZ segment and the web server in the same segment was attacked. This represents
a SYN attack from the Internet. The experimental setup is shown in Figure 9.12 and
the CORE emulator display is shown in Figure 9.13. The thicker red lines represent high
bandwidth of the SYN ﬂood attack.
In Figure 9.14, the bandwidth and SYN packets bandwidth detected are shown with the
ﬁrst experiment. In this attack, a SYN ﬂood attack is launched directly into the DMZ.
The Event Query (EQ) is set to trigger if the number of SYN connections per ﬁve-second
interval is more than 500. As shown in Figure 9.14, the bandwidth and SYN packets
in the servers segments are nearly constant. This proves that the SYN ﬂood attack was
not routed to the servers segment. The DMZ segment bandwidth and SYN packets spike
signiﬁcantly after 20 seconds, which corresponds to the time at which the BreakingPoint
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Figure 9.13: CORE Emulator Display of SYN Attack Direct DMZ
starts with its ﬂood attack. After 40 seconds, the DMZ sensors start to fail, with only
the bandwidth sensor recovering after 140 seconds. The SYN ﬂood attack stopped the
sensors from communicating to the Aeneas server. With this experiment, the Ramp-up
phase of Denial-of-Serive scenario was triggered. For the detection to work, the scenario
must be triggered before the sensors go oine due to the severity of the attack. The same
scenario could also be triggered by increasing the bandwidth usage signiﬁcantly in a short
time.
In the second test, the network used setup as shown in Figure 9.15 and the CORE emulator
display is shown in Figure 9.16. BreakingPoint was used to simulate a DoS attack. The
Session Breaking Point attack was used. This attack simulates a DoS attack by opening
an increasing number of network sessions, until the network is saturated. The attack is
modelled to start slowly and to increase until a maximum session is reached. The tempo
of new sessions is set within BreakingPoint and is shown in Figure 9.10c.
In Figure 9.17, the bandwidth sensors within the DMZ and servers segments are shown
as red and blue lines. The bandwidth stays relatively low, but after 95 seconds, the
communication between the web server (10.0.1.8) and the Aeneas server (10.0.2.2) fails.
The second experiment demonstrates a limitation in the system in that the network
communication failed before a Traffic Influx Event Query (EQ) has been detected. In
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Figure 9.14: Bandwidth Measured with the Bandwidth and SYN Sensors
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Figure 9.15: Session Attack Experiment 2
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Figure 9.16: CORE Emulator Display of SYN Attack via Client Segment
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Figure 9.17: Bandwidth Measurement During Session Attack
this case, the Servers Running Event Query (EQ) is triggered (Section 9.9.2) and the
session attack was able to trigger the Denial-of-Service attack scenario Damage phase.
9.9.2 Servers Running
As soon as one or more servers cannot be contacted (via ICMP), the Servers Running
Event Query is triggered. The IsAlive sensor is used to determine if the servers are
still communicating on the network. When one or more servers were removed from the
network, the test resulted in a successful indication that the Denial-of-Service attack
scenario has entered the Damage phase.
9.9.3 Unusual Bandwidth
This Unusual Bandwidth Event Query (EQ) used the Bandwidth sensor to determine if
the network load is high during non-working hours. If the sensor reports bandwidth used
beyond a threshold during non-working hours, the Unusual Bandwidth Event Query (EQ)
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is triggered. The test resulted in an indication that the Resource Theft scenario is in the
Damage phase.
9.10 Event Queries that use Interrupt Information Sen-
sor
In this section, Event Query, phases and scenarios that use interrupt sensor information
Event Queries were tested. These events use sensors that only communicate when data
is available, and the data is to be analysed before the Event Query can be triggered.
9.10.1 Port Scan
The Port Scan Event Query uses the Snort Honeyd sensor to determine if the network is
being scanned. The popular port scan tool, Nmap9 was used to scan the test bed. The
Snort Honeyd sensor was able to detect a port scan in normal and stealth scan mode.
The test resulted in a successful indication that the System Compromise, Resource Theft
and Unauthorised Data Access attack scenarios are in the Reconnaissance phase.
9.10.2 Vulnerability Scan
In this test, a vulnerability scan was launched against a SSH server (IP of 10.0.2.4).
The SSH vulnerability scan was launched from a computer with the Backtrack 5 R310
operating system using the Metasploit11 framework. Once the vulnerability scan has
started, the Snort-Honeyd sensor starts to send data to the Aeneas server. Only after 32
036 messages does the sensor determine that a vulnerability scan is in progress. After the
Snort-Honeyd sensor sent the key message, the System Compromise, Unauthorised Data
Access and Resource Theft scenarios' Ramp-up phases were detected.
The same Vulnerability Scan was also triggered by scanning the Snort and Honeyd sensor
with the popular vulnerability scanner Nessus12. Since Nessus also performs a port scan,
it also triggered the Post Scan Event Query.
9http://nmap.org/
10http://www.backtrack-linux.org/
11http://www.metasploit.com/
12http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus/
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9.11 Summary
Network attacks do not occur in a vacuum, thus two test environments (test beds) are
presented in which network traﬃc is generated. On a sterile network it would be a trivial
task to detect anomalies as any spike in traﬃc would indicate an attack. The simulated
traﬃc described in this chapter simulates fairly accurate traﬃc volumes of a small-scale
corporation without the use of complex or expensive packet simulation tools. In the ﬁrst
test bed, real network traﬃc is generated by software application within a collection of
virtual computers. The second test bed used a combination of the CORE emulator and
BreakingPoint systems to emulate network attacks.
The Aeneas system presented in Chapter 8 is tested by empirically verifying each of
the Event Queries. The Aeneas system was able to classify attacks according to their
respective scenario and phase. As expected, some attacks, such as a port scan, could not
be narrowed down to a single scenario. The prototype was only tested with a limited
set of attacks as the goal was not to test the system exhaustively, but to prove that the
prediction methodology is viable. The Aeneas system proved that the methodology is
viable and that network attacks can be classiﬁed in a near real-time environment.
CHAPTER
TEN
CONCLUSIONS
"Men in general are quick to believe that which they wish to be
true."
Julius Caesar
10.1 Introduction
The primary focus of this thesis was the development, formalisation and validation of
an ontology on network attacks. The ontology was developed by ﬁrstly constructing a
taxonomy. This taxonomy was constructed by building from existing taxonomies by other
researchers and by studying signiﬁcant historical attacks (van Heerden et al., 2012c).
Along with the taxonomy, a temporal model was developed to describe network-based
attacks. From studying signiﬁcant historical attacks, ten main network attack scenarios
were identiﬁed (van Heerden et al., 2012b). These attack scenarios form the base of the
ontology, and the other classes of the taxonomy are linked via their relationships.
The ontology was developed formally, thus ensuring the Protégé implementation and re-
lated automated reasoner deductions were correct. By utilising an automated reasoner,
the attack scenarios were reduced to ones that are viable in a near real-time environ-
ment. The taxonomy, ontology and related work resulted in the publication of several
international and local papers. These papers are listed in Section 1.4.
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During the course of this study, a network attack prediction system Attack Estimation
Network Evaluation Architecture System (Aeneas) was developed. Aeneas mapped sensor
output to network attack scenarios and the network attack temporal model. The system
was able to detect attacks and classify them according to the reduced set of attack sce-
narios and the network attack model. The viability of Aeneas was proved with empirical
experimentation.
10.2 Research Review
This section recapitulates the research presented in this thesis.
Chapter 1 presented a summary of the research question and outlined the research
method and research processes followed.
Chapter 2 investigated signiﬁcant historical computer-based attacks. From this collec-
tion of signiﬁcant attacks, the following attack scenarios were derived: Denial-of-
Service, Industrial Espionage, Web Defacement, Unauthorised Data Access, Finan-
cial Theft, Industrial Sabotage, Cyber-Warfare, Resource Theft, System Compro-
mise, and Runaway Malware.
Chapter 3 presented a literature study of models, taxonomies, ontologies and sensors re-
lated to network attacks. The models were presented as ﬂow charts, the taxonomies
and ontologies as class diagrams and the sensor types were listed.
Chapter 4 developed a taxonomy that presented the classes of a computer network-
based attacks from both the point of view of an attacker and a defender. These
classes were: Actor, Actor Location, Aggressor, Asset, Attack Goal, Attack Mecha-
nism, Automation Level, Eﬀects, Motivation, Phase, Sabotage, Scope, Target, and
Vulnerability. The Phase class was further developed into a temporal network attack
model. The model consisted of ﬁve main phases: Target Identiﬁcation, Reconnais-
sance, Attack and Post-Attack Reconnaissance. The Attack Phase was divided into
three sub-phases: Ramp-up, Damage and Residue.
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 presented an ontology that describes the relationships be-
tween the taxonomy classes formally. The Attack Scenario class formed the base of
the ontology. The ontology was presented in story form, formally and via a software
implementation.
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Chapter 7 investigated the quantiﬁcation and possible measurements of the classes on
the taxonomy in near real-time. By relaxing the scenario deﬁnition to only classes
that can be quantiﬁed in near real-time, some of the relaxed attack scenario classes
were found to be equivalent. The attack scenario was reduced to: Denial-of-Service,
Web Defacement, Resource Theft, Unauthorised Data Access, System Comprise,
Runaway Malware.
Chapter 8 demonstrated how to identify attack scenarios by mapping sensors' outputs
to the temporal attack model and attack scenarios. A prototype system called
Aeneas was presented.
Chapter 9 presented the environment in which the Aeneas system was veriﬁed. Two
environments were presented: virtualised systems with a ﬁrewall connected to the
Internet, and virtualised systems within an Internet simulator. Empirical experi-
ments were performed that verify the prototype. Each Event Query was veriﬁed to
report the correct phase and scenario. The Event Queries were grouped in three
main types: Interrupt binary sensors, Continuous polling sensors and Interrupt in-
formation sensors.
10.3 Research Goals Achieved
The goals of this research were to formally deﬁne network attacks and to investigate how
the detection of network attacks diﬀers in near real-time environment.
The ﬁrst goal were achieved by deﬁning attack scenarios in a taxonomy. The relationships
between the classes in the ontology were formally deﬁned into an ontology. Along with
the scenarios, a temporal model was constructed that describe attack phases. Not all of
the scenarios and phases are relevant in a near real-time environment. The ontology was
evaluated in the near real-time environment and the scenarios were reduced to the ones
that are relevant in near real-time. The ontology was implemented within the Protégé
ontology, and the HermiT-automated reasoner was used to infer which scenarios can be
identiﬁed in near real-time. Attack individuals were classiﬁed according to their scenario
in the ontology, utilising Protégé and the HermiT-automated reasoner.
Thus the research questions from Section 1.1 are answered:
∙ Diﬀerent types of computer network attacks were presented in a taxonomy as attack
scenarios (Chapter 4).
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∙ Computer network attacks are deﬁned in an ontology (Chapter 5 and 6).
∙ A relaxed set of computer attack scenarios that are viable in near real-time are
deﬁned in Chapter 7.
A prototype system Aeneas was developed to identify network attacks. This Aeneas
system used various network-related sensors and collated their information into a central
server. The sensors' data was mapped to scenarios and phases via Event Queries. The
automated reasoner mapped the relationship between the network sensors and the Event
Query. The Event Queries were polled to check the status of incoming network attacks.
The Aeneas system was tested on two test beds, and was able to identify and classify
network attacks successfully.
10.4 Future Work
The struggle between those who attack networks and those who defend is never ending.
This struggle can also be considered an arms race, where the weapons (tools) used by both
sides are in continuous development. When these weapons and tools become redundant,
future work will entail updating the taxonomy, ontology and Aeneas.
The taxonomy developed in Chapter 4 can be expanded and updated to keep up to date
with new and future developments. Since the attack and defence struggle is an eternal
arms race, the taxonomy should be updated regularly. For example, some of the sub-
classes of the Attack Mechanism class can be expanded to include the mobile computer
environment. The ontology that links the taxonomy classes should also be updated when
new technologies become available. The ontology and automated reasoner infer binary
results  either an individual is a member of a scenario or not.
The prototype system also only reports on an attack that is in progress, but there is no
conﬁdence level. The system can be expanded to rather incorporate probabilistic results,
and thus infer pseudo probabilities to which scenario and attack individuals belong.
The prototype would then also report a conﬁdence level of detected attacks. The Aeneas
prototype can be further developed into a viable network attack prediction system. This
will require extensive testing on live networks so as to reduce the false positives. A
signiﬁcant challenge would be to verify/train the system and increase the true positive
rate, and this can only be done in the case of real attacks. The approach of using
BreakingPoint may be the only viable method to test via realistic attacks.
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APPENDIX
A
DETAIL OF LITERATURE SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT
COMPUTER-BASED ATTACKS
In this Appendix, the detail of the literature survey of signifcant computer based-attacks
are shown in Table A.1 to Table A.12.
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Table A.1: Malware  a Brief Timeline (Heater, 2011)
Date Malware Brief Description
1971 Creeper Virus Regarded to be one of the ﬁrst viruses.
1982 Eric Cloner One of the ﬁrst self-replicating virus's that aﬀected per-
sonal computers. This virus was aimed at Apple II per-
sonal computers.
1986 Brain Virus This virus is considered the ﬁrst self-replicating virus for
MS-DOS. This virus used ﬂoppy disks to transfer itself
between computers.
1986 PC-Write Trojan A trojan that was hidden in shareware.
1988 Morris Worm The Morris worm was one of the ﬁrst Internet-
distributed worms.
1991 Michelangelo Virus This virus erased data on a predeﬁned day of the year
(March 6).
1999 Melissa Virus This virus is notable as the ﬁrst mass-mailed virus
2000 I-LOVE-YOU This worm spread itself to all available contacts in an
e-mail client address book.
2003 SQL Slammer In its time, it became the fastest spreading worm ever
seen. It used database ﬂaws to spread.
2005 Commwarrior-A This virus targeted Symbian cell phones.
2005 Koobface This virus used social networks to spread.
2008 Conﬁcker This complex worm used multiple infection vectors and
inﬂicted signiﬁcant damage.
2010 Stuxnet A worm that targeted Iran's nuclear program.
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Table A.2: Ten Most Costly Cyber-attacks in History (Julian, 2011)
Date Cyber Attacks Brief Description
2011 Citigroup Citigroup customers' information were stolen.
2000 Titan rain Titan rain is the FBI's name for an extensive cyber
spying campaign for US military secrets.
2008 Heartland Payment
Systems
Credit card numbers were stolen from Heartland
servers. An estimated $140 million loss.
2007 Hannaford Bros Over 4 million credit card numbers were stolen
from the Hannaford Bros store servers. Estimated
$252 million loss
2007 TJX Over 45 million credit card numbers were stolen
from the TJX retail company. An estimated $250
million loss.
2004 Sven Jaschan Sven distributed a virus that damaged systems all
over the world and caused damage of appoximate
$500 million.
2000 Michael Calce Michael, also known as Maﬁaboy, disabled cor-
porate company's networks (such as Dell, CNN,
Amazon and Ebay) and caused an estimated dam-
age of $1.2 billion.
2011 Sony Playstation Over 100 million Sony Playstation accounts were
breached and credit card information stolen. The
estimated damage was between $1 billion and $2
billion.
2011 Epsilon E-mail addresses of large corporations such as Best
Buy and JP Morgan Chace were stolen when Ep-
silon's e-mail-handling servers was hacked. The
damage is estimated to be between $225 million
and $4 billion.
1982 The Logic Bomb The CIA blew up a Siberian gas pipeline by in-
serting malicious code into the computer systems
controlling the gas pipeline.
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Table A.3: The 12 Costliest Computer Viruses Ever (Miranda, 2010)
Date Virus Brief Description
1988 Morris Worm The Morris worm was one of the ﬁrst Internet-
distributed worms.
2003 Blaster Worm This worm targeted Microsoft's windowsupdate.com site
and caused Windows PCs to crash as soon as they con-
nected to a network.
2004 Sasser Worm The Sasser worm made use of a buﬀer overﬂow in the
component LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem
Service.
2001 Nimda A Virus that infected though several vectors and thus
caused signiﬁcant damage.
2003 SQL Slammer In its time, it became the fastest spreading worm ever
seen. It used database ﬂaws to spread.
2001 SirCam A ﬁle-based virus that attacked computers after itself
was opened.
1999 Melissa A virus embedded in a Microsoft Word document.
When opened, the macro in the document mass-e-mailed
itself to the ﬁrst 50 entries in the user's address book.
2001 Code Red The worm exploited a vulnerability in Internet Infor-
mation Services (IIS) from Microsoft, and spread itself
using the buﬀer overﬂow technique.
2008 Conﬁcker This complex worm used multiple infection vectors and
inﬂicted signiﬁcant damage.
2000 I-LOVE-YOU This worm spread itself to all available contacts in an
e-mail client address book.
2003 SoBig A virus that spread through e-mail attachments.
2004 MyDoom A worm that infected computers and sent spam e-mails.
This worm slowed down the Internet by 10%.
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Table A.4: The Seven Worst Cyber-attacks in History (That We Know About) (Hall,
2010)
Date Cyber War-
fare
Brief Description
2000 Titan rain Titan rain is the FBI's name for an extensive cyber spy-
ing campaign for US military secrets.
1999 Moonlight Maze Hackers compromised American computer systems
(Pentagon, NASA, the Department of Energy and oth-
ers).
2007 The Estonian
Cyberwar
Estonian computer networks were ﬂooded and disabled
after the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn statue was removed
and Russian sentiments angered.
2008 Presidential-
level Espionage
Foreign sources successfully used computer attacks
against the computers used by Obama and McCain dur-
ing their presidential campaigns.
2007 China's
"750,000 Ameri-
can zombies"
Paul Strassmann (US information security oﬃcial)
stated that there were 735,598 compromised computers
"infested by Chinese zombies." (Hall, 2010).
1982 The Logic Bomb The CIA blew up a Siberian gas pipeline by inserting
malicious code into the computer systems controlling
the gas pipeline.
2008 The Most Seri-
ous Breach
A ﬂash drive was inserted into a military laptop in the
Middle East, creating a digital staging post, from which
data were transferred to servers under foreign control.
Table A.5: The Decade's Biggest Cyber Crime Attacks Exploits (Marcus, 2011)
Date Exploits Brief Description
2004 MyDoom A worm that infected computers and sent spam e-mails.
This worm slowed down the Internet by 10%.
2000 I-LOVE-YOU his worm spread itself to all available contacts in an e-
mail client address book.
2007 Conﬁcker This complex worm used multiple infection vectors and
inﬂicted signiﬁcant damage (Other researchers states
that Conﬁcker only surfaced in 2008).
2010 Stuxnet A worm that targeted Iran's nuclear program.
2007 Zeus Botnet An information stealing botnet that has been used to
steal Internet Banking details and other identity infor-
mation. Over 700 variants of the Zeus botnet have been
found.
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Table A.6: The Decade's Biggest Cyber-crime Attacks Scams (Marcus, 2011)
Scams Brief Description
Scareware Fake anti-virus software that is used to induce unsus-
pecting users into installing malware.
Phishing Scams. The art of tricking users into freely giving away personal
information by spooﬁng legitimate information requests.
Phony Websites Fake websites that simulate e-commerce sites such as
banking or auction websites.
Online Dating Scams Fake personal relationships are created in order to steal
information or extract cash.
419 Scam An e-mail message that requests help in moving money
from a foreign country. The scammer asks for an up-
front transfer or other related fees that are then never
returned.
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Table A.7: Ten Worst Cyber-crimes of the Decade (Buckland, 2011)
Date Cybercrimes Brief Description
2000 I-LOVE-YOU This worm spread itself to all available contacts in an
e-mail client address book.
2000 Michael Calce Michael, also known as Maﬁaboy, disabled corporate
companies (such as Dell, CNN, Amazon and Ebay) and
caused an estimated damage of $1.2 billion.
- 419 Scam An e-mail message that requests help in moving money
from a foreign country. The scammer asks for an up-
front transfer or other related fees that are then never
returned.
2004 MyDoom A worm that infected computers and sent spam e-mails.
This worm slowed down the Internet by 10%.
2005 Operation Get
Rich or Die
Trying
Albert Gonzalez and his conspirators stole credit card
information from major global retailers.
2006 The L.A. traﬃc
signal attack
Los Angeles' city traﬃc signals were changed by a mali-
cious engineer during a strike. That caused traﬃc to be
gridlocked for days.
2006 John Dillinger
returns
Credit card thefts were being attributed to alias named
"John Dillinger", a famous Great Depression-era bank
robber. Polish and Romanian criminals were arrested
for selling credit card information.
2008 Conﬁcker This complex worm used multiple infection vectors and
inﬂicted signiﬁcant damage.
2009 Facebook Proﬁle
Spy
By promising to let users know who views their facebook
proﬁles, this software hacked 500 000 Facebook accounts
and sent out fake "Help! I've been robbed!" phishing
spam.
2006 WikiLeaks Leaked oﬃcial documents are posted to WikiLeaks.
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Table A.8: The Decade's Ten Most Dastardly Cyber-crimes (Poulsen, 2009)
Date Cybercrimes Brief Description
2000 Michael Calce Michael, aka Maﬁaboy, disabled corporate companies
(such as Dell, CNN, Amazon and Ebay) and caused an
estimated damage of $1.2 billion by attacking their web
services.
2002 California Pay-
roll Database
Breach
A California server housing the state government's pay-
roll database was compromised with names, Social Se-
curity numbers and salary information for 265,000 state
workers.
2003 Sasser Worm The Sasser worm made use of a buﬀer overﬂow in the
component LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem
Service).
2004 Foonet A small ISP hosted in Ohio (US) that was the ﬁrst black-
hat (hackers for hire) hosting company.
2005 Operation Get
Rich or Die
Trying
Albert Gonzalez and his conspirators stole credit card
information from major global retailers.
2006 The L.A. traﬃc
signal attack
Los Angeles' city traﬃc signals were changed by a mali-
cious engineer during a strike. That caused traﬃc to be
gridlocked for days.
2006 Max Vision Max Vision hacked other hackers collections' of stolen
credit card and he opened his own site own site, Carder-
sMarket to sell the numbers.
2008 RBS Worldpay
Heist
Payment processor RBS Worldpay had been hacked and
$9.5 million dollars were stolen by cashiers to slam the
accounts with repeated rapid-ﬁre withdrawals.
2009 Conﬁcker This complex worm used multiple infection vectors and
inﬂicted signiﬁcant damage.
2009 Money Mules Small businesses that use on-line banking are targeted
by trojan horses software that steal credentials and ini-
tiate wire transfers from their accounts.
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Table A.9: Fifteen Worst Data Breaches (Armerding, 2012)
Date Data Breach Brief Description
2008 Heartland Pay-
ment Systems
134 million credit card numbers were stolen. SQL injec-
tion was used to install spyware.
2006 TJX 94 million credit cards exposed because the corporate
network was not protected by a ﬁrewall.
2011 Epsilon Names and e-mails of millions of customers of retail
stores plus several ﬁnancial institutions were compro-
mised.
2011 RSA An estimated 40 million employee records were stolen as
well as information on the company's SecurID authen-
tication tokens.
2010 Stuxnet A worm that targeted Iran's nuclear program.
2006 Department of
Veterans Aﬀairs
A database with personal information for over 26 million
USA veterans, active-duty military personnel and their
spouses were stolen
2011 Sony Playsta-
tion
Over 100 million Sony Playstation accounts was
breached and credit card information stolen. The es-
timated damage was between $1 billion and $2 billion.
2011 ESTsoft Personal information of 35 million South Koreans were
stolen from ESTsoft database.
2010 Gawker Media 1.3 Million e-mail addresses and passwords were stolen
from popular blogs and the source code from Gawker±
content management system.
2009 Google, ect The Chinese government launched a massive and un-
precedented attack on Google, Yahoo, and several com-
puter and communications companies. A security hole
in an older version of Internet Explorer was used.
2010 VeriSign The incidents only became public after mandatory Se-
curity Exchange ﬁllings listed the network breaches.
2005 CardSystems 40 million credit card accounts numbers were stolen.
2006 AOL More than 20 million private web-page inquiries were
exposed.
2007 Monster.com Personal information of 1.3 million job seekers were
stolen. The information was then used in a phishing
scam.
2007 Fidelity Na-
tional Informa-
tion Services
Information from 3.2 million private customers were
stolen by an employee.
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Table A.10: Top Ten Hacks of All Time Liddinton-Cox (2012)
Date Hack Brief Description
2011 Sony Playsta-
tion
Over 100 million Sony Playstation accounts were
breached and credit card information stolen. The es-
timated damage was between $1 billion and $2 billion.
2011 Epsilon e-mail addresses of large corporations such as Best Buy
and JP Morgan Chace were stolen when Epsilon's e-
mail-handling servers was hacked. The damage is esti-
mated to be between $225 million and $4 billion.
2000 Titan rain Titan rain is the FBI's name for an extensive cyber spy-
ing campaign for US military secrets by unknown actors.
2009 Google, ect The Chinese government launched a massive and un-
precedented attack on Google, Yahoo, and several com-
puter and communications companies. A security hole
in an older version of Internet Explorer was used.
2004 MyDoom A worm that infected computers and sent spam e-mails.
This worm slowed down the Internet by 10%.
2003 Adrian Lamo Adrian hacked Microsoft, Yahoo, Bank of America, Cin-
gular and Citigroup.
1988 Morris Worm The Morris worm was one of the ﬁrst Internet-
distributed worms.
2006 WikiLeaks Leaked oﬃcial documents are posted to WikiLeaks.
1995 Kevin Mitnick Famous hacker that was a very skilled social engineer.
2000 Michael Calce Michael, aka Maﬁaboy, disabled corporate companies
(such as Dell, CNN, Amazon and Ebay) and caused an
estimated damage of $1.2 billion.
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Table A.11: Best Known Cyber-attacks of All Time (Tech Analyser, 2011)
Date Cyber Attack Brief Description
1971 Creeper Software that spread through ARPANET and displayed
"I'M THE CREEPER CATCH ME IF YOU CAN".
1982 Eric Cloner A virus that spread through ﬂoppy disks and displayed
a poem.
1986 Brain Virus This virus is considered the ﬁrst self-replicating virus for
MS-DOS. This virus used ﬂoppy disks to transfer itself
between computers.
1988 Morris Worm The Morris worm was one of the ﬁrst Internet-
distributed worms.
1991 Michelangelo
Virus
This virus erased data on a predeﬁned day of the year
(March 6).
1995 Macro Macro virus was written in order to prove that macro
viruses can spread
1999 Melissa Virus This virus is notable as the ﬁrst mass-mailed virus
2000 I-LOVE-YOU This worm spread itself to all available contacts in an
e-mail client address book.
2001 Code Red The worm exploited a vulnerability in Internet Infor-
mation Services (IIS) from Microsoft, and spread itself
using the buﬀer overﬂow technique.
2001 Nimda The Nimda worm used ﬁve diﬀerent infection vectors to
spread.
2003 SQL Slammer In its time, it became the fastest spreading worm ever
seen. It used Database ﬂaws to spread.
2003 Blaster Worm This worm targeted Microsoft's windowsupdate.com site
and caused Windows PCs to crash as soon as they con-
nected to a network
2004 MyDoom A worm that infected computers and sent spam e-mails.
This worm slowed down the Internet by 10%.
2004 Sasser Worm The Sasser worm made use of a buﬀer overﬂow in the
component LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem
Service
2007 Storm Botnet
Worm
The Storm Botnet used a Trojan horse that spread
through e-mail spam, and gathered infected computers
into a remotely controlled network of zombied (hijacked)
computers.
2009 July 2009 cyber
attacks
North Korea's telecommunications ministry spread ma-
licious code that copies data to an encrypted ﬁle, and
then overwrites the original ﬁles.
- Autorun This virus use ﬂash drives as its source of propagation.
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Table A.12: Ten Worst Computer Viruses of All Time (Strickland, 2008)
Date Malware Brief Description
1999 Melissa Virus This virus is notable as the ﬁrst mass-mailed virus
2000 I-LOVE-YOU This worm spread itself to all available contacts in an
e-mail client address book.
2001 The Klez Virus e-mail virus that spoof the "From" ﬁeld in e-mail head-
ers.
2001 Code Red The worm exploited a vulnerability in Internet Infor-
mation Services (IIS) from Microsoft, and spread itself
using the buﬀer overﬂow technique.
2001 Nimda The Nimda worm used ﬁve diﬀerent infection vectors to
spread.
2003 SQL Slammer In its time, it became the fastest spreading worm ever
seen. It used Database ﬂaws to spread.
2004 MyDoom A worm that infected computers and sent spam e-mails.
This worm slowed down the Internet by 10%.
2004 Sasser Worm The Sasser worm made use of a buﬀer overﬂow in the
component LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem
Service.
2006 Leap-A A virus that targeted Mac Computers (made by Apple
Computers).
2007 Storm Botnet
Worm
The Storm Botnet used a Trojan horse that spread
through e-mail spam, and gathered infected computers
into a remotely controlled network of zombied (hijacked)
computers.
APPENDIX
B
EVENT QUERIES
In this Appendix, Event Queries are described and mapped to their respective Attack
Scenarios. Protégé with the HermiT reasoner (Section 5.2) are used to determine which
scenario is detected by which Event Query. The Traffic Influx and Unusual Web Activity
Port Scan are presented in Section 8.4.1.
B.1 Traffic Influx
The Traffic Influx Event Query determines if the amount of incoming traﬃc has increased.
The Firewall Sensor (Section C.3) is used to determine the amount of incoming traﬃc.
This Event Query is triggered when the amount of incoming traﬃc exceeded a speciﬁed
threshold and the amount of data increased signiﬁcantly.
The algorithm used for the Traffic Influx Event Query is shown in Listing 9 (similar to
the algorithm shown at for Listing 3).
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following question to determine which scenario
is detected by the Traffic Influx Event Query:
∙ has at least one:
– Disrupt Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship
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Listing 9 Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query
Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query Start
Load Traﬃc Inﬂux Settings
Retrieve Bandwidth Sensor Data
Calculate Bandwidth used
Calculate Bandwidth Threshold
if Bandwidth exceeds Bandwidth Threshold then
Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query detected
end if
Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query End
– Access Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship
– Network Infrastructure Device Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship
– Denial of Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismRam-
pup relationship
Reasoner 
question 
for Traffic Influx 
Event Query
Scenarios Inferred 
by Automated 
Reasoner
Figure B.1: HermiT automatic reasoner Traﬃc Inﬂux Event Query result
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Traffic Influx Event Query calculated the the
following scenario:
∙ Cyber-Warfare
∙ Denial-of-Service
∙ Relaxed Cyber-Warfare
∙ Relaxed Denial-of-Service
The Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service scenario have been proven equivalent for near-
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Listing 10 Servers Running Event Query
Servers Running Event Query Start
Servers Running Settings
Retrieve IsAlive Sensor Data
Calculate the number of the servers that are Communicating
if Servers down greater than set threshold OR IsAlive Sensor stopped communicating
then
Servers Running Event Query detected
end if
Servers Running Event Query End
real time environment (Section 7.3.2), thus this Event Query will be classiﬁed within
Denial-of-Service. The phase is deﬁned as Ramp-up because the Attach Mechanism in
the query is deﬁned as Ramp-up. In Figure B.1, the result of the Traffic Influx Event
Query in Protégé is shown.
B.2 Servers Running
The Servers Running Event Query determines if one can communicate with the servers
through the network. The IsAlive Sensor (Section C.2) is used to test the communications
ability of the servers. This Event Query is triggered when the number of servers that
cannot communicate falls below a speciﬁed threshold.
The algorithm used for the Servers Running Event Query is shown in Listing 10 (similar
to the algorithm shown at for Listing 10).
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Servers Running Event Query:
∙ has at least one:
– Disrupt Attack Goal deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship
– Access Asset deﬁned by hasChainTargetAsset relationship
– Network Infrastructure Device Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship
– Denial-of-Service Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismDam-
age relationship
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Servers Running Event Query calculated the
the following scenario:
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Reasoner question 
for Servers Running 
Event Query
Scenarios Inferred 
by Automated 
Reasoner
Figure B.2: HermiT automatic reasoner Servers Running Event Query result
∙ Cyber-Warfare
∙ Denial-of-Service
∙ Relaxed Cyber-Warfare
∙ Relaxed Denial-of-Service
The Cyber-Warfare and Denial-of-Service scenarios have been proven equivalent for the
near real-time environment (Section 7.3.2), thus this Event Query will be classiﬁed within
Denial-of-Service. The phase is deﬁned as Damage because the Attach Mechanism in the
query is deﬁned as Damage. In Figure B.2, the result of the Servers Running Event Query
in Protégé is shown.
B.3 Unusual Web Activity
The Unusual Web Activity Event Query looks for non-human web-crawling type activities.
The Crawler Detector sensor (section 8.5.3) detects if a website has been accessed by a
non-human looking for vulnerabilities. This is typically done with a web crawler. A web
crawler is software that systematically scans and harvests information of a web site. The
algorithm used for the Unusual Web Activity Event Query is shown in Listing 11.
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Unusual Web Activity Event Query:
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Listing 11 Servers Running Event Query
Unusual Web Activity Event Query Start
Load Unusual Web Activity Settings
if Crawler detected unusual activity then
Unusual Web Activity Event Query detected
end if
Unusual Web Activity Event Query End
∙ has at least one:
– Web Server Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship
– Web Crawl Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismRec rela-
tionship
Reasoner question 
for Unusual Web  
Event Query
Scenario Inferred 
by Automated 
Reasoner
Figure B.3: HermiT automatic reasoner Unusual Web Activity Event Query result
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Unusual Web Activity Event Query calculated
the following scenario:
∙ Web Defacement
∙ Relaxed Web Defacement
The phase is deﬁned as Reconnaissance because the Attach Mechanism in the query is
deﬁned as Reconnaissance. In Figure B.3, the result of the Unusual Web Activity Event
Query in Protégé is shown.
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Listing 12 Web Defacement Event Query
Web Defacement Event Query Start
Load Web Defacement Settings
Retrieve Deface Sensor Data
Determine if the website has been defaced
if Website was defaced then
Web Defacement Event Query detected
end if
Web Defacement Event Query End
Reasoner question 
for Web Defacement  
Event Query
Scenario Inferred 
by Automated 
Reasoner
Figure B.4: HermiT automatic reasoner Web Defacement Event Query result
B.4 Web Defacement
The Web Defacement Event Query is triggered if the website has changed without ap-
proval. The Deface Sensor (Section C.4) is used to detect a vulnerability scan on the web
server. This Event Query triggers as soon as a vulnerability scan on the web server is
detected. The algorithm used for the Web Defacement Event Query is shown in Listing
12.
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Web Defacement Event Query:
∙ has at least one:
– Web Server Target deﬁned by hasTarget relationship
– Change Data deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship
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Listing 13 Failed Login Attempts Event Query
Failed Login Attempts Event Query Start
Load Failed Login Attempts Settings
Retrieve Failed Logins Sensor Data
Determine an Unsuccessful Occurred
if Unsuccessful Login then
Failed Login Attempts Event Query detected
end if
Failed Login Attempts Event Query End
– Web Crawl Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismDamage re-
lationship
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Web Defacement Event Query calculated the
the following scenario:
∙ Web Defacement
∙ Relaxed Web Defacement
The phase is deﬁned as Damage because the Attach Mechanism in the query is deﬁned
as Damage. In Figure B.4, the result of the Web Defacement Event Query in Protégé is
shown.
B.5 Failed Login Attempts
The Failed Login Event Query determines if incorrect login attempts have been made.
This can be an indication that an attacker is trying to login, but was unsuccessful. The
Failed Login Attempts sensor (Section C.8) is used to detect unsuccessful logins. The
algorithm used for the Failed Login Attempts Event Query is shown in Listing 13.
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Failed Login Attempts Event Query:
∙ has at least one:
– Change Data or Steal Data or Gain Control deﬁned by hasChainActorAttack-
Goal relationship
– Open Information Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismDam-
age relationship
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Reasoner question 
for 
Failed Login Attempts  
Event Query
Scenarios Inferred 
by Automated 
Reasoner
Figure B.5: HermiT automatic reasoner Failed Login Attempts Event Query result
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Failed Login Attemps Event Query calculated
the following scenario:
∙ System Compromise
∙ Unauthorised Data Access
The phase is deﬁned as Reconnaissance because the Attach Mechanism in the query is
deﬁned as Reconnaissance. In Figure B.5, the result of the Failed Login Attempts Event
Query in Protégé is shown.
B.6 Runaway Malware: Single and Multiple
The Runaway Malware: Single and Runaway Malware: Multiple Event Query detects self-
spreading malware. The malware is still limited to a single host, Runaway Malware: Single
is set, if the malware is detected from multiple hosts, and Runaway Malware: Multiple
is set. The Network Telescope Sensor (Section 8.5.1) is used to detected self-spreading
malware.
As soon as the network telescope detects attempted communications from an infected
host the Event Query is triggered. The algorithm used for the Runaway Malware: Single
and Runaway Malware: Multiple EQs is shown in Listing 14.
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Runaway Malware Event Query:
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Listing 14 Runaway Malware: Single Event Query
Runaway Malware Event Query Start
LoadRunaway Malware: Single Settings
if Network Telescope Sensor Detects Malware then
if Malware From a Single Host then
Runaway Malware: Single Event Query detected
end if
if Malware From Multiple Hosts then
Runaway Malware: Multiple Event Query detected
end if
end if
Runaway Malware Event Query End
Reasoner question 
for 
Runaway Malware Alert
(Single and Multiple)  
Event Query
Scenario Inferred 
by Automated 
Reasoner
Figure B.6: HermiT automatic reasoner Runaway Malware Event Query result
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Listing 15 Unusual Bandwidth Event Query
Unusual Bandwidth Query Start
Load Failed Unusual Bandwidth Settings
Retrieve Firewall Bandwidth Monitor Sensor Data
Determine if an Unusual Amount of Bandwidth has been used
if Unusual Amount of Bandwidth then
Unusual Bandwidth Event Query detected
end if
Unusual Bandwidth Event Query End
∙ has at least one:
– Spread deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship;
– PC or Server Target deﬁned by the hasTarget relationship;
If a host source of malware is detected, the phase is deﬁned as Reconnaissance and the
Event Query Runaway Malware Alert: Single is triggered. If multiple most sources of
malware are detected the phase is deﬁned as Ramp-up and the Event Query Runaway
Malware Alert: Multiple is triggered. In Figure B.6, the result of the Runaway Malware
Event Queries in Protégé is shown.
B.7 Unusual Bandwidth
The Unusual Bandwidth Event Query is triggered if the amount of bandwidth used is
not within usual parameters. This can occur when an attacker uses network resources to
launch DDoS attacks or hosts a warez site remotely.
The Unusual Bandwidth sensor (Section C.3) is used to detect unsuccessful logins. The
algorithm used for the Unusual Bandwidth Event Query is shown in Listing 15.
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Unusual Bandwidth Event Query:
∙ has at least one:
– Gain Resources Control deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship
– System Abuse Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Unusual Bandwidth Event Query calculated the
the following scenario:
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Reasoner question 
for Unusual Bandwidth 
Event Query
Scenario Inferred 
by Automated 
Reasoner
Figure B.7: HermiT automatic reasoner Unusual Bandwidth Event Query result
Listing 16 Unusual Disk Usage Event Query
Unusual Disk Usage Query Start
Load Failed Unusual Disk Usage Settings
Retrieve Unusual Disk Usage Sensor Data
Determine if Disk has been Unauthorised
if Unauthorised Disk Usage then
Unusual Disk Usage Event Query detected
end if
Unusual Disk Usage Event Query End
∙ Resource Theft
The phase is deﬁned as Damage because the Attach Mechanism in the query is deﬁned
as Damage. In Figure B.7, the result of the Unusual Bandwidth Event Query in Protégé
is shown.
B.8 Unusual Disk Usage
The Unusual Disk Usage Event Query is triggered if the disk space is being used by an
unauthorised actor. This can typically occur when an attacker hosts warez or multmedia
on corporate data storage. The Unusual Disk Usage sensor (Section C.9) is used to detect
unsuccessful logins. The algorithm used for the Unusual Disk Usage Event Query is shown
in Listing 16.
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Unusual Disk Usage Event Query:
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Figure B.8: HermiT automatic reasoner Unusual Disk Usage Event Query result
∙ has at least one:
– Gain Resources Control deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship
– System Abuse Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Unusual Disk Usage Event Query calculated
the following scenario:
∙ Resource Theft
The phase is deﬁned as Damage because the Attach Mechanism in the query is deﬁned
as Damage. In Figure B.8, the result of the Unusual Disk Usage Event Query in Protégé
is shown.
B.9 Hidden Data Accessed
The Hidden Data Accessed Event Query is set when data that should never be seen is
accessed. The Tripwire Access sensor (Section C.1) is used to detect unsuccessful logins.
The algorithm used for the Hidden Data Accessed Event Query is shown in Listing 17.
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Hidden Data Accessed Event Query:
∙ has at least one:
– Change Data or Steal Data deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship
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Listing 17 Hidden Data Accessed Event Query
Hidden Data Accessed Usage Query Start
Load Hidden Data Accessed Settings
Retrieve Tripwire Access Sensor Data
Determine if TripWire Sensor has been Triggered
if TripWire was Triggered then
Hidden Data Accessed Event Query detected
end if
Hidden Data Accessed Event Query End
Reasoner question 
for Hidden Data Accessed 
Event Query
Scenario Inferred 
by Automated 
Reasoner
Automated Reasoner 
limitation
With Web Defacement 
Scenario Inferred
Figure B.9: HermiT automatic reasoner Hidden Data Accessed Event Query result
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Listing 18 Unauthorised Super User Event Query
Unauthorised Super User Query Start
Load Unauthorised Super User Settings
Retrieve Root Login Sensor Data
Determine if Server has been Remotely Accessed
if Server has been Remotely Accessed then
Unauthorised Super User Event Query detected
end if
Unauthorised Super User Event Query End
– Exploit Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismDamage rela-
tionship
– Data Asset deﬁned by the hasChainTargetAsset relationship;
– Server Target deﬁned by the hasTarget relationship;
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Hidden Data Accessed Event Query calculated
the following scenario:
∙ Unauthorised Data Access
∙ Web Defacement
The phase is deﬁned as Damage because the Attach Mechanism in the query is deﬁned
as Damage. In Figure B.9, the result of the Unusual Bandwidth Event Query in Protégé
is shown. The Web Defacement attack scenario is identiﬁed because a WebServer is a
subset of the Server class. The automated reasoner has the limitation that its query
cannot search match a class without a speciﬁed sub-class. This problem can potentially
be corrected by moving the Web Server class out from within Server class.
B.10 Unauthorised Super User
The Unauthorised Super User Event Query is triggered when a server administrator ac-
count is accessed remotely. The server should only be accessed locally. The Root Login
sensor (Section C.9) is used to detect unsuccessful logins. The algorithm used for the
Unusual Disk Usage Event Query is shown in Listing 18.
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Figure B.10: HermiT automatic reasoner Unauthorised Super User Event Query result
The HermiT automatic reasoner used the following query to determine which scenario is
detected by the Unauthorised Super User Event Query:
∙ has at least one:
– Gain Resources Control deﬁned by hasChainActorAttackGoal relationship
– System Abuse Attack Mechanism deﬁned by the hasAttackMechanismDamage
relationship
The HermiT automatic reasoner with the Unusual Disk Usage Event Query calculated
the following scenario:
∙ System Compromised
The phase is deﬁned as Damage because the Attach Mechanism in the query is deﬁned
as Damage. In Figure B.10, the result of the Unusual Bandwidth Event Query in Protégé
is shown.
APPENDIX
C
SENSORS
In sections 8.5.2 and 8.5.3, Honeypot and IDS and Crawler Detector sensors are presented.
In this appendix, the remaining sensors that are used by the Aeneas are presented. The
goal of these sensors is to validate the Aeneas system, and not to present any improvements
to the sensors. In sections C.1 to C.10, the remaining sensors are presented.
C.1 Tripwire Access Sensor
Tripwire is a software tool that is used to monitor a designated set of ﬁles and directories
for any change (Kim and Spaﬀord, 1994). This tool was ﬁrst made available in November
1992 and is used as a sensor because of its long track record of being secure and automat-
able. Kim and Spaﬀord developed it to mitigate break-in activity on the Internet and to
be used as a tool to ﬁnd a backdoor left by hackers.
The Tripwire monitor sensor uses the Tripwire programme1 to detect when hidden ﬁles
have been modiﬁed in any way. Tripwire logs any change event, including:
∙ creation of new ﬁles;
∙ deletion of ﬁles;
∙ change of ﬁle content; and
1http://sourceforge.net/p/tripwire/discussion/
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Listing 19 Tripwire Sensor Algorithm
Tripwire Sensor Start
if Hidden data Accessed then
Read Tripwire Log File
Parse Tripwire Log
Send Parse Log to Aeneas Server
end if
Wait 1 Second
Return to Tripwire Sensor Start
∙ change of ﬁle permissions.
The output is parsed by a script which extracts the relevant data and outputs it to a text
ﬁle. An example of the log follows:
2013:02:22:10:48:45,Tripped,10.0.3.6
Stored in the raw data ﬁle is the time of the logged event, the event type, as well as the des-
tination IP address. The time is stored in the format of Year:Month:Day:Hour:Minute:Second
and the IP address is in IPv4 format. The Tripwire sensor is a host-type sensor that logs
that hidden data has been accessed. The algorithm used to parse to the Tripwire monitor's
output is shown in Listing 19.
C.2 Is Alive Sensor
The goal of the Is Alive sensor is to determine if servers in a network are still communi-
cating. This sensor veriﬁes the connectivity of networked devices from a static list using
ICMP (also known as a ping request). A custom script was developed to determine which
of the servers are not responding and to log which severs stopped communicating. The
output of these scripts are logged to a single log ﬁle called alive.log. An example of the
alive.log follows:
2013:02:17:10:31:12 10.0.2.8
2013:02:17:10:31:12 10.0.2.100
Stored in the log ﬁle is the time and the server that has been reported as being down.
The time is stored in the format Year:Month:Day:Hour:Minute:Second. IP addresses are
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Listing 20 IsAlive Sensor Algorithm
IsAlive Sensor Start
Read List of Servers
for all List of Servers do
Verify Server is Communicating
end for
Calculate Number of Servers Communicating
Send Number of Servers Communicating to Aeneas
Wait 30 Seconds
Return to IsAlive Sensor Start
stored in IPv4 format. The IsAlive sensor is a network-type sensor and indicates when
servers no longer respond to remote ping requests. The algorithm used to parse to the
IsAlive sensor's output is shown in Listing 20.
C.3 Firewall Bandwidth Monitor Sensor
The Firewall Bandwidth sensor uses data collected by the Lucidview2 ﬁrewall. The main
feature of this sensor is its ability to log the bandwidth usage over a period of one minute.
These logs of bandwidth usage are then stored in a text ﬁle as follows:
1899.8955078125 1360323780
652.0068359375 1360323840
942.8291015625 1360323931
996.6462484375 1360323992
The following data is stored in the Firewall Bandwidth sensor raw text ﬁle: bandwidth
usage (in kilobytes) per minute intervals, and the time in Epoch format. The ﬁrewall has
the ability to store source and destination IPs as well as the source and destination ports.
This data may be used if need be in the future.
The Bandwidth sensor is a ﬁrewall-type sensor which counts all the raw data retrieved
from the Lucidview ﬁrewall. The algorithm used to parse to the Firewall Bandwidth
sensor's output is shown in Listing 21.
2http://www.lucidview.net/products-and-services/lucidview-guardian/
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Listing 21 Firewall Sensor Algorithm
Firewall Sensor Start
Request Bandwidth use from the Firewall
Calculate Bandwidth
Send Bandwidth to Aeneas
Wait 30 Seconds
Return to Firewall Sensor Sensor Start
C.4 Web Defacement Sensor
The Web Defacement sensor detects if any of the static ﬁles of a website have been
changed. This sensor retrieves the website with the wget3 utility and them compares the
static parts of the website to verify that no part has changed. Any user content pages are
ignored. The output of this sensor is logged to a single log ﬁle. This text ﬁle is shown
below:
1361777839 10.0.2.8 127.0.0.1 80 Website defaced
1361777978 10.0.2.8 127.0.0.1 80 Website DoS
Stored in the log ﬁle is the time, source IP address, source port, destination IP address,
destination port and a description of the crawl event type. The time is stored in Epoch
time format and the IP addresses are in IPv4 format. The Web Defacement sensor is
a host-type sensor and indicates when the website has been defaced. If the wget utility
can't access the page, it will report that the website cannot be accessed. The algorithm
used to parse to the web defacement monitor's output is shown in Listing 22.
C.5 Bro Connections Sensor
The Bro Connections sensor uses the Bro4 IDS. One of the features of this IDS is to log
all connections that are visible from itself. These connections are stored in text ﬁle as
follows (some ﬁelds were committed below):
1358857747.681339 10.0.3.12 46956 10.0.3.217 80 tcp http
1358857712.125418 10.0.3.10 40853 10.0.3.217 80 tcp
1358857723.964073 10.0.2.100 138 10.0.255.255 138 udp
1358857736.807653 10.0.3.42 8 10.0.3.10 8 icmp
3http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/
4http://www.bro.org/
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Listing 22 Web Defacement Sensor Algorithm
Web Defacement Sensor Start
if Static Web Page Not Accessible then
Set DoS Detected
end if
if Static Page Altered then
Set Web Defacement Event
end if
Parse Time, Event Type and Destination IP
Parse Web Defacement Raw Output
Send Parse Output to Aeneas Server
Wait 30 Seconds
Return to Web Defacement Sensor Start
Listing 23 Bro Connections Sensor Algorithm
Bro Connections Sensor Start
Measure Conventions with Bro IDS
Parse Time,Number of Connections, Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP and Des-
tination Port
Send Parse Data to Aeneas Server
Wait 30 Seconds
Return to Web Bro Connections Sensor Start
In the Bro Connection raw text ﬁle, the time, source IP, source port, destination IP,
destination port and event type are logged. The date is represented in Epoch time. The
source and destination IPs are represented in IPv4 human readable format. The source
and destination ports are represented by an integer value. The event type is represented
as the protocol type.
The Bro Connection sensor is a a network IDS-type sensor that indicates the network
load and number of connections available. The Bro Connection sensor algorithm is shown
in Listing 23.
C.6 Root Login Sensor
This sensor was custom written for Aeneas. The sensor monitors the .bashrc ﬁle that
executes every time a user logs in, and it has been modiﬁed to execute the rootsensor
bash script. This script checks if the current executing user is a root user. This sensor is
used to detect if hackers gained root (administrator) access to a server. Logs of root user
logins are stored in a text ﬁle as follows:
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Listing 24 Root Login Sensor Algorithm
Root Login Sensor Start
while .bashrc Changed do
Read .bashrc File
if Root User Detected then
Parse Time, Source IP, Event Type
Send Parse Data to Aeneas Server
end if
end while
Return Root Login Defacement Sensor Start
2013:02:22:09:14:49,Root Detected,10.0.4.30
The date, event type and destination IP address are stored in the Root Logins raw text
ﬁle. The time is stored in human readable time in the following format:
Year:Month:Day:Hour:Minute:Second. The destination IP is stored in human readable
IPv4. The Root Login sensor is classiﬁed as a host-type sensor that indicates all root user
logins on a particular host. In Listing 24, the algorithm used by the Root Login sensor is
shown.
C.7 SSH Login Sensor
Similar to the Root Login, this sensor is also custom written for Aeneas. This script
executes every second and uses the linux "who"5 command to determine if any users are
connected via SSH. This sensor determines if someone has logged into a server remotely.
An example of logs of SSH logins are stored in a text ﬁle as follows:
2013:02:22:10:02:55, SSH Login,10.0.4.30,10.0.4.31
In the SSH raw text ﬁle, the date, event type, source IP address and destination IP address
are stored. The date is stored in a similar way to the Root Login sensor and is in the
following format: Year:Month:Day:Hour:Minute:Second. The source and destination IP
addresses are in IPv4 format. The SSH Login sensor is host-type sensor and indicates all
successful SSH logins on the host. The algorithm used by the SSH Login sensor is shown
in Listing 25.
5http://linux.about.com/library/cmd/blcmdl1_who.htm/
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Listing 25 SSH Login Sensor Algorithm
SSH Login Sensor Start
Execute "who" command
if SSH User Detected then
Parse Time, Source IP, Destination IP, Event Type
Send Parse Data to Aeneas Server
end if
Wait 1 Second
Return to SSH Login Defacement Sensor Start
Listing 26 Failed Login Sensor Algorithm
Failed Login Sensor Start
Read /var/log/auth.log
if Failed User Detected then
Parse Time, Source IP, Destination IP, Event Type
Send Parse Data to Aeneas Server
end if
Wait 1 Second
Return to Failed Login Defacement Sensor Start
C.8 Failed Login Sensor
The Failed Login sensor is a script that checks the /var/log/auth.log ﬁle for "authenti-
cation failure" entries. This sensor determines if failed attempts have been made to log
into a server. The raw data for the Failed Login sensor is shown below:
2013:02:22:10:02:57, Failed Login,10.0.4.30,10.0.4.31
The raw data is stored in a similar way to the SSH Login sensor entries. The date has the
following format: Year:Month:Day:Hour:Minute:Second. The source and destination IP
addresses are in IPv4 format. The Failed Login sensor is classiﬁed as a host-type sensor
and indicates all unsuccessful logins on the host. The algorithm used is shown in Listing
26.
C.9 Unusual Disk Usage Sensor
This sensor uses the "du"6 application to check if the disk usage of a certain directory
has changed. Similar to Tripwire, the output is parsed by a script and then the relevant
6http://linux.about.com/library/cmd/blcmdl1_du.htm/
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Listing 27 Unusual Disk Usage Sensor Algorithm
Unusual Disk Usage Sensor Start
Execute "du" command
if Directory Usage has changed then
Parse Time, Source IP, Event Type
Send Parse Data to Aeneas Server
end if
Wait 1 Second
Return to Unusual Disk Usage Defacement Sensor Start
data is placed into a text ﬁle, as shown as follows:
2013:02:22:10:02:52, Storage Usage,10.0.3.6
This raw data ﬁle contains the time (formatted as Year:Month:Day:Hour:Minute:Second),
the event type and the IPv4 destination IP address. This sensor is classiﬁed as a host-
type sensor and indicates if resources in terms of disk usage have been used without
authorisation. The algorithm used is shown in Listing 27.
C.10 Bandwidth and SYN Sensor
The Bandwidth and SYN sensor uses custom-written software to determine the bandwidth
usage detected and the number of SYN packets visible on an interface. The Bandwidth
sensor is similar to the Firewall Bandwidth Monitor sensor (Appendix C.3), except for not
requiring a ﬁrewall. The bandwidth is reported in kilobytes. The SYN sensor is similar to
the Bro Connection sensor (Appendix C.5), except only the number of TCP connections
are detected. ICMP, UDP and other connections that do not use SYN packets are not
counted.
The output of this sensor is logged to two log ﬁles. One ﬁle stores bandwidth, the other
the number of SYN connections. Examples of the logged ﬁles are shown as follows:
1374250912,321,Bandwidth DMZ
1374250912,14,SYN DMZ
The algorithm for the Bandwidth and SYN sensor as shown in Listing 28.
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Listing 28 Bandwidth and SYN Sensor Algorithm
Bandwidth and SYN Sensor Start
Clear Bandwidth and number of SYN connections
while 30 Seconds passed do
Calculate Total Bandwidth usage
Calculate number of SYN connections
end while
Parse Time, Source IP, Event Type
Send Bandwidth u sage number of SYN connections to Aeneas Server
Return to Bandwidth and SYN Sensor Start
C.11 Summary
The sensors used by the Aeneas are presented in this appendix. These sensors were
developed to validate the principles and not to be unique or new sensors.
APPENDIX
D
TIME FORMATS
Formats the given timestamp according to the given format. The format string is used as
a template to format the date and is copied character by character except for the following
special characters, which are replaced by the corresponding value1.
% w - abbreviated weekday (Mon, Tue, ...)
% W - full weekday (Monday, Tuesday, ...)
% b - abbreviated month (Jan, Feb, ...)
% B - full month (January, February, ...)
% d - zero-padded day of month (01 .. 31)
% e - day of month (1 .. 31)
% f - space-padded day of month ( 1 .. 31)
% m - zero-padded month (01 .. 12)
% n - month (1 .. 12)
% o - space-padded month ( 1 .. 12)
% y - year without century (70)
% Y - year with century (1970)
% H - hour (00 .. 23)
% h - hour (00 .. 12)
% a - am/pm
% A - AM/PM
1http://www.gnu.org/software/octave/doc/interpreter/Timing-Utilities.html/
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% M - minute (00 .. 59)
% S - second (00 .. 59)
% s - seconds and microseconds (equivalent to %S.%F)
% i - millisecond (000 .. 999)
% c - centisecond (0 .. 9)
% F - fractional seconds/microseconds (000000 - 999999)
% z - time zone diﬀerential in ISO 8601 format (Z or +NN.NN)
% Z - time zone diﬀerential in RFC format (GMT or +NNNN)
%% - percent sign
% E - Epoc Time
